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Abstract 
The existence of imperfect information is thought to 
provide firms with incentives to degrade contract quality 
by supplying terms that well-informed consumers would refuse. 
We show, in contrast, that these incentives are weaker than 
is commonly supposed; rather, when consumers gather relatively 
little information, the profit maximizing strategy for firms 
is likely to involve offering the contract terms that consumers 
prefer, but at supracompetitive prices. In consequence, a 
standard state response to imperfect information problems, 
regulating the substantive terms of transactions, is often 
misplaced. When imperfect information exists, the state 
instead should reduce the costs to consumers of comparison 
shopping for contract terms, because such shopping reduces 
prices and also reduces further the incentive of firms to 
degrade contract quality. 
no•ERJIECT INFORllATION IN MAIIETS FOR CONTRACT TBIUIS: 
TIIE EXAMPLES OF WAUANTIBS AND SECURITY INTERESTS 
Alan Sohw1rt1• and Loni• L. Wilde•• 
Imperfect information is co1n111only a11umed to eziat whoo 
con1umer1 cannot choose contract ter•• that correctly reflect their 
preference• because con1umer1 are uninfor•ed about th• ri1k1 that 
these term• allocate, Pir111  are 11id to szploit thia i1nor1nce by 
degrading contract quality, For ezample, if consua•rs believe 
products to be •ore reliable than they are in faot, cons1111er1 will too 
readily accept di1claimer1, which ahift the ri1k of prodnot defects to 
them; and firms will respond by usin1 discl•l•ers frequently. Thia 
conventional focua i• mialoadinaly narrow. Con1uaor1 1110 1r1 
disadvantaged whoo they are unaware of th• array of prices and t•r•• 
that the f irm1 in a market can offer, Con1uaer1 who lack this 
information 11ay accept poor deals because they do not know that bettor 
one1 exist; and finis will have little incentive to offer better de1l1 
bec1u1e the10 will not be taken, 
The notion that imperfect information e1l1t1 when con1nmer1 
cannot choose correctly ind tho moro novel notion th1t i•perfect 
information e1i1t1 when consumers ire ignorant of m1rket opportunity 
sets both imply that finn1 will re1pond in1dequ1tely to con1umor 
preferences, A focus on tho litter for• of imperfect inform1tion, 
however, yields insight• that differ strikingly from those thin c1n bo 
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derived frOll the notion of l•perfect information aa incorrect choice. 
Till• view t.pll•a two fonaa of reaulatlon: (i) Firms ahould b• made to 
esplaiu tran1actloa1 to con1U11er1, 10 cou111111r1 can choo11 correctly, 
or (ll) Plrma ahoald be prohibited fr1111 d11radln1 contract quality by 
ual•a aaah t1na1 •• dl1•l•l•1r1. By foca1lu1 on th• notion of 
imperfect lafonaatloa 11 laaorauce of •ark•t opport1U1ity 1et1 we 
ldeatlfy aa addltloaal probl••· Suppo11, 11 aa •sample. that th• 
coa1 .. er1 of a partlcalar product are well iafor••d about defect rl1k1 
and prefer a warraaty to a diaclal•er, but th••• coa1U11 r1 laok 
laformatloa about th• r1a1• of prio•a and werrauty t•r•• that th• 
•arket offera, 11 abow that flrma la thl1 clrcua1tauc1 are much •ore 
likely to 1apply warraati•• at 1apraoo•p1titl•• prlc•• than refu1e to 
provide the• 1lto11th1r. Heace, •••• when coa1U11 r1 are ••fficleatly 
info"19•d about rl1k1 to ohoo11 contract t•r•a correctly, •• 
lnformatloa probl•• ••Y esl1t1 firm• could be charaln& 
1upr1co•petltl•• prio11 for ter•• la re1poa11 to cou11111er lanorauce of 
market po11lblllti11. Couventloaal 11111 analy•i• ccmpletely 
overlooka thl• problem, 
We araoe here, however, not that 1upracompetitive pricin& ia 
an overlooked iafor•atloa problem in "••rket1 for contract ter•a,• but 
that often it la th• only probl•• 1ufflcl1ntly 11rlou1 to juatify 
reaolatory concern. Thia ia becauao the incorrect choice problem 
1rla11 only in a limited aot of c111a. If conauacr mi1take1 
respectlna the rlaka that contract tera1 1lloc1t1 fluctuate randomly 
around true values in 10 llllbiaaod way, firms will act a1 lf con1UJDer1 
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made correct choices. If oon11111era are "p111l•i1tlc,• 1y1tea1tlc1lly 
over1t1tin1 the adver11 con11quenc11 of parch••• deoiaiona, f inaa ln 
many c1ae1 again will act 11 lf conauaer choloaa were correct, Aleo, 
pea1lai1a c1oae1 oon11111er1 to d•••nd more protectlo� la th• fona of 
favorable contract term• than their better lnfonaed ael••• woald 
chooae, aad auch overprotection h11 not been thouaht to ralae 1erlou1 
policy probl1a1, Con11qu1atly, flra1 will d11rad1 contract qaality la 
undeairable waya oaly lf cou1aa1r1 1y1t1•1tlcally uad1r1tat1 the 
adv1r1• coa11queac11 of purcha11 declaloaa, Coa111111r1 aay be 
"optl•l•ttc• ln thla way lf they lack data aboat rl1k1 or lf they 
ml1proc111 rel•vaat data 10 11 to aad•r1t1t1 lta a111tlv1 
l•pllc1tloa1, Ia •01t c11e1, a1lth1r po11ihlllty la likely, 
Con1aaer1 have laoeatl••• to beco•• informed aboat laportaat rl1k1, 
aad th• evldeac• indlc1t11 that they oft•• act apoa th111 laoeati•••· 
Al10, an 1u1ly1l1 of the p1ycbolo1loal literatar• d11lla1 with 
co1nitlv1 error 1u1111t1 that ooa1 .. er1 in the •11r•1•t• 11lde111 
ml1proc111 prodaot related data 1ach that they act optl•latloally, AA 
esoeptloa to th••• ooaclu1loa1 le ooa1tlt•t•d by tr1u11otloa1 la 
inosp1n1iv1, frequently purch111d prodaot1 that will c1a11 11riou1 
per1ou1l hara a very low p1rc1ut111 of th• ti••• of whloh the paradlaa 
011mpl• la the purchaaa of aoda i• a bottle that later esplodea, le 
ahow that the coa1uaer1 la th••• tr1u1actloa1 are wallkely to 111roh 
for iafonaatlon about the low rlat of hana, and aay re1pond 
optialatically to whatever iufoniatioa about thi1 rl1t 0111111 their 
way, 
Tho notion of imperfect information as ignorance of market 
opportunity s1t1 thu1 implies 1 regulatory scheme that differ& 
significontly from tho one1 now in place. Decisiorunakera 1hould 
"improve" contract quality by banning contract terms much loss 
frequently thin they now do, Instead, decisioninakers should attempt 
to identify and provont supracompetitivo pricing for those contract 
terms that aro now in frequent use. Because comparison shopping 
reduces pric11, this latter aoal should bo implemented both by 
providina oon1umor1 with explanations of tran11ction1 .lllll by lowering 
tho co1t1 to con1umor1 of comparina the prices and terms that firm• 
off or. 
Part I briefly summarize• current reaulatory respon1os to the 
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existence of iaperfect information a1 it i1 thought to affect contract 
term1, Part II aets out our model of a market for warrantie11 Part 
III then 1et1 out a security interest model, Warranty and security 
interest clau1e1 allocate sianificant risks between consumers and 
fil'llll in very different ways, Ronco, conclusions drawn from an 
1n1ly1i1 of these cl1u1e1 should generalize l!l..iJ!a 1..!.iLi£ to other risk 
allocation tora1 in oonsumor contracts. Parts II and III for 
convenience introduce the policy implications that the models generate 
only as they concern warranties and security intore1t1, Part IV next 
asks to what extent these implications aro impeached when certain of 
tho key a11umption1 underlying the formal models arc relaxed, As an 
example, our model of a warranty �1arket supposes consumers to know 
product failure probabilities perfectly. In Part IV, we drop this 
s 
assumption to consider the consumer optimism question just described, 
Part V then considers and reject• additional conceptions of tho 
possible 1ffect1 of imperfect information and set1 out several 
recommendations for incroasina comparison shopping for contract terms. 
Before roaching the argument, two preliminary rem1rk1 1hould 
be made about it, First, wo a11ume that tho state should be 1ati1fiod 
with tho existence of competitive outcomes in markets for contract 
terms. Thia premise follows naturally from a concern with imperfect 
information, Tho exi1tonce of imperfect information i1 a 1p1cie1 of 
market imperfection that enables finis to charae 1upracomp1titiv1 
prices or impo10 unwanted tera1 on con1uaer1, The many reaulatory 
rosponse1 designed to provide con1umer1 with inforaation or ameliorate 
the effects of it• abaonce1 thus must a11ume that oompotiti•e outcomes 
are desirable. Thia assumption 1110 i• justifiable because when a 
market i1 in competitive equilibrium, fira1 are proYidina aood1 and 
contract term• at tho lowest po11iblo coat consistent with tho 
continued existence of these f ini1. Thus, 1uppo1in1 a given 
distribution of wealth, oonaumers cannot do bettor than puroha1e in 
2 competitive markets. 
Second, tho economic and paycholoaical theory relevant to 
contract performance under conditions of •ncertainty ii relatively 
primitivei ours, for example, ire tho only formal models of markets 
for contract terms that suppose it to bo costly for con1umer1 to 
acquire information about the offerings of different finis. Hence, 
our policy conclusions should be taken more 11 1ertou1 1u1101tion1 
than a s  hard recommenda t i ons . Pol i cy sugge s t i ons gr ounde d in theory ,  
however,  s e e m  an advance over the a theore t i ca l  intu i t i ons that  now 
inf l uence re gu l a t i on in thi s area ,  
I ,  Reaul ation .Q.f Contract � 
Sta t e s  r e spond t o  i nformat i on impe r f e c t i ons that are thought 
to  affect  cont ract terms by requ i ring d i s c l o s ure or by banning 
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d i sf avored c l aus e s ,  D i s c l osure regu l a t ion typ i c a l ly i s  more concerned 
w i th e xp l aining the indiYidual tran s ac t i on t o  the consumer than w i t h  
f ac i l i ta t i ng the consumer'• abi l i ty to  compare contract t e rm s  a cr o s s  
f i rm s ,  As e xamp l e s ,  Re gu l a t ion 226. b ( a)  t o  the Truth i n  Lending Law 
require s consume r  credi t d i s c losures  to "be made c l early,  
conspicuous l y ,  [ and] in meaningful s e quence"; regulat ions 
226.7(c ) (1 ) -( 3 )  require d i s c l o sure o f  the "cond i t i ons under whi ch a 
f i nance char ge  may be impo sed,  inc l ud i ng an expl ana t ion of t he t ime 
period, if  any , w i thin which any c re d i t  exte nde d may be paid w i thout 
incurrin1 1 f inance charge • , • H, the "me thod of determining the
bal ance upon whi c h  a finance charge may be  impo sed," and the "method 
o f  d e t e rmining the amount o f  the f inance charge , • • •  "; and s e c t i on 
701 , 2  of the regul ations imp l ement ing the Magnus son-Mon Warr anty Act 
requi r e s  f irm s t o  provide a "ste p-by- step  expl anat ion of the procedure 
which the consumer should fol l ow in order to obt a in per formance of any 
warranty obl i ga t i on • , • " Such regulation impl i c i tly as sum e s  that 
e a ch consumer v i s i t s  only one f i rm to  make his first and l a s t  
transaction o f  the type a t  issue. 
Regu l a t ion of the subs ta nt ive term s  o f  trans a c t i ons is a l so 
common. S ix s t a t e s  ban warranty d i sc l a imers in a l l  sa l e s  of consumer 
3 goods , and s e c t i on 1 0 8  of the Magnusson-Mo s s  Act bans such
d i s c l aimers whenever a f i rm makes a written e xpre s s  warranty 
.. respect ing the produ c t ,  whi c h  i s  of t e n  done i n  sal e s  o f  consum e r
du rabl e s .  A l so ,  almost  a l l  state s have adopted  the s t r i c t  .l iab i l i ty 
in tort doctrine , so that  f i1111s mus t warrant aga inst  d e fe c t s  that 
cause per son a l  inj ury or prope r ty damage , In add i t i on, when f i r111s 
prom i se to repa i r  or replace  de f e c t ive  pa r t s  of consum e r  produc t s ,  
cour t s  commonly requ i r e  them to  repair such produc t• i n  re l at ively  
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short order or to repl ace  them; the prom i s e  to attempt t o  repair par t s  
s is converted  into a w arranty t o  supply a we l l  func t i oning who l e ,  
6 State s are be g i nning t o  adopt t h i s  r u l e  by statut e ,  The pre 1uaed 
e x i s t e nce o f  impe r f e c t  informat ion is often given as a jus t i f i cat i on 
for a l l  of thi s  regu l a t i on .  In a dd i t i on, moat f inding• o f  
uncon s c i onab i l i ty depend c ruc ial ly o n  t h e  apparent pre s e nce o f  
un informed consume r s . 7 As a l ast  e xamp l e ,  t h e  Uni form Consumer Cre d i t 
Code prevent s s e l l er s  from taking s e cu r i ty intere st s  i n  consumer 
goods , 8 other than purcha s e  money secur i ty inte r e s t s ,  and several
9 s t a t e s  have adopted the Code or p a s s e d  l aws s im i l ar t o  i t .  Extens i ons  
of these  l aws  or  new one s in the same  v e in are  freque nt ly propo s e d ,  
The regu l a t i on j us t  summarized seem ingly a s sume s that 
comparison shopp ing w i l l s e l dom improve consumer wel f1r e  f or much o f  
it make s little e f fort to  increa se t h e  amount of compa r i son s hopp ing 
that occu r s ;  and this re gul a t i on a l so a s s um e s  that wha t a consumer 
learns in one transact ion w i l l  no t be app l ied  in others l ike i t .
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Sta tutes  a nd l e g a l  doctrine s that ban contract terms s uppo se that 
f irms typ i c a l ly exp l o i t  the exi s tence of imperfect inf orm a t i o n  by 
of f er i ng terms t h a t  consumers would rej ect were they properly 
informed , Thia paper argues that a l l of the se a s sump t i ons are wrong 
or prob l em a t i c ,  
I I .  Wnrranty Markets 
A. Conyen t i opal � 
The imperfec t informa t i on concept has t wo a spe c t s :  ( i ) 
consumers may l ac k  informat i on about the ri sks that part i cu l ar terms 
a l l oc a te ;  ( i i )  consumers may l ack informa t i on about the pri ce s and 
terms that d i f ferent f irms o f fer, Convent i ona l exp l ana t i ons of the 
pos i t ive and normat ive fea tures of warrant i es suppose that  impe rfec t 
inform a t i on i n  i ts second a spe c t  i s  absent ; consumers are a s sumed t o  
know the market opportun i ty set perfec t ly .  The se e xp l ana t ions d i f fer 
in their treatment o f  the f irst a spe c t  o f  imperfe c t  i nf ormat ion. 
"Signa l l ing" exp l ana t i ons suppose consumers t o  be poorly inf ormed 
about produ c t  qua l i ty though perfec t ly informed about pri ces and 
term s .  "Compara t ive advanta ge" exp l ana t i ons suppose that ne i ther 
aspe c t  o f  imper f ec t  informat i on exists,  but somet imes cons i der how 
their concl us ions wou l d  be a f fected were consumers un informed about 
the ri sk  of produc t defec t s .  The authors of these e xpl ana t ions , 
however,  sel dom spe c i fy in de t a i l  the re l a t ionship betwee n  the mode l s' 
assumpt i ons a nd the mode ls' re sul t s: and t h i s  f a i l ing obs cures the 
cruc i a l  c ontribu t i on to  the s e  re sul ts that i s  made by assuming 
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consumers to be pe rfec t l y  informed about prices and t e rm s .  We sha l l  
be g i n ,  then , by making exp l i c i t  t he rol e that  i s  p l ay e d  i n  the 
convent i on a l  exp l ana t i on s  by the a s sump t i ons the mode l s  make about 
f i rms and consumers , as a useful pre l ude t o  our ana l y s i s  o f  the e f fect 
on warranty coverage o f  the fact that consumers .P!.Y.2i know a l l  
e l ements o f  the market opportun i ty set perfec t ly ,  
( 1 )  Signall ina Explanations 
S i gna l l ing exp l ana t i ons assert  that  a warranty s i gna l s  t he 
11 ( qua l i ty of a f irm's produc t ,  Such exp l ana t i ons suppose that:  i ) 
Imperfect i n format i on i n  t he f irst sense exi s t s ,  in t h a t  consumers 
cannot dist i ngu i sh among competing  produc t s  on the ba s i s  of thei r 
l i kel ihood o f  f a i l ure; ( i i )  Consumers bel ieve that produc t qua l i ty 
correl ates p o s i t ively with  the ext ent and dura t i on of warranty 
covera ge; ( i i i )  The cost to f irms o f  making warrant i es varies 
inversely with product  qua l i ty; the more l ikely a produ c t  is to f a i l ,  
the more e1pens ivo i t  w i l l  be t o  comply with warrant i e s  m a de 
re spe c t i ng i t ;  ( iv )  I f  f irm s do not commun i ca te their qua l i ty l evels 
to  consumers, the consumers wil l suppose that each f i rm sel l s  a 
produc t of " average qua l i ty , "  Consumers a l so w i l l  assume that  the 
average i s  re l a t ive l y  l ow; shoul d consumers suppose avera ge qua l i ty to 
be h i gh ,  f irm s wou l d  exp l o i t  thi s i gnorance by of feri ng l ow qual i ty 
products a t  h i gh qua l i ty prices, I n  consequence of the se f our 
assumpt ions , warranty coverage shoul d correlate po s i t ively w i t h  
produ c t  qua l i ty ,  Firm s  w i th products whose qua l i ty i s  above t h e  l o w  
average that consumers perce ive have an i ncent ive t o  commun i c a te thi s 
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f aot. Aooording to a s sump t ion ( i i ) , they can succes s ful ly commun i c a te 
the i r  qual i ty by making �strongw warrant i e s. Assump t i on ( i i i )  then 
impl i e s  that f il'lDa w i th poor p roduc t s  w i l l  be unab l e  to  imitate  these 
warranty " s i gna l s"; such f i rm s  i ncur re l a t ively g r e a ter expe nse in 
making s trong warrant ies than do f irm s w i th good produc t s  because the 
f ormer s e l l  produc t s  that f a i l  more freque nt l y. Hence , supp o s ing 
p r oduct qua l i ty of ten to  be he terogeneous , a var i e ty of warrant i e s  
shoul d exi s t ,  each o f  them s i gna l l ing the qua l i ty o f  the product i t  
a ccompani e s. 
Signa l l ing  e xp l anat i ons nece s s a r i l y  s uppose consume r s  to have 
con s i derab l e  knowledge about pr i c e s  and cont r a c t  term s ,  s ince f irms 
have no incen t ive to send s igna l s  that w i l l  not be  ob s e rved. 
Conae quont l y ,  s i gn a l l ing model s commonly add an  a s sumpt i on (v) , th a t  
consumers  c a n  c o s t l o s s l y  obs e rve t h e  price s and t e rms o f  every f irm in  
tho  market , We some t im e s  ref e r  to this a s  "the zero s e a rch cost  
a ssumpt i on," Thi s  a s sumpt i on is  a lways f a l se i n  fact,  and i ts fal s i ty 
seems a t  l ea s t  par t ly re spons ib l e  for tho maj or d i f f i cul ty w i th 
s i gna l l ing exp l ana t i on s , their incons istency with  the da t a .  Three 
count e r examples should s u f f i ce. F i rst,  si gna l l ing theory pred i c t s 
that  f i l'lDs with  more durab l e  produc t s  w i l l  mnke warrant i e s  that extend 
over l onger  t ime per iods. Jn cont rast,  actual warrant i e s  in  g iven 
markets genera l ly are made e f fe c t ive for ide n t i c a l  t ime p e r i ods, wh i ch 
a l so are con s i der ably shor ter than the useful l i fe of the produc t s  
12  they accompany . Second, s i gna l l ing theory impl i e s  that warrant i e s  
w i l l  not b e  made i n  comme rcial  marke ts  or  w i l l  take a d i f ferent f orm 
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there than in oonswnor n1arke ts,  Th is ia be ca use f il'lDs are  s a i d  t o  
make warrant i e s  to  inform otherw ise i gnorant consumer buy e r s  about 
produc t qua l i ty ,  whi l e  many commer c i a l  buyers  supposedly  are wel l 
informed about product qual i ty ,  Warrant i es in commer c i al marke t s ,  
howev e r ,  seem a s  common a s  those i n  consumer marke t s ,  and t a ke qui te 
s im i l ar f orm s.
13 Thi rd ,  a s t rong po s i t ive corre l a t i on between w arranty 
coverage and p roduct rel iabi l i ty o f t e n  s eems d i f f i c u l t  to d e t e c t .  For 
examp l e ,  frequency of repa i r  d a t a ,  such a s  that reported in Consumer 
Repor ts ,  som e t im e s  show wide vari a t i on s  among f il'lDs ,  but t he produc t s  
themselves  trade under s im i l ar o r  i dent i c a l  warrant i es. 
S i gna l l ing exp l ana t i ons , in summary, f a i l  to  a c c ount for 
important phenomena, and for those a nd o ther roa son114 are not useful
for pol icy purpo s e s ,  Pa rt o f  the d i f f icul ty s tem• f rom the i r  use o f  
the zero sea rch c o s t  a s sumpt ion, Ana l y s i s  o f  s i gna l l ina exp l ana t i ons 
thus suggest s that  l ight may be shed on warranty i s1uo 1 by abandoning 
i t .  
( 2 ) Comparative Adyantago Explanation• 
Thia second set of exp l an a t i ons accoun t s  for warr anty coverago 
by reference to the compara t ive a dvantage s of f il'lDs and c o naumers  in 
lS reduc ing the c o s t s  of or insuring a g a i n s t  product defec t s. To see 
how such exp l ana t i ons work, suppoae that ( i ) F i rm s  c a n  reduce tho 
fre quency of def e c t s  i n  r e f r i g e rator motor s more cheaply than 
consumers can because  f irms have more exper t i se re spe c t ing mot ors , can 
take a dvant a g e  of econom i e s  o f  scale in purch a s i ng repa i r  too l s  a nd so 
forth; ( i i )  Consumers can ensure the durab i l i ty of r e f r i ge rator doors 
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and shelves more cheaply than f irms can because the mo s t  e f f ic i ent way 
to achi eve durab i l i ty for the s e  i tems i s  through care f ul us e ;  ( i i i )  
Consumers are perf e c t l y  informed respe c t in g  the r i s k  that de f e c t s w i l l  
occur and are aware o f  the s t e p s  nece s s ary to  re duce t h i s  ri sk;  ( iv) 
Consumer s m inim i ze ne t purcha s e  c o s t s; ( v) F i rm s  maximize prof i t s ;  
( v i )  Search c o s t s  are zero--consumers c a n  cos t l e s s ly observe every 
price and contract  t erm that a l l  f irms in the marke t do or coul d 
o ffer.
Under the s e  a s sumpt i on s , f irms w i l l  o f fer an opt imal 
re fri gerator warranty contrac t .  As sump t i ons ( i ) and ( i i )  imply that a 
contrac t  e x i s t s that  m inimizes consumer co s t s  a s so c i a te d  w i th de f e c t s  
i n  refri gerators. Under this cont r a c t ,  f irm s wou l d  a s sume the r i sk of 
d e f ect• i n  motors--i·S· warrant a g a inst  them--but s h i f t  the risk of 
defect s in doors a nd shelve• to  consumer s--i·�· d i s c l a im thi s r i s k. 
A.s sumpt i on ( Hi )  impl i e s  that consumers would recogn i ze the cost  
m in im i z in g  contrac t ,  and a s sumpt i on ( iv )  ensure s that consumers would 
purcha se it  were i t  ava i l ab l e ,  F i nal ly,  a s sump t i ons ( v) and ( v i )  
imply t h a t  c o s t  m inim i z ing contrac t s  w i l l  b e  of f ered .  Since by 
a s sumpt i on ( v i )  consumers can costle s s ly search for the cost  
m inim i z in g  contra ct,  each f irm knows that by of fering it,  the f irm can 
t a ke s a l e s  from riva l s  who of fer d i f ferent contra c t s .  And by 
a s swnpt i on (v) , t h a t  f irms are pro f i t  maxim i zers,  f i rms would then 
of fer t h i s  contra c t .  Compara t ive advantage expl ana t i ons thus pre d i c t  
t h a t  opt imal warrant i e s  w i l l  emerge through the informed dec i s i ons of
conswner s  a nd f irms, 
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Comparat ive advant a ge expl ana t i ons of warranty content seem 
p l a u s i b l e  because  consumers and f irms do have d i f f ering ab i l i t i e s  t o  
reduce or insure a g a inst  product  re l a ted ri sks, and because  consumers 
and f irm s often  act as if they want to  maxim i ze prof it• or minim i ze 
co s t s ,  A l so ,  the s e  exp l an a t i ons a cc ount f or some of wha t i s  actua l ly 
obs erved, For examp l e ,  Commerc i a l  Law doe s not require f irms to 
repa ir or repl ace d e f e c t ive part s o f  consumer produc t s ;  rather, it 
g iv e s  consumers a caus e o f  act i on f or the damage s such de f e c t s  could 
c a us e . 16 Neverthe l e s s ,  firm s  o ften warrant a g a i n s t  de f e c t s i n
mater i a l s  and workmansh i p .  The compara t ive a dvant a g e  theory predict•  
this  resul t,  for repa irs o f  new produ c t s  by f irms o f ten are  l e s s 
c o s t l y  than repa irs by cons umers p l us damage s u i t s .  
Compara t ive a dvant a g e  e xpl ana t i on s ,  however, have s ign i f icant 
d i f f icul t i e s  that a l so are traceab l e  to  tho informa t i ona l a s sump t i ons 
they make . The s e  d i f f icul t i e s  are perhaps b e s t  rev e a l e d  by an 
ana l y s i s  o f  the mo s t  recent serious compara t ive advanta g e  e xp l ana t i on,  
17 that o f  Pro f e s s or George Pri e st. Pro f e s sor Pr i e s t ' s  theory re s t s  on
the s ix a s sump t i on s  j us t  s e t  out and one more , ( v i i ) , that  consUller s  
h ave he terogene ous pre f erence s for warranty coverage: s ome consumers 
want broa der covera ge than others do, The se soven 111ump t i ons imply 
that a ctual warranty covera ge shoul d be  homogeneous i n  the ways in 
whi ch consumers can be  expe c t e d  to  be homogene ous . For examp l e ,  a l l  
consumers would want coverage aga ins t d e f e c t s  i n  re fri g e rator motors,  
s o  all  f irms w i l l  offer basic  covera ge a ga i n s t  such  de f e c t s. The 
a s sump t i ons al so imply that covera ge shou l d  be he terogeneous in the 
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way s consumers  c an be exp e c t e d  to be hete rogene ous ; some consumer s ,  
those w i th l ar go f am i l i e s  f o r  examp l e ,  m ight want s t r onge r  than usua l 
w arranty cove r a ge , so a t  l e a s t  some f i rm s shoul d offer  re l a t ively 
extens ive warrant i e s, Pr i e st  then e xamined a c tual  warrant i e s  and 
f ound that they "tended to con f i rm" h i s t he s i s ,  though "further 
re search , , i s  requ i re d  be f ore  a con f i de nt conc lus ion can be 
r e a ched,"
18 In b r i e f ,  he obs e rved p a t te r ns o f  homo- and he terogen i e ty 
in warranty coverage that seemed cons i s tent w i th h i s  theory, but i n  
s ome c a s e s  t h e  samp l e  s i z e s  were sma l l  and o c c a s i ona l c o unterexamp l e s  
cx iated, 
Prof e s so r  Pri e s t  conclude d that  the coverage  he obs e rved 
probably was opt imal, The consumers i n  h i s  mode l were a s sumed to  be  
perfectly i nf orme d  about the ri sks o f  product de f e c t s  a nd the be st 
me thods of avoiding  them , and to  want to  m inimize  ne t purchase c o s t s .  
Hence , they coul d recogn i z e  a n d  woul d demand opt imal warranty 
cont r a c t s ,  And b e cause Pri e s t  a l so a s s umed s e arch co s t s  to  be  zero,  
be conc luded that f i rms .!Q.l!l.I! offer  op t imal cont r ac t s .
19 
The se 
contra c t s  wero a s  d e s c r ibe d--homogeneous in some respe c t s  bu t 
heterogene ous in othe r s. A f ocus on the contr ibut i on of the z ero 
se a r ch cost a s sump t i on t o  the se re sul ts  sugge s t s  that they requi re 
qua l if i c a t i on. 
I n i t i a l l y ,  Pro f e s sor Pr i e st  has  not shown that the cont r a c t s  
h e  obs e rved r e f l e c t e d  correct consumer cho i c e s. Suppo s e  that 
consumer s  are imperfectly  inf ormed re spe ct ing the r i sk o f  product 
d e f ec t s .  Such consumers  neve r the l e s s  could h ave heterogene ous 
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preference s f or warra nt i e s ;  s ome may n1i s t a kenly think they need broad 
warrant i es whi l e  others mi s t a kenly could t h i nk they ne e d  narrow one s, 
By assump t i on s  ( v) and ( v i )  a bove ( f irms maxim i z e  prof i t s  a nd s e a rch 
c o s t s  a r e  z er o ) , f irms s t i l l  w i l l  o f f e r  the warrant i e s  that  consum e r s  
want . The se warrant i e s ,  howeve r ,  w i l l  be i ne f f i c i ent, Hence , 
Prof e s sor Pr i e st ' s  observa t i on o f  heto rogenous warranty coverage 
cannot e s t ab l i sh his cl aim that consumer warrant i e s  probably re f l ec t  
"manuf acturer a n d  consumer inv e s tment s to  opt imize produc t  s e rv ice s , "  
To sus t a i n  t h i s c l a im,  the a s s umpt ion t h a t  consumers  c a n  a ccurate ly 
value ri sks must be i nde pende nt ly j us t i f i ed or shown t o  be irrel evant 
to  e f f i c i ency ana ly s i s, 
Prof e s sor Pr i e s t a l so c a nnot s us ta i n  h i s  clsia that  the 
warrant i e s  he ob s e rved corre c t l y  re f l e c t e d  t ho preference s that 
consum e r s  a c t ua l ly held, To see why , suppo s e  that a s sump t i on s  ( v i )  
and ( v i i )  above a r e  r e l axe d ;  consum e r s  now n o  l onger f a ce z e r o  s e arch 
co s t s  but have homogeneous pre fcronce s--a l l  want the same warr anty 
covera ge, Le t a s s umpt i ons ( i ) - ( v) be as above, In t h e s e  
c i rcum s t a nce s ,  t h e  search theore t i c  e conom i c  l i te r ature sugge s t s  that 
f i rms may s t i l l  offer  diverse warranty terms. Ana ly s t s  working  i n  
t h i s  l i te r a ture commonly s uppo s e  a l l  f irm s t o  s e l l  a homogene ous 
product under a s a l e s  cont ract  that  h a s  only one term,  the p r i ce. 
Consume r s  cons eque ntly mus t have homoge ne ous p r e f erence s r e spe c t i ng 
thi s term ;  they want i t  to be a s  l ow a s  poss ibl e ,  whi ch occur s when 
f irms charge compe t i t ive p r i ce s. Thu s ,  a l l  consumers  want to purchase 
a t  the compe t i tive pri ce, A s t a ndard re sul t in this l i tera ture , 
however, is that pri ce diver s i ty can exist when i t  is cos t ly for 
consumers to  i n form themse lve s of the pr i ce s  that d i f ferent firm s  
20 charge , even t hough a l l  consumers pre f er the same pri ce , Inferring
that consumers pre f er d i f f erent price s because d i f ferent pri ces are 
ob s erve d  would p l a inly be a m i s t a ke ;  the heterog e n i ety in pri ces c a n  
o n l y  be  t h e  resul t o f  po s i tive s e arch cos t s .
Part I I  D ,  infra, next e xtend s  this s t a ndard re sul t to  the 
c a s e  of warrant i e s, to  show that when se arch c o s t s  are posi t iv e  a nd 
Al! consumers pre f er the same warranty, some f irms neverth e l e s s  may 
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no t o f fer i t ; h e t e rogene ous warranty covera ge c a n  exist in the f a ce of 
homogeneous consumer pre f erences.  There f ore , the diver s i ty in 
warranty covera ge  that Pro f e s sor Pr i e s t  b e l ieved t e nded t o  conf irm h i s  
theory coul d have b e e n  t h e  re sul t of heterogeneous consumer 
preference s, a s  he supposed,  or the re sul t of pos i t ive s e arch cost s--
1· �· of imperf e c t  informat i on in i ts se cond a spe c t .  If it wos the 
l a t ter, his concl u s ion that warranty coverage a c cura t e l y  re fl e c ted 
consumer pre f erence s is i ncorre c t .  To exclude t h i s  pos • i b i l  i ty, one 
mus t  ana lyze h ow warranty marke t s  behave when the consumers in them 
f ace po s i t ive s earch cos t s .  Ne i ther Profe ssor Pr i e s t  nor any other 
compara t ive adv antage  theori s t  has made such an analy s i s, 
To su111mari ze, compara t ive advant a ge exp l anat i ons of warrant i e s  
corre c t l y  ident ify important de termina nt s of warranty covera ge  but are 
too part i a l . They suppose search co s t s  to  be z ero , but this 
a s sump t i on a t  be s t  impl i e s  that marke t s  w i l l  s a t i s fy consumer choice s ,  
whe ther ba sed on c orre ct o r  f a l se ass e s sments of r i s k ,  Al s o ,  se arch 
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c o s t s  are never z ero, and much e c onom i c  a na ly s i s  sugge s t s  that in this 
ev ent marke ts  o f ten c a n  be re l a t ively unre spons ive to  consumer 
pre f erence s ,  It i s  essent i a l , then, to expl ore the compara t ive 
adv anta ge idea in a world o f  po s i t ive se arch cost s .  
D. A M.2ill of .! Warranty Marke t 
( 1) A S impl e  Search Egyilibrium Mod e l  
To understand t h o  l o g i c  t h a t  underl i e s  our analys i s  o f  
warranty marke t s, it i s  h e l pful to b e g i n  w i th a re l a t iv e l y  s impl e  
s e arch equil ibrium mode l. The word "se arch" re fers t o  the process by 
whi ch consumers be come informed about the produc t s, pri ce s and t erms 
t h a t  f irms o f f er ,  The obj e c t  of thi s  c l ass of mode l s  i s  to  de s cribe 
the outcome s--Hequi l ibri a"-- that marke t s  rea ch whe n consumers pursue 
spe c i f ied "search stra tegi e s" ( 1.�· become informed in p a r t i cu l ar 
way s ) , ond f irm s pursue spe c i f i e d  prof i t  maximizing a tr a t e g i e s . 2
1 A:n 
under st anding of those mode l s  i s  essent i a l  to anyone concerne d  w i t h  
t h e  e f fect  t h a t  imperfect  informa t i on h a s  o n  � performance . 
2 2  W e  ini t i a l ly dev e l op e d  a s e arch equ i l ibrium mod e l  that 
suppose d :  ( i ) a l arge number of f irms e x i s t e d ;  ( i i )  the s e  f irms s o l d  
t h e  s a m e  produc t-- a "homogeneous" good-a l l  o f  whose  f e a ture s were 
obs ervab l e  be fore purchase ; consumers thus could not be uncertain 
about product qua l i ty; ( i i i) f irms d i d  not  adverti se, but  instead  
commun i c a t e d  informat ion to  consumers when consumers v i s i t e d  them; 
( iv)  a l arge number of consumers e xi s t e d ,  each of whom would purcha s e  
n o  noore than one un it  of t h e  produ c t ; ( v) a l l  consumers h a d  a common 
" l im i t" price, whi ch meant that every consumer woul d buy if he or she 
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observed a price which equa l led or w a s  l e s s  than thi s common l im i t ,  
whi l e  n o  one wou l d  buy a t  pri ces above the l imi t ;  ( v i )  consumers 
became i nformed about prices by u s i ng a ttfixed s ampl e  s i z e tt s t r a t e gy .  
Ea c.h consumer , before enter ing the market,  de c i ded how many firms  t o  
v i s i t ,  a n d  would t hen v i s i t  a l l  firm s  in  t h e  samp l e  before purcha s ing; 
a purcha s e  was t hen made at the l owest  price obse rve d ,  if that price 
was  no g rea ter than the l im i t  p r i ce;  ( v i i )  consumers  fe l l  into two 
ca tegories respec t ing thi s fixed s ampl e  s i z e  s t ra t e gy ;  some of them 
had s a mp l e  s i zes of one--they would v i s i t  only one f i rm--wh i l e  others 
had s amp l e  s i zes greater than one . 
Such model s r a i se three quest i ons: F i r s t ,  wha t re sul t s  does 
the model y ield? Second, are the model ' s a s sump t i on s  suffi c i ently  
pl aus ibl e or its  pred i c t i ons s uff i c ient l y  confirmed for  the se  re sul t s  
t o  be t a ken ser i ou s l y? Third,  i f  tho resul t s  d o  d e s e rve s e r i ous 
cons ider a t i on, wha t  are thei r impl i c a t i ons? 
A principal  resul t of this model i s  that the only po s s ibl e 
equ i l ibr i um in whi oh a l l  firm s  charge the same pr i ce occurs when that  
price is  compe t i tive,  To see why , first suppo s e  that a l l  firms in  the 
market charge the same price, "p 0" , whi ch is l e s s  than the common l im i t
• 
price, HpLtt' but g rea ter than t he compe t i t ive pr i ce, "p • <i·�· 
• 
P <Po< pL) .  Then let one firm l ower i t s  price be l ow Po by a very
smal l  amoun t .  Th i s  firm would s e l l  to a l l  "nons hopp e r s "--consumers  
who only v i s i t  one  fi rm--who v i s i t  it ;  the price cut t e r  would a l so 
se l l  to al l " shopp e r s "--consum o r s  who v i s i t  i t  and other fi rrns--
be cause i t s  pri ce would be tho l ow e s t  one the shopp e rs obs e rve. Thus, 
price cut t i ng would be a prof i t a bl e  stra tegy for the f i rm, ll a l l  
other firms c ont inue d t o  charge the o l d  p r i ce, p0• But these  f i rm s
a l so h ave t h e  s ame incent ive t o  c u t  their pri c e s ,  Conse quen t l y ,  a n  
out come in whi ch a l l  firm s  char ged p0 �1ould b e  uns t abl e ,  s i nce a t
l e a s t  some firms woul d undercut i t ;  p0 i s  not a n  equ i l ibrium p r i ce • 
• 
The compe t i t ive pri ce, p , could be a n  equi l ibr ium pr i ce because no 
firm woul d unde rcut i t .  Th i s  i s  because the compet i t iv e  p r i ce by 
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defini t ion al ways equa l s  e a ch firm's minimum average c o s t ,  which means 
that  the revenue from a sale j us t  equa l s  the l ow e s t  co s t  neces s a ry t o  
generate tha t sa l e, Since p r i oe cut s bel ow thi s point mus t  produce 
l os s e s ,  firms have no incent ive t o  reduce pr i ces bel ow the compe t i t ive 
l eve l .  
Suppose next that  a l l  firm s  a re charg i ng the compe t i t ive 
• 
p r i c e ,  p One firm then con s i ders r a i s ing i t s  p r i ce, If i t  does s o ,  
i t  woul d cont i nue t o  sel l t o  nonshopper s who v i s i t  i t ,  prov ided t h a t  
i ts new price doe s n o t  exceed t he l im i t  pr i ce, pL. Thi s  firm wou l d
n o t  s e l l  to shopper s ,  however, because i t s  new prioe woul d b e  h i gher 
than t he other prices  that  the shopp e r s  see.  S ince the firm wou l d  
• 
l o s e  a l l  of the shopp e r s' bus i ne s s  at any p r i ce above p a nd r e t a in 
a l l  of the non s hoppe r s '  bus i ness a t  a ny p r i oe equal to or bel ow PL• 
th i s  firm would charge pL. Whe ther the s t r a tegy of ra i s ing p r i ce t o
t h e  l im i t  would b e  profitable neces s a r i l y  depends o n  whether the ga i n s  
m a d e  from cha r g i ng pL to nonshoppcrs  wou l d  exceed the l osses  c rea ted
by no l onger bei ng able  to se l l  to the shopper s ,  If £.!l.2.1!.&ll shoppers 
exi s t e d ,  r a i s ing p r i c e s  woul d be a l os ing s t rate gy ,  The refore, the 
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compet i t ive price would be the equ i l ibr i um pr i ce in a part i cu l ar 
market i f  enough compari son shopp ing took p l ace . 
Jf too few compari son shoppers e x i s t e d  to sus t a in a 
compe t i t ive equi l ibrium, many f i rms m ight s t i l l  charge the compe t i t ive 
price. Other f irms, however, wou l d  f ind i t  prof i t able to sel l to  a 
mix o f  shoppers and nonshoppers at supracompe t i t iv e  p r i ce s .  Thus, 
a l though the product is homogeneous and consumer preference s are 
homogeneous-- a l l want to buy at the l owe s t  p r i c e , --pr i ce di spe r s i on 
would exi s t .  Fina l ly, if very few consumers comp a r i son s hop, ra i s ing 
price above the competi t ive level could be a prof i tabl e  s t r a tegy for 
• 
a l l  f irm s :  every price in equ i l ibrium woul� exceed p , and for 
s uf f i c ient l y  few s h oppers p r i ce s  wou l d  converge t oward pL. We
somet ime s  refer to PL as the monopoly pri ce because it i s  the p r i ce 
that a monopol i s t  would charge i f  it operated in the r e l evant marke t, 
g iven our a s sumpt i ons about consumer demand . 
We have d i scus sed the a s sump t i ons that  generate the se re sul t s  
e l sewhere, 23 and s o  w i l l s a y  only a few words about them here , I t  i s
p l au s i b l e  t o  a s sume that consume rs  use a f ixed s ampl e  s i z e  shoppin& 
s t r a tegy for three rea sons . F i r s t, f ixed c o s t s  to s e arch some t imes  
e x i s t--the main shopping expense could be ge t t i ng to  the s hopp ing 
d i s t r i c t--and a f i xed s ampl e  s i z e  s t r ategy minim i z e s  the s e  f ixed c o s t s  
b y  sprea d in g  them over v i s i t s  to several s t ore s .  Second, s e a rch 
some t im e s  i s  a con s umpt ion a c t i v i ty; consumers  who enj oy shopp ing thus 
may crea te and p l an to exhaus t a saop l e  of several s t ores be fore they 
begin to s e a rch . Th i rd, when consumers have l i t t l e  price inform a t i on ,  
2 1  
the i r  s t r a t e gy choi ce i s  e i ther to  s e t  sampl e s  or l e t  t h e  amount o f  
s e a rch they eng a ge i n  b e  a funct i on o f  the prices they see .  A s  
examp l e s  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  s o r t  of s t r a tegy, a consumer who v i s i ted two 
s tore s and s aw the same price at both might s t op searching b e c ause  he 
or she a s s umed that f inding a s i gn i f i cant ly l ower p r i ce woul d be 
un l ik e l y ;  thi s consumer could infer from observ ing iden t i c a l  price s 
that l i t t l e  p r i c e  var i ab i l i ty ex i s ted.  In cont r a s t, a consumer who 
saw two d i f ferent p r i ce s m i gh t s e a rch a great dea l ,  bel iev ing 
s i gn i f i cant p r i ce d i sper s i on to  exi s t .  A strate gy such as this makes 
the number of s t ores v i s i ted be p a r t ly a funct i on o f  the pri ces one 
s e e s .  Exp eriment a l  evidence shows that t h i s  s t r a tegy i s  s ubj ect t o  
m i s spec i f i c a t i on, in the sense t h a t  consumers us ing i t  who a re 
i gno rant of the actual  p r i ce d i stribut i on in the market may shop much 
l e s s  or much more than the var i ab i l i ty in that d i s t r ibut i on warrant s .  
A f ixed samp l e  s i z e  stra tegy, i n  contra s t, i s  l e s s  subj ect  t o  such
n1i sspe c i f i c a t i on, and is thus a sens ibly conserv a t ive s trategy for 
con s ume r s  to  a dop t .  Respe c t ing other of the model ' s  impor tant 
a s s umpt i ons,  one of us has shown e l s ewhere that the model ' s  
qua l i ta t iv e  re sul t s  are un changed i f  consumer s  may purc h a se more than 
one un i t ; 2 4  and these  resu l t s  wi l l  a l so obtain if each consumer i s
a l l owed t o  have a n  individua l l im i t  price. 2 5
Th i s  s imple search mod e l  pred i c t s  that p r i ce dive r s i ty wi l l  
some t ime s be  ob served in  a c t ua l  marke t s, and i t  i s .  Al s o, tho mode l 
predi c t s  that marke t price s moy be l owered i f  consumer s can be induced 
t o  e neage in more compari son shopping. Ev idence drawn f rom actual 
marke t s  i s  cons i stent with this prediction.26 Hence, the model's 
a s sumpt ions and pre d i c t i ons seem suffi c i ently plausible to warrant 
concern with its impl ica t i ons , What are they? 
Ini t i a l ly ,  the model shows that information about market 
choices need not be perfect ,  A market can be in competitive 
equil ibrium even though the ra t i o  of compari son shoppers in it to 
total  shoppers i s  c ons iderab ly l e s s  than one, Such competitive 
equil ibr i a  are bes t  achieved by increa s i ng the amount of comparison 
shopping that  take s  p l ace, for the mode l a l so shows that greater 
compari son shopp ing corre l a te s p o s i t ively w ith lower prices. Those 
impl ica t i on s  are drawn from a mod e l  in which f irms sel l a homogeneous 
product,  but we have elsewhere shown that they a l s o  hold when firms 
27 are a l l owed t o  vary product quality. The quest ion we next take up, 
then, i s  the extent to whi ch the lessons drawn from this relatively 
s imple mode l mus t be mod i f ied when firms are allowed to vary contract 
quality , 
( 2 )  2
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A Warranty .M.2.!!t! 
Thi s  11ode l retains the assumptions about firms and consumers 
made above and a l so suppos e s  that a homogeneous good is sold, It 
necessarily adds several assumptions which it will be useful to 
discuss in de t a i l .  These are : ( i ) Consumers do not know, when they 
begin to shop, which firms sell with warranties and which do not, 
Jlence, the nonshoppers sample one firn1 at random from among all firms 
before purchasing, while tho shoppers sample more than one firm at 
random from among all firms, This assumption is n:ade to capture the 
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notion that consumers are imperfectly informed respecting the prices 
and terms that markets offer, We denote the ratio of nonshoppers to 
total consumers in the market by "ai" and the ratio of shoppers to 
total consumers by 110211; a1 + a2 
= 1; ( i i) Consumers also are 
differentiated according t o  their de s ire for warranties, A consumer 
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prefers a warranty, in this mode l ,  if a consumer who sees tho product 
offered with a warranty at the compe t i t ive pri ce a nd o f fered w i thout a 
warranty at the compe t i t ive pri ce  would then purcha se the product with 
the warra nty. A consumer therefore is s a i d  not to prefer a warranty 
if he would be unwilling to pay the l owe s t  p o s s ible prem ium tha t firms 
must char ge to prov ide warranty protec t i on, ( i i i )  Th i s  model retains  
the assumption that consumers have common l im i t  pri ce s ,  but  mod i f i e s  
i t  because a consumer now ha s the add i t i on a l  choi ce of buy ing w i th or 
without a warranty. We let "hw" be the l im i t  pri ce, or "wil l ingne s s
to  pay , "  for the product  w i th a warranty and "�" b e  the l im i t  price
f or tho product w i thout a warranty, llere, '1w a l ways is greater than
hN because a warranty is a desirable produ c t  fea t ure; thu s ,  i t  would 
b e  irra t i onal  of a consumer t o  be w i l l ing  to pay more f or the produc t 
without a warranty than with one, even if the consumer prefers not to  
have warranties. This no t a t i on a l so a l l ows  us to capture more 
precisely the notion of a preference f or warrant i e s, The term '1w - � 
can be regarded as a consumer's marginal w i l l ingne s s  t o  pay for 
warranty protection, Then, a consumer prefers a warranty when 
• • • 
hw - �I > Pw - pN' where pVI is the competitive pri ce for the product
• 
with a warranty and pN is the competitive price for the produc t 
without a warranty, Assumptions (ii) and (iii) ,further imply that a 
consumer who prefers a warranty in the sense just defined would 
purchase without a warranty if (a) he or she only saw the product 
offered without warranties, and (b) the price equalled or was less 
than the limit price, hN' Similarly, a consumer who prefers to buy 
without a warranty will buy the product with a warranty if (c) he or 
she saw only warranties, and (d) the price equalled or was less than 
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hw· These limit prices incorporate all relevant information 
respecting consumer preferences, For exau1ple, other things equal, the 
spread between hw and hN will be greater if consumers strongly prefer 
warranties, (iv) Consumers now purchase one unit of a product that 
has a positive probability, "n, " of breaking and becoming useless; n 
is independent of the care with which the product is used, end is 
known to firms and consumers. Thus, although the relevant product can 
fail, once more no uncertainty about product quality exists. In the 
terminology used here, imperfect information in tho first sense, 
dealing with the possible consequences of purchase, is absent. 
Respecting the firms in the model, we add: (v) Firms produce 
the product with a fixed cost, "F," and a constant marginal cost over 
some range, "c," This marginal cost is incurred whether a warranty is 
mnde or not, Firms can sell with a warranty or without, but cannot do 
both. (vi) A warranty in this model consists of a promise, that is 
always redeemed, to replace any defective product with n new one at no 
charge, 29 (vii) Offering the product with a warranty docs not 
directly affect each firm's �1erginal cost, but n1ay require ndditionnl 
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fixed costs, "F ." These additional fixed costs may arise from 
ndministrntive or other expenses that a replacement program could 
cause. (viii) "nrginal cost nevertheless is increased when a warranty 
is made, A firm that sells with a warranty must plan for the 
replacement of defective products, and the replacements also could be 
defective. Hence, the firm must produce more than one unit to 
"support" a sale of one unit; the total amount that muat be produced 
per sale is 1/(1-n) where n is the failure probability, Then, with a 
constant marginal cost, c, the firm's total variable cost if it makes 
a warranty and sells x units is cx/(1-n), Its marginal coat, called 
"cw"• is this total variable cost divided by total effective output, 
or c/(1-n), which is greater than c since n is positive but less than 
one. Finally, let "s" be the firm's output in competitive equilibrium 
when it sells without warranties, Then, a firm that sells with 
warranties has a total output in competitive equilibrium of lf•w", 
where sW = (1 - n)s, The output sW is less than s because the firm 
must provide for replacements. 
We next consider the model's results in two paradigm cases, 
In the first, all consumers prefer warranties, This case is 
considered because decisionn1akers and commentators commonly suppose 
that consumers went more warranty protection than markets provide, 
Thus, it is useful to ask whet is likely to happen when every consumer 
in a market wants a warranty but firms are permitted to disclaim, The 
second pnrndigm case considered is when no consumer prefers a 
warranty, The rationale for analyzing this case is set out below. 
(a) Al! Consumers Prefer Warranties 
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Three mutually exclusive outcomes can occur in this case, of 
which the most desirable is that !.l.l firms of fer the product with a 
warranty at the competitive price, Whether this outcome obtains is 
once more a function of the amount of comparison shopping in which 
consuD1ers engage, The logic that underlies this result is similar to 
that described above. Let all firms in the market sell with 
• • 
warranties at a price Po > Pw• where Pw is the competitive price, 
Then every firm has an incentive to cut its price by a small amount 
because it would continue to sell to nonshoppers and capture 
the shoppers who visit it, The price cutting strategy is not 
• 
all of 
profitable at prices below the competitive price Pwl hence, a single 
price equilibrium can occur only if all firms charge this price, If 
• 
all firms sell with warranties at Pw• o firm that wants to deviate in 
the price dimension will charge the limit price hW because it sells 
only to nonshoppers. This would be an unprofitable strategy--i·�· a 
firm would have no incentive to deviate--if enough shoppers existed, 
for then the increased revenue gained from tho nonshoppers would be 
more than offset by the losses resulting from the disappearance of the 
shoppers, A firm also could deviate from a competitive equilibrium, 
• 
in which all firms sold with warranties at Pw• by offering the product 
without a warranty. This firm too would sell only to r.onshoppcrs, for 
every consuD1er in the market prefers o warranty by assumption and each 
shopper would see at least one other firm selling with n warranty ut 
• 
Pw• llence, a deviant firm not only would disclaim but also would 
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raise its price to hN' the most consumers would pay when not getting a 
warranty, Again, if enough shoppers existed, disclaiming warranties 
while charging monopoly prices would be an unprofitable strategy, In 
summary, then, when all consumers prefer warranties and enough 
consumers comparison shop, the market will provide warranties at 
competitive prices. 
Suppose that too few comparison shoppers exist to sustain a 
competitive equilibrium. The remaining possibilities are: Second, All 
firms sell with warranties although some or all of them charge prices 
that are supracompetitive; the market power that insuffioient consumer 
search creates is manifested in the prioe but not the oontract quality 
dimension, Third, some (possibly all) firms sell without warranties 
and charge supracompetitive prices, This outcome is plainly the least 
desirable, To see whether it or the second possibility will occur, we 
must introduce a particular concept of comparative advantage. 
We define a comparative advantage with respect to firms by 
reference to the number of customers that a firm would need to break 
even when it charged the limit price--the highest price consumers 
would be willing to pay. If a firm, as a result of its cost structure 
and consumer preferences, would need fewer customers to break even 
when selling at the limit price Il11l a warranty, we then say that the 
firm has a comparative advantage at selling with warranties, 
Similarly, if a firm would need fewer customers to break even when 
selling at the limit price without a warranty, the firm is said to 
have a comparative advantage nt selling without warranties, 
To understand why this concept of comparative advantage is 
relevant, supp o s e  that all firms in the market offered the product 
• 
with a warr a nty a t  Pw and one firm considered deviating. In this 
i l l u s t r a t ion, too f ew shopp e r s  e x i s t  to make .lUlY deviation from the 
compe t i t ive c a s e  unprof itabl e,  Because the deviant firm would sell 
only to nonahopp e r s ,  i t  wou l d  charge the limit price, but it now ha s 
the opt i on o f  making a warranty and char g i ng hw or disclaiming 
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warrant i e s  a nd charging  hN' If the firm woul d need fewer customers to 
break even when se l l ing at hw• i t  would then o f fer  a warranty. This 
strategy y i e l d s  h i gher prof i t s  because the f irm reaches i t s  br eateven 
point w i th f ew e r  s ales, On the other hand, if the firm woul d need  
f ewer cus tome r s  t o  break  even when selling at hN, the firm would 
d i scl aim  warrant i e a, When firms have a comparative advantage at 
s e l l ing without warrant i e s--th i s  third case--warranties could 
disappear altogether if very few consumers shopped, though every 
consumer preferred  one , Should there be a fair number of shoppers, 
howeve r ,  too f ew nonshopp e r s  would exist to support every firm that 
w i shed t o  d i s c l a im warrant i e s  .!!!.Ii charge monopoly prices. Thus , some 
warranties will be s e e n  a nd some f irms that disclaim will charge less 
To summarize, when firms have a comparative ndvuntage nt 
selling with warranties, but not enough consumers shop to sustain a 
competitive equilibrium, disclaimers are not seen, but 
supracompetitive prices exist. When the comparative advantage runs 
the other way, some firms will degrade contract content but probably 
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not all; again, supracompetitive pricing will occur for products with 
and without warranties, 
When do firms have a comparative advantage at selling with 
warranties? This advantage obtains when (1) the making of a warranty 
adds little to a firm's fixed cost (F'=O or is small) , .!!.!1!! (2) 
consumers strongly prefer warranties, Respecting the rat iona l e  f o r  
these conditions, i f  consumers s t rongly prefer  warrant i e s ,  the highest 
price they would be willing to pay for the good with a warranty shoul d 
significantly exceed the h i gh e s t  price  they wou l d  be willing to pay 
for the good without a warranty; hence , a f irm offer i ng the good a t  
its highest price would ne e d  fewer cua t omer s  t o  break even when 
selling with warranties than when s e l l ing w ithout them, unl e s s  f ix e d  
costs are considerably higher with a warranty, Cond i t i on (1) rul e s  
this possibility out, This mode l there fore y ie l d s  the seemingly 
sens ib l e  r e s u l t  that warranties will be more common when they c o s t  
relatively little to  make a n d  are s t rongly p r e f e r r e d ,  e v e n  i n  
environments characterized b y  cons iderabl e  impe rfect  i nf orma t i on, 
The three p o s s ible  out come s j us t  d i scus s e d  c a n  b e  
characterized mathematically, In addition to the not a t i on used  abov e ,  
let "aw" be the comparative advantage of s e l l ing w i th warrant i e s ,  and 
"11-i" be the comparative advantage of selling without warranties. Then
(F + F')/(hw - cW) 
and 
Given these definitions. 
(1) The necessary and sufficient condition for all firms to 
sell with warranties at competitive prices is 
a1 •w � minimum [aw , aNJ,
(2) The necessary and aufficient condition for all firms to 
sell with warranties, but with some or all firms charging 
supracompetitive prices, is 
°w � minimum(a1sW,aN). 
(3) The necessary and aufficient condition for some (possibly 
all) firms to 1111 without warranties and at supracompetitive 
prices is 
°N � minimum(aW , a1sw>· Warranties will disappear
altogether if 
(a) al 'w ) (al + 2a2) °N, and 
(b) kw� alF'
/(al + 2 a2) aN 
whore kw= (1\r - o1) - (� - c).
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Respecting tho last two conditions in case (3) , the first implies that 
a complete deterioration of warranty content is unlikely if a fair 
number of consumers shop, for then a1sw will be small relative to 
Ca1 + 2a2) °N; tho inoqnality i• then less likely to be satisfied. The 
second condition implies that a complete deterioration of warranty 
content is unlikely if consumers strongly prefer warranties, for then 
hw - cw should bo considerably larger than hN - c. In this event, kw 
also will be large, and so the second inequality is less likely to be 
satisfied, 
(b) No Consumers Prefer Warranties 
A warranty is an insurance policy that sellers offer against 
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product related losses. In the case considered here, consumers prefer 
to spend on other things than insurance, Since consumers are 
perceived often to want at least some protection against defects, 
especially when purchasing durable goods, another way to conceptualize 
this second case is to regard consumers as preferring "limited" 
warranties when firms have the technical capability to offer "full" 
wnrranties,30 We next show that in this event firms will never offer 
full warranties, but may charge supracompetitive prices for limited 
ones. For convenience, we describe this case as involving consumers 
who prefer no warranties at all, but the essential result ahould be 
kept in mind: firms will never offer� warranty protection than 
consumers desire. 
We make the same assumptions as above respecting consumers and 
firms, but change the notation slightly. Here "lw" h the consumer's 
willingness to pay or limit price for the prodnct with a warranty 
while "IN" is the consumer's willingness to pay for the produot 
without a warranty. Because consumers now do not prefer warranties, 
• • 
their preferences can be captured by the exprosaion fw - IN < Pw - pN; 
o consumer's marginal willingness to pay for warranty protection is 
less than the minimum cost firms mnst incur to sell with warranties. 
Also, the comparative advantage to firms of selling with warranties is 
then "llw•" where llw = (ll + F')/<lw - cw) ;  the comparative advantage to 
firms of selling without warranties is then "PN"' where 
Once mor e ,  if enough consume r s  compa ri son shop a l l  f i rm s w i l l  
s e l l  w i thout warrant i e s  a t  the compe t i t ive  pr i ce ,  TI1 e l o g i c  i s  
s im i l ar to t h a t  used abov e ,  I f  a l l  f irm s s e l l  w i thout warrant i e s  a t  
the compe t i t ive pr i c e ,  a f i rm w i sh i n g  t o  dev i a te w i l l  s e l l  only t o  
nonshoppo r s .  Shoul d  i t  dev i a t e  i n  t h e  p r i ce dimens i on only ,  i t  w i l l  
charge IN; shoul d i t  deviate  i n  b o t h  dimens i ons , i t  w i l l  make a 
warranty and charge t1• Once mor e ,  if e nough shopp e r s  e x i s t ,  the
l o s s e s incurred by l o s ing t h e i r  bus ine s s  w i l l  outwe i gh the ga i ns f rom 
e i ther dev i a t i on s t r a t e gy ,  He nce , a compe t i t i v e  equil ibr i um in which 
no f i rm s  o f fer warr ant i e s  i s  sus t a i nabl e .  The ne c e s s a ry and 
s uf f i c i ent cond i t ions f or thi s equ i l ibr i um to ob t a i n  are 
and 
If t oo f ew shopp e r s  e x i s t  to sus t a i n  a compe ti tive  
equ i l ibr i um ,  f i rm s  woul d dev iate  f rom the  compe t i t ive outcome only  in 
the price dimens i on ;  they would never offer unwanted warrant i e s .  To 
see  '1hy , we shoul d l ook a g a i n  a t  the conce pt  of  w i l l ingne s s  t o  pay . A 
consum er ' s "wil 1 i ngne ss to pay" for warranty p r o t e c t  i on m ay b e  
conce p t ua l ized a s  t h e  d i f ference be twe en t h e  h i g h e s t  pri ce that  a 
consumer woul d p ay for the product w i th a warra nty and the h i ghe st 
p r i c e  ho or she  would p ay for the produc t w i thout one , I f  t h i s  
d i f f erence i s  l e s s  than the marginal  c o s t  t o  f irms of  o f f e r i n g  
warrant i e s ,  n o  w a rranty woul d e v e r  be  o f f e r c cl .  Th i s  i s  b e c a u s e  a f i rm 
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could induce a consumer to t a ke a warranty only by o f f ering  it at l e s s  
than mar g i n a l  c o s t , and prof i t  maximiz ing f i rms w i l l  not make s uch 
s a l e s .  
A consume r ' s  w i l l ingn e s s  to pay for warr anty prote c t i on may be 
w r i t t e n  as fw - l N' and the a dd i t i onal mar ginal c o s t  n e c e s s a ry to s e l l
w i th a warranty i s  cw - o .  Hence , n o  warrant i e s  a r e  o ffered when
lw - lN < cw - c. Th i s  cond i t ion doe s not ne ce 1 1 a r i ly hold und e r  the
re l a t iv e l y  re s t r i c t ive a s s umpt ion we make re spe c t ing f i rms '  c o s t  
f un c t i on s ,  that  f i rm s have constant marginal co s t s ,  a n d  s o  s e l l  u p  t o  
a c a pa c i ty cons t r a i nt in compe t i tive equ i l ibr i um .  Thi s  a ssumpt i on i s  
m a d e  f o r  ana l y t i c a l  t r a c t ib i l ityl  we re we t o  r e l ax i t ,  s u c h  tha t f irms 
• 
had more "no rmal" c o s t  curve s ,  i t  would t urn out that  ow "' Pw and
• 
c "' pN; p r i c e  equa l s  marginal  co s t .  Then, unde r  thi s natur a l
• • 
condi t i on, that fw - l N < Pw - pN would imply that  fw - IN < cw - o .
Henc e ,  we a ss ume thi s l a t t e r  inequa l i ty t o  h o l d .  When i t  doe s ,  
consumers who d i s l ike warrant i e s  would never b e  w i l l ing t o  pay for 
warranty prot e c t i on ;  thus , no warrant i e s  woul d ever b e  ob s e rved.  If  
an insuf f i c i ent number of shoppers e x i s t  t o  sus t a i n  a compe t i t ive  
equil ib r i um, f irm s will  inc r e a s e  price s .  Thi s  occurs whe n  
c .  Pre l iminary Norma t ive Implicat ions 
F i rm s  commonly are s a i d  to re spond t o  the  exi s t ence o f  
" impe r f e c t  inf orma t i on" b y  supply ing l e s s  warranty coverage  than 
consum e r s  want . We have shown , in cont r a s t , that cons um e r s  are l ike l y  
in m any c a s e s  to g e t  j us t  that  warranty cov e rage t h a t  t hey d e s i re ,  
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Also, not every consumer must shop for war rant i es to make warranty 
markets responsive to consumer pref e rence s .  These results a r e  
significant f o r  three reasons. First, beca u s e  w e  have assume d  that 
consumers can mnke correct choice s--they know failure probab i liti es 
perfectly--the competitive equilibria that actually occur are 
ef ficient. Second ,  noncompetitive equilibr i a  tate a different form 
than is commonly suppo sed , Firms are thought to degrade coverage i n  
these equilibri a ,  but they a r e  more l ik e ly to o f f er the correct 
coverage at s up r acompe titive prices. This has obvious policy 
32 implica tions that we pursue below. Thi rd, consumers in our 01ode l  
will purcha se warranties only i f  they believe war r a nty protection to 
be worthwhile; that is, only if warranties a re of fered for sale at or 
below the consumer s '  limit prices, Persons in general seem better o f f  
i f  they c a n  g e t  what they want, though they sometime s may have to pay 
too much for it, than they would be if their d e s i res w e r e  f rustrated 
altogether . 
Finally, our model is sugge stive respe ct i ng the question 
wheth e r  impe r f ect in formation c a us e s  a war ranty market to behave 
non competiti vely. F.conomic models o f ten are hard to apply d i rectly to 
real world problems because i t  i s  d i f f icult to gather the data on 
which the i r  npplica t ion depends. For example, expl i c i t  warranty 
p r i c e s  se ldom ar e obse rvable b e c a use f i rms conuaonly sell a j o int 
product for a s i ngle price--tho item w ith a w a r r a nty . Also, the 
necessary and su f f icient cond i t ions for the various e q u i l i b r i a  we set
out above i nclude terms r e f e r r i n g to f irms ' ma r g i nal costs ( cw and c ) ;
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mar g inal cost data i s  noto r i ously hard to get. Uence, a model such as 
ours is us e f ul for policy purposes only if it tells a story that i s  
m o r e  plaus ible thnn compe t i ng b u t  equally d i f ficult t o  te st 
explanat ions , The model also mny ussist in the evalua t i on o f  actual 
market outcomes i f, in addition, it suggests factors that correlate 
w i th normative ly relevant states of the world .!ill! if decisionmakers 
can observe such factors relatively conveniently . Our mode l  satis f i es 
all of these c r i ter i a  f airly well. 
Ini tially, the model rests on two plausible intuitions a bout 
firms a nd consumer s . The first is that firms will satisfy consumer 
pre f e rences when doing so would increase profits. If enough consumers 
w ill w ithdraw business f rom firms that ignore their interest s ,  
satisfying those interests then becomes the profit maximiz ing 
strate gy. Hence, normati vely desirable equilibria in our mod e l  
correl ate posi tively with the e xtent of compari1on shopping in which 
con sumers engage. The second intuition is that consumers w i ll get 
what they want if they are willine to pay for it. In particular, if 
con s umers stronnly p r e f e r  warr anties, firms are unlikely to have a 
comparative advantage at selling w i thout warrant i e s ;  consequently, the 
probable r e sponse of f i rms to impe r f ect information will be to ra i se 
p r i c e s  rather than de teriorate warranty content. Thus, normatively 
de sirable equilibria in our mode l also correlate positively w i th 
consumers'  w i ll ingness to rn .  The f actors of compa r ison shopping and 
w ill ingness to pay rencrate a story about warranty markets that s e ems 
�ore plaus i ble than the compe ting e xplan a ti ons c r i t icized in Part IIA 
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above ,  The se two f actors a l so w i l l  some t im e s  be of  u s e  to 
de c i s i onmaker s  in eva lua t ing a c tual  marke t s .  
Before showing how t h e s e  f actors  can  b e  use d  in  t h i s  f a sh ion 
we note  a par t i cul ar fact  about consumer warrant i e s ,  the i r  
homogene i ty ,  A lmost  ident i c a l  warranty coverage  s e em ingly exi s t s  
w i thin  and some t ime s  across product  l ine s ,  For many "hard" goods , a s  
a n  e xampl e ,  there i s  a standard warranty, that ( i ) d i s c l a ims  impl ied 
warrant i e s  of  merchantabi l i ty and f i tne ss ;  ( i i )  make s an expre s s  
warranty against  d e f ec t s  in  mater i a l s and workmansh ip ,  ( i i i )  l im i t s  
t h e  consumer s '  recovery under this  warranty t o  t h e  r e p a i r  or 
repl acement of d e f ec t ive product parts ;  ( iv )  l im i t s  the t ime w i thin  
which  c l aims can be brought under  the  expre s s  warranty; and  ( v) when 
personal inj ury or seri ous property damage i s  pos s ib l e ,  excludes  
33  recovery for consequent i a l  damage s ,  Dev i a t ions from thi s  p a t te rn,
broadly speaking, are  of two maj or type s ,  Some f irm s w i l l  reduce 
coverage , as by l im i t ing coverage to the original  purchaser  or 
exclud i ng it for spe c i f ied use s ,  such as racing  a pas senger veh i c l e ,
Al so ,  some f il"l!ls w i l l  expand coverage , primari ly by lengthening the 
s tandard term w i th in  which cl a ims can be  brought .  Uecause o f  the very 
sm a l l  sampl e  s i z e s  i n  exi s t ing re search of actual  warrant i e s  a nd 
becaus e  re searche r s  often compare warrant i e s  across  indus t r i e s  ra ther 
than w i thin  part icular  produc t l ine s ,  i t  is impo s s ib l e  to know how 
frequent ly the se dev iat ions f rom the st andard wurranty actual ly occur ,  
Consequent ly ,  lfC sha l l  br i e f ly  cons ider three typothe t i cal but
po s s i b l e  c a s e s  i n  l ight o f  the � n u ly s i s  abov e .  
3 7  
( 1 ) A l l  f irm s  s e l l i ng a s im i l ar product l ine offer  the same 
warranty ,  whi ch provi de s l e s s  than ful l protec t ion a g a ins t  product 
r e l at ed  harm s .  Our mode l shows that consumers  w i l l  ge t no more 
coverage than they want but m ay ge t l e s s ;  hence , compl e t e  homogene i ty 
at l e s s than the ful l prote c t i on l eve l  coul d ref l e c t  a l l  f irms 
offering the coverage that  consume rs  pre f er  or a l l  f irms de teriorat ing 
warranty content in  ident i c a l  f a shion,  Two f actors  that  a 
d e c i s i onninker could use to a sc er t a in  which possibi l i ty i s  most l ikely 
are the extent of compa ri son shopp ing and the consumer s '  w i l l ingne s s  
t o  pay for lfarranty prot e c t i on .  A numer ica l  examp l e  w i l l i l lustrate  
the re l evance of the se mea sure s ,  
When consumers prefer  a g iven l eve l  o f  warranty protec t i on, 
.!.11 f irms in  a marke t w i l l  of fer l e s s  prot e c t i on than t h i s  if and only 
if a l l  of three cond i t ions are  s a t i s f ied : 
( 1 ) aN � min (aW, �l
sW} ; 
( 2 )  a1 sW > ( a1 + 2 a2 ) �;
( 3 ) �v � a1r • / < a1 + 2 a2 l '?I '
where  1\v = < llw - cN) - ( 1\,1 - c ) .  Le t
F h .ooo 
F '  = t200 ( for a ful l er warranty) 
SW 
100 uni t s 
c t45 
t46 ( for a 3 4  cw ful l e r  warranty) 
h
\'I t62 ( for a ful l er  
warranty)
� i59
a1 = , 80 ( 80% o f  the consum e r s  a r e  non shopp e r s ) . 
Respe c t ing  t he three condi t i ons l i s t ed abov e ,  the f i r s t  i s  
s a t i s f ied,  for °N = 7 1 ;  a l'/  = 7 5 ;  a1 sW = 80 , and thus
°N � m i n ( aW , al sW } .  Decaus e  f i rms have a compara t ive advant a ge a t
s e l l ing w i thout warrant i e s ,  some o f  them coul d d e t e r i orate  warranty 
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coverage in re sponse to a l ack o f  compa r i son shopp ing , For a l l  f i rm s  
t o  a c t  i n  thi s  w a y ,  t h e  l a s t  two cond i t i ons ruus t a l so b e  s a t i s f i e d .  
Cond i t ion two i s  not . Whi l e  a1 sW = SO , ( a1 + 2 a2 ) � = 85 ; t h e  l e f t
s i de o f  t h e  ine qua l i ty i s  l e s s  than t h e  r i gh t  s i de ,  Uenc e ,  the 
observed homoge n i e ty could not r e f l e c t  a compl e te de t e r i or a t i on of  
warranty covera ge . I n  a dd i t ion, s i nce  at  l e a st some  f irms in  t h i s  
i l l u s t r a t i on woul d reduce warranty cove r a ge i n  r e sponse t o  
insu f f i c i ent comp a r i son shopp ing, t h a t  n o  f irm s h ave  done s o  impl i e s  
t h e  occurrence of  e nough compa ri son shopping t o  sus t a i n  a compe t i t iv e  
equil ibr i um.  A l s o ,  w e  have de f ined a consume r ' s  w i l l ingne s s  t o  pay 
for a warranty as the  d i f fe rence be twe e n  the h i g h e s t  price s the 
consumer would be w i l l ing to  pay for the good w i th and wi thout 
warranty prot e c t i on .  In t he i l l us t r a t i on, th i s  d i f f e rence is $3 . Le t 
the w i l l i ngne s s  to pay for a warranty ri se to $4 . 50 .  Then t h e  
r e spe c t ive co�pa r a t iv e  advant a g e s  a r c  rev e r s e d ;  aN remains a t  7 1  whi l e
all decl ine s t o  6 !J ,  I n  th i s  event , f i rm s  wou l d  never re spond t o
impe r f e c t  inform a t i on by reduc ing cover a g e , Thus ,  a l though the 
f i gure s  them s e l v e s  are im aginary,  they do s ug g e s t  that i f  a mode r a t e  
amount o f  compa r i son shopping occurs ( 20 percent i u  tho  e xarup l c )  and 
i f  consun1 o r s  s t r ongly prefer w a r r a n t i e s ,  an outcoue in which a l  1 f i rms
o f f e r  the same cov e r a g e  is unl ike l y  to r e f l e c t  the compl e te monopo l y
e q u i l ibr ium,  
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( 2 ) /lo st  f i rm s in a marke t  o f f e r  the same warranty, but a 
very f ew o f f e r  extended cov e r a ge on important compone nt s .  Since 
consume r s  w i l l  no t ge t more warra nty coverage  than they want , thi s 
p a t t e r n  coul d r e f l e c t  ( a )  "Noi s e " : The devi ant f irms are making 
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promot iona l warrant i e s ,  for examp l e ;  ( b )  Unsuspe cted  h e t e rogene i ty in 
produc t s  o r  consum e r  p r e f e rence s ,  A d e c i s i onm ake r evalua t ing cove rage  
mus t wake a n  i n i t i a l , l argely  impr e s s i oni s t i c  j udgment as  t o  what 
36 produ c t s  are in  the same marke t .  Diverse  warr anty cov e r a ge could
indicate  previous l y  unno t i c e d  d i f f e rence s i n  product typ e s  o r  consum e r  
want s ;  ( c )  All  b u t  a f ew f i rm s  a r e  dev i a t i n g  downward f r om t h e  
pre f e rred coverage in r e sponse to  a l ac k  of  compa r i son s hopp ing . 
The se pos s ib i l i t i e s  sugge s t  the f ac t o r s  that a de c i s i onmake r 
could expl ore , Promot iona l warrant i e s  are e a sy to ident i fy s i nce they 
commonl y  are a s so c i a t e d  with the introdu c t i on of  new produc t s .  
Re spect ing a choice be tween the  l a s t  two outcom e s ,  the que s t i on i s  
whe ther consumers  n c t ua l ly are shoppers for the produc t s  that  have a nd 
l a ck the be t t e r  warranty, Suppo s e  that consum e r s  who pur cha se the 
s t a ndard w arranty woul d not purch a s e  the be t t e r  one , though they have 
the opp o r t un i ty to do so, because  they be l i eve  the add i t i onal 
prot e c t i on not to be worth its cost to them . Then, two m ar ke t s  
a c t u a l l y  e x i s t , one f o r  a produ c t  w i th the st andard warranty and the 
o t h e r  for  a product w i th the b e t t e r  warr anty ; coverage i n  each marke t 
i s  homogeneous and c a n  be c v n l ua t e d  a s  above , llut i f  consum e r s  .!'.2il
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pay tho p r e m i um roqu i s i to for g r e a t e r  w a r r a nty p r o t e c t i on ,  so t h o t  one 
m o rte t i n  f oo t  e x i s t s ,  marke t p e r formance i s  u n s a t i s f a c t ory . Uany 
f i rm s  are o f f e r i n g  l e s s p r e f e r r e d  cove r a g e  at sup r a compe t i t iv e  p r i c e s ,  
( 3 )  Mo s t  f i rms i n  a m a rke t o f f e r  the same w a r r anty , but a very
few r e s t r i c t  cov e r a g e , as  by l im i t i n g  i t  t o  t h e  o r i g i na l  purch a s e r .  
Th i s  p a t t e r n  c o u l d  r e f l e c t  ( a )  Unsuspe c t e d  h e t e r o g e ne i ty .  Consum e r s  
who pu r c h a s e  t h e  r e s t r i c t e d  w a r ranty woul d not pay t h e  p r e m i um 
requi s i te to ob t a i n i ng the s t a nd a r d  w a r r a nt y ,  .Q!'. ( b )  One m a rke t e x i s t s
a nd a f ew f i rm s i n  i t  a r e  de t e r i or a t i n g  w a r r a nty cont e n t . In t h i s  
event , p r i ce s f o r  t h e  s t a n d a r d  w a r r a nt y  a l so o re l ik e l y  t o  b e  t oo 
h i gh ,  for i n s u f f i c i en t  compa r i s o n  shopp i ng o c c u r s  t o  s us t a i n  t h e  
c ompe t i t iv e  e qu i l i b r i um .  I f  i nqui ry rul e s  out h e t e r o g e ne i ty ,  a 
de c i s i onmnker c o u l d  know t h a t  whi l e  cove r a g e i s  not a s e r i ous 
p r obl em-- only a f e w  f i rm s dev i a te--pr i c i n g  could b e , An a na l y s i s  o f  
a c t u a l  p r i c i n g p a t t e rn s  wou l d  then i l l um ina t e  the p r ob l em ' s 
s e r i ousne s s ,  
Two g e ne r a l  remarks s h o u l d  b e  m n d e  about t h i s  e xe r c i s e .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  f ac t o r s  t h a t  w e  sugge s t  o r e  r e l evant w i l l  s e l dom b e  
s u s c e p t i b l e  o f  p r e c i s e app l i c a t i on .  They r e l y  heav i l y  on s u rv e y  
d a t n--how nmch shopp i n g  occu r s ?  Woul d consum e r s  pay for b r oa d e r 
w a r r a nt i e s ?  Such d a t a  i s  e xp e n s ive to g a th e r ,  and s om e t im e s  w i l l  
s u f f e r  f rom r e spon s e  b i n s ,  A s  a n  i l l u s t r a t i on ,  a c o n s um e r  m i g h t  say 
in a n  i n t e rv i ew that he wou l d  b e  w i l l ing t o  pay n l a r g e  s um f o r  a 
w a r r a n t y  b e c a u s e  he w a n t s  to p o r t r a y him s e l f  a s  a prudent pe r s on ,
whi l e  i n  f a c t  he w ou l d  buy w i t h out a w a r r a nty i f  !: i v e n  t h e  ch o i c e . 
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Consum e r  surv e y s  n e v e r t he l e s s  may y i e l d  u a e f ul d a t a ,  and a r e  e mp l oy e d  
i n  o t h e r  l e g a l  f i e l d s  for s i m i l a r  purpo s e s  a s  t h o s e  sugge s t e d  h e r o . 
In a nt i t r us t ,  a s  a n  i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  c o n s um e r  a t t i t ud e s t ow a r d  p o s s i b l e  
p r i c e  movement s a r e  u s e d  t o  de t e rm ine whe t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  p r oduc t s  
a c tua l l y arc i n  t h e  s a m e  m a rke t for t h e  purpo s e  o f  eva l ua t i ng t h e  
compe t i t iv e  e f f e c t o f  n1c r g e r s .  Al so , d e c i s i onn1ake r s  t o d a y  ev a l ua te 
the e f f e c t  o f  i mp e r f e c t  i nf o rm a t i on on cont r a c t  qua l i ty inno c e nt both 
of theory .!!.!!Jl. d a t a .  Sug g e s t i v e  data whose r e l evance is impl i e d  by 
p l au s i b l e  the ory shou l d  m ake p o s s ib l e  more s e n s i b l e  pol icy , 
Second,  b o t h  the r e l a t iv e l y  happy norm a t iv e  out com e s  t h a t  t h e  
c1ode l p r e d i c t s-- c o n s um e r s o f t e n  w i l l  g o t  t ho w a r r a n t i e s  t h e y  want ; a l l  
compe t i t iv e  e q u i l ib r i a  a r e  e f f i c i e nt-- and t h e  po s i t iv e  a na l y s i s  i t s e l f  
d e p e n d  h e av i l y on t h e  mode l ' s  a s sump t i on s . For examp l e ,  i f  c o n s um e r s  
w i l l  m ake i n c o r r e c t  choi ce s r e s pe c t i ng warranty cove r a g e  b e c a u s e  they 
are un i n f ormed about r i s k s , that m a rke t s  by and l a rge r e spond 
ad equa t e l y  t o  t h o s e  c ho i ce s m ay not be e sp e c i a l ly de s i r a b l e ,  The 
mode l ' s  a s sump t i ons thus niu s t  be e xa m ine d in m o r e  d e t a i l ,  but b e f o r e  
d o i n g  s o ,  w e  s h a l l  s e t  o u t  a mode l f o r  a s e cu r i ty int e r e s t  m a rke t .  
Th i s  mode l i s  s im i l a r  t o  t h e  one s j us t  d i scus s e d ,  a nd w i l l  c o mp l e t e 
the f o rm a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  marke t s  f o r  cont r a c t  t e rm s ,  
II I .  S e c u r ity I nterest Markets 
S e cu r i ty i n t e r e s t s  in consum e r  goods have b e e n  e xt e ns i v e l y  
regul a t e d .  S in c e  t h e  c e n t r a l  conce rn i s  overbroad s e cu r i ty ,  t h e  
r e l ev a nt (iUe s t i on i s  whe t h e r  f i rms e xp l o i t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  e i t h e r  
a s p e c t  o f  impe r f e c t  i n f o rm a t i on b y  e xa c t i n g  m o r e  d r a co n i a n  s e cu r i ty 
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intere s t s  t han w e l l  informe d  c onsum e r s  wou l d  g r a n t . A s  be fore , we 
i ni t i a l ly suppo s e  t h a t  cons um e r s  can m a ke c o r r e c t  cho i c e s r e s pe c t i ng 
s e cu r i t y ,  and t h e n  s e t  forth a mod e l  of a " s e cu r i ty int e r e s t  m arke t" 
in whi ch consum e r s  aro imp e r f e c t l y  inform e d  o f  m a r ke t p r i c e s  a nd 
t e rm s .  37 Th i s  model  show s  t h a t  f irm s w i l l  not r e spond to insuf f i c i ent
consumer s e a rch by e x a c t ing ov e rbroad s e cu r i ty i n t e r e s t s ,  but may 
charge supra compe t i t iv e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f o r  those s e cu r i ty terms t h a t  
conswners p r e f e r , Hence , regul a t i on r e s t r i c t i n g  s e cu r i ty o n  impe r f e c t  
i nform a t i on groun d s  i s  m i s conce ived i f  consum e r  cho i ce s f o r  and 
a g a i n s t  s e cu r i t y  are corre c t ,  e que s t i on we t a ke up in Pa r t  IV, inf r a .  
W e  i ni t i a l ly supp o s e : ( i )  Cred i t o r s  o r e  b a nks , e a c h  of wh i c h
m a ke s l oa ns f o r  a f i x e d  amoun t ,  "L" ; ( i i )  The p r ob a bi l i ty that a 
consumer w i l l  d e f au l t i s  "n " , 1Thi ch i s  known to a l l ;  ( i i i )  c on s um e r s
w h o  de f a ul t m a y  g o  b a nkrup t ;  the probab i l i ty t h a t  o consum e r  w i l l  g o  
ba nkrup t � t h a t  h e  or she has  de f a u l t e d  i s  "A";  ( iv) F i rm s  r e cover
a f ra,c t i on o f  the unpa i d  d e b t ,  "p" , in b a nkrup tcy proce e d i ng s ; ( v) A 
f irm c a n  l e nd 1d t h  or w i thout a s e cu r i ty i n t e r e s t ,  but c a nno t do b o t h .  
Secu r i ty intere s t s  i n  t h i s  mode l ore purch a s e  money; t h e  b a n k  p rovide s 
3 8  cre d i t  t o  enab l e  the consumer t o  purch a s e  the r,r oduc t .  I f  a f i rm 
t a ke s s e curi ty , i t  c a n  recover the v n l ue o f  the u s e d  good , "V , "  
whe ther t h e  consum e r  goe s b ankrupt or no t .  3 9 lie a s s u01c t h a t  the 
co l l a t e r a l  on r e po s s e s s i on is  worth l e s s  than the out s t a n d i ng d e b t ; 
L ) V; ( v i )  "r" i s  t h e  i nte r e s t  r a t o ,  "S" i s  t h e  t o t a l  amount of f un d s
ava i l ab l e  for l oa n s , n nd S / LF s  i s  then t h e  f i rm ' s c a pa c i ty ,  t h e  t o t a l  
numb e r  o f  l oo ns t h a t  c a n  b e  n:nde ; ( v i i )  " F "  i s  the f i rr.1 ' s f ixed c o s t
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in m a k i n g  l oa n s , nn<l " c "  i s  i t s  m a r g i na l  c o s t .  Th i s  c o s t  i s  m e a sured 
as  a n  i n t e r e s t  r a te-- the opportun i ty c o s t  o f  not l e nd i n g  in 
nonconswn e r  v10rke t s .  Le t " cs" b e  the marginal  c o s t  o f  l e nd ing w i th 
s e cu r i ty und " cN" the m u r g i na l c o s t  of l ending un s e cure d ,  I f  a f i rm 
doe s t a ke s e curi ty , i t s  f ixed c o s t s  i nc r e a s e  in an amount "F ' " •  where 
r •  i n c l ud e s  the co s t  o f  d r a f t i ng s e curi ty a g r e ement s ,  a dm i n i s t e r i ng a 
r e s a l e  f a c i l i ty for repo s s e s s e d  c o l l a te r a l  a nd so f o r t h .  
The s e  a s sump t i ons impl y  t h a t  a f i rm' a e xp e c t e d  n e t  m a r g i n a l  
r a t e  o f  l o s s  due to ba nkrup t cy i s  n� ( l - p )  � k ,  I f  a f i rm recov e r s  a 
f ra c t i on o f  the unpa i d  d e b t ,  p ,  in b a nkrup t cy proce e d i ng s ,  i t  l o s e s 
t h e  f ra c t i on ( 1-p )  when the consum e r  b e com e s  b a nkrup t .  The 
probab i l i ty o f  de fault i s  n ,  and o f  b a nkrup t cy .&.lY!!I default is Al
hence , the tot a l  expocted r a t e  of l os s  f rom bankrup tcy i s  the product
o f  the s e  f ac t o r s ,  nA ( l - p ) , which we deno t e  by k .  I f  t h e  f i rm t a ke s 
n s e cu r i ty inte r e s t ,  i t  c a n  recov e r  the v a l ue of the u s e d  good,  V .  
S in c e  otherw i s e  i t  m i gh t  have to s e e k  th i s  v a l ue i n  b a nkrup t cy ,  a n d  
i t s  r a t e  o f  l o s s  on t he s u m  wou l d  then be k ,  tho v a l ue o f  s e cu r i ty t o  
t h e  f i rm i s  V k ;  s e cu r i ty s,ave s the f i rm th i s  s um ,  The a dd i t i on a l  c o s t
o f  t aking s e cu r i ty p e r  l o a n  i s  F ' /s ,  where F '  i s  t h e  i nc r e a s e d  c o s t  o f
s e cu r i ty a n d  s i s  tho numbe r  o f  l o a n s ,  We a s sume F '  /s < Vk, whi ch i s
t o  s ay that the c o s t  o f  s e cur i ty to a f i rm ( F ' /s )  i s  l e s s t h a n  the
>I< 
g a i n  ( Vk) , I f  rN i s  the compe t i t iv e  inte r e s t  r a t e  on a l oan w i thout 
>I< 
s e cu r i ty and rs i s  the r a t e  w i th s e cu r i ty ,  i t  then fol l ow s  t h a t  
>I< • 
rN > rs ; inte r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  l ower when f irm s t ake s e cu r i ty b e c a us e  in
comp e t i t i v e  equ i l ibr ium pr i ce equa l s  c o s t  and s e cu r i ty lowers a f i rm ' s 
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c o s  t s .  
lle s p e c t i n g  c o n s ume r s ,  w e  s s s un1e t h a t  ( i )  e a ch consum e r  w a n t s  
t o  b o r r ow L d o l l ar s  o r  none ; ( i i )  c o n s um e r s  s h o p  e x a c t l y a s  t h e y  d o  
f o r  w a r r a n t i e s .  I n  p a r t i cu l ar ,  consume r s  s e t  f i x e d  s amp l e  s i z e s  
b e f or e  s e a r c h i n g  f o r  l oa ns , w i t h  some c o n s umer s '  samp l e  s i z e s  e q u a l ing 
one ( th e  non s h opp e r s )  and s om e  con sume r s '  s a mp l e  s i z e s  e xc e e d i n g  one 
( t h e  shoppe r s ) ;  ( i i i )  � is the l im i t  p r i c e ( o r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ) t h a t  a 
consumer w i l l  pay when no s e cu r i ty i n t e r e s t  i s  t a ke n  a nd hS i s  t h e  
l im i t  p r i c e  when s e cu r i ty e x i s t s .  H e r e  hN ) h s ; consuti c r s  a r e  w i l l ing
t o  p a y  h i g h e r  i nt e r e s t  r a t e s  when no s e cu r i t y i s  demande d ;  ( iv )  
Consumer s p r e f e r  !!Q1 t o  g i v e  s e cu r i ty ,  Th i s  i s  t o  s a y  t h a t  a consumer
o f f e r e d  t h e  opp o r t un i ty t o  bo rrow a t  compe t i t iv e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s w i th 
and w i thout s e cu r i ty w i l l p a y  the p r em i um n e c e s s a ry to compe n s a t e  
f i rms f o r  l e n d i n g uns e cured . F o r  conveni ence , consum e r s  a r e  s a i d  h e r e  
not to p r e f e r  s e cu r i ty a t  a l l ;  the a n a l y s i s  a l s o a pp l i e s  w h e n  
consum e r s  p r e f e r  l o s s  s e cu r i ty t h a n  f i rm s wou l d  l ike t o  o b t a i n .  
The o n l y  s i n g l e  p r i c e  e q u i l i b r i um i n  t h i s  mod e l  o c c u r s  when no 
f i rm demands s e cu r i ty and a l l  f i rms c h ar g e  t h e  compe t i t iv e i nt e r e s t  
r a t e  r� , The l o g i c unde r l y ing t h i s  rc sul t i s  s i m i l a r t o  t h a t  u s e d
abov e .  F i r s t ,  l e t  tl'e compe t i t i v e  o u t c om e  o b t u i n .  /I f i rm w i s h i n g  t o
• 
r a i s e  i t s  p r i c e  above rN but l e n d  w i thout s e cu r i t y w i l l  l o s e  t h e  
bus i ne s s  o f  e v e ry s hoppe r .  Th i s  i s  b e c a u s e  e a c h s h opp e r  w i l l s e e  n t  
• 
l e a s t  one p r i c e-- rH-- t h a t  i s  l e s s t h a n  t h e  p r i c e  of t h e  de v i a n t  f i rrn.
Hence , the dev i ant w i l l  l e nd o n l y  to no n s h oppL r s a nd \•J ou l d  c h a r g e  t hem 
hi'! , the h i 3h e s t  r a t e  f o r  n l oa n  w i t hout s e cu r i t y t h a t  c o n s um e r s  w i l l
pn y .  I f  too f e w  non s hoppe r s  e x i s t ,  the f i rm wou l d  d o  b e t t e r  by 
• 
45 
s t a y in g  a t  rN t h a n  by r, o i n g  t o  hN . A f i rm w i s h i n g  to c! e v i a t e  f r om the
compe t i t iv e  outcome by dem and i ng s e cu r i ty a l s o  wou l d  l end only to 
non s h opp e r s .  The s hopp e r s  b y  a s s ump t i on p r e f e r  t o  b o rrow un s e cu r e d  a t  
"' 
rN r a ther than b o r row s c eu r e c!  a t  the l owe s t  p r i c e  po s s i b l e  f o r
• 
s e cu r i ty ,  rs · Dence , th i s  dev i a n t  f irm a l so wou l d  l e nd o n l y  t o
nons hoppe r s ,  a n d  t hus woul d b o t h  e x a c t  s e cu r i ty a n d  r a i s e  i t s p r i ce t o  
h s , t h e  h i gh e s t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  consum e r s  a re w i l l ing t o  p a y  f o r  s e cu r e d
l oa ns . Once more , i f  t o o  f e w  non s h opp e r s  e x i s t ,  t h i s  s t r a t e gy wou l d  
b e  l e s s  p r o f i t a b l e  than t h o  s t r a t e gy o f  c o n t i nu i ng t o  l e n d  un s e cu r e d  
• 
a t  rM ' Th e r e f o r e , i f  enough comp a r i son s h op p i n g  o ccur s ,  t h e  only
s i n g l e  p r i c e  e qu i l i b r i um  w i l l  b e  at the compe t i t ive p r i c e ,  w i thout 
s e c ur i ty .  
I f  too f ew s h opp e r s  e x i s t  t o  s u s t a i n  a compe t i t i v e  
e q u i l ibr i um ,  f i rm s  w i l l  c h a r ge sup r a c omp e t i t iv e  i n t e re s t  r a t e s but 
wou l d  not demand s e cur i t y .  To see w hy ,  r e c a l l  that 11 f i rm ' s m a r g i n a l  
c o s t  for l end i n g w i th s e cu r i ty i s  cs , a nd f o r  l en d i n g  un s e cu r e d  i s  cN . 
F i rm s  would not f or e g o  s e cur i ty unl e s s  c o n sume r s  would be w i l l in g  t o  
p a y  t h em t h e  c o s t  o f  g iv in g  i t  up . Th i s  c o s t  i s  cN - c s a n d  t he 
c o n s umer s '  w i l l i n gne s s  to pay to a v o i d  s e cu r i ty i s  hN - h s , H e nce , 
s e cu r i ty w i l l  not be s e e n  i f  hN - 118 cN - cs . Aga i n ,  t h ough t h i s
i ne q ua l i ty doe s not ne ce s s a r i ly ho l d  g iv e n  t h e  r e s t r i c t iv e  cons t a nt 
m r.r r, i n o l c o s t  a s sump t i on w e  ru n ke , we a s s um e  i t  to h o l d ,  for i t  woul d 
• • 
be t h e  c a s e  t h a t  cN = r�1 and c s  rs w e r e  f i rm s a s sum e d  t o  h a v e  m or e
n o r 1:1 a l  co s t  curve s .  Th e r e f or e , i f  c o n s um e r s  do not want s e cur i ty b u t  
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too few o f  them shop t o  g e ne r a t e  a compe t i t iv e  e quil ibrium ,  f irm s w il l  
charge supra compe t i t i v e  p r i ce s but w i l l  not e x a c t  unwa nt e d  s e cur ity 
i n t e re s t s .  
Consumers may p r e f e r  s e curi ty i f  Vk, the s a v i n g s  t h a t  s e curity
make s po s s ibl e to a f i rm ,  is l ar&e • I n  t h i s  event , s e curi ty could 
• • 
reduce a f i rm ' s  co s t  s uf f i cient l y  so t h a t  hN - hS < rN - rs ; 
consumers ' w i l l ingne s s  to pay ( �  - hS) i s  too s l igh t to ove rcome the
• • 
l arge premium t h a t  f i rm s  woul d charge to e schew s e curi ty ( rN - rs > ·  
Suppo s i ng consumers now t o  want the i nt e re s t  r a t e  re duc t i ons t h a t  
s e curi ty m a k e s  pos s i bl e ,  the a na ly s is i s  then s im i l ar to t h a t  m ad e  
resp e c t ing warrant i e s ,  I n  t h i s  e v e nt ,  ( 1 ) u l l f i rm s  w i l l  l e nd w ith 
• 
s e curi ty at r8 if e nough consumers compa ri son shop;  ( 2) a l l  f ir�1s w il l
l e nd w i t h  s e curity but some o r  a l l  w i l l  charge supracompe t i t iv e  price s 
i f  (a) not e nough shopping occurs t o  sus t a in a compe t i t ive equil ib rium 
n nd (b) f i rms have a comp a r a t i v e  advant a g e  a t  se l l ing w i th s e curi ty , 
a nd ( 3 )  f irms w i l l  b o t h  charge sup r a compe t i t iv e  price s a nd e s chew
s e curi ty i f  the comp a ra t i v e  a dv a nt a ge is the o t h e r  wny and 
i nsuf f i c i e nt s hopp inc o ccur s .  Firm s  w il l  have a compa ra t iv e  a dv a n t a g e  
a t  l ending w ith s e curi ty i f  the f ix e d  c o s t  of s e curi ty ( F ' )  i s  . l ow and 
the consum e rs '  de s i re for the l ower int e re s t  ra t e s  t h a t  a ccompany it-
- th e  w il l ingne ss (not) t o  p ay-- i s  h i gh ,  He nce , consum e r s  who p r e f e r  
to borrow w i t h  s e curi ty w i l l  be abl e to d o  so i f  the i r  pre f e re nce i s  
suf f i c i en t l y  s t rong a n d  s e curity i s  not exce s s iv e l y  co s t l y  f o r  f irm s 
to t a te ,  even if l i t t l e  s hopp ing for cre d i t  o c cu r s . 
TI1 i s  ana l y s i s  impl ies that current re gul a t ion of s e curity 
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int e r e s t s  in consumer goods i s  m i s conce ive d ,  t o  the e x t e nt t h a t  it i s  
r.i nde to re s t  on t h e  no t ion t h a t  consumers are impe rfect l y  inf ormed 
about the pos s ib i l i t i es r e s p e c t ing s e cur i ty t h a t  the marke t o f f er s . 
re gul a t i on t oday i s  devoted a l mo s t  e xc l us iv e l y  to re s t r i ct i ng the 
abil ity of f irm s to t a ke s e cur i t y .  But f irm s w i l l  not  demand more 
s e curi ty than consum e r s  pre f e r  to give,  though they may e x a c t  l e ss ,  
Al s o ,  those compe t i t iv e  equi l ibr i a  t h a t  e x i s t  i n  m a rke t s  for s e curity 
inte re s t s  a r e  e f f i c i e nt , supp o s i ng consumers to be abl e to m ake 
correct  cho i ce s  respe c t i ng s e curi ty . Thus , the  princ i p a l  probl em in 
Llarte ts for s e curity s e em ing l y  i s  t h a t  i nt e r e s t  rate s may be too h i g h ,  
This probl em, however,  h a s  a l re a dy b e e n  a dd re s s e d  b y  l e g i s l a t i on such 
ns the Truth in Lending Law, appare n t l y  succe s s ful l y .
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Aga i n, thoug h ,  the pos i t iv e  a nd norm a t ive imp l i c a t i ons of t h i s  
anal)• s is are s e ns i t iv e  to i ts a s s ump t i ons , For examp l e ,  we suppose 
t h a t  consumers can make correct cho i ce s r e s p e c t i ng s e curi ty but have 
g iv e n  no g rounds in support of t h i s  as sump t i on.  We thus turn t o  a n  
analy s i s  of t h e  import a nt but s e em ingly cont rove rs i a l  a s sumpt ions t h a t  
unde rl ie t h e  mode l s  j us t  d e s c r ibe d ,  
IV . Unde rlying Assumpt ions 
Econom ic mode l s  commonly make a s sumpt i ons for h e ur i s t ic 
purpo s e s t h a t  m ay be f a l s e  in f a ct ,  The s e  a s sumpt ions o f t e n  are 
innocuous . Fo r examp l e ,  our mode l s  a s sUJU e  that consumers h ave 
pe cul iar dem a nd funct ions-- they always buy one un i t  or none--and that 
f irm s have pe cu l i a r  cos t s t ructure s-- they have cons t a nt marginal cost s  
s o  t h a t  avera ge co s t s  cont inuous l y  d e c l ine unt il the l ev e l  of out put 
i s  reached a t  w h i ch they are m i n i m i z e d ,  a f t e r  w h i c h  co s t s  b e come 
i n f in i te . The mode l s '  r e s u l t s  d o  not change when these s t rong 
a s sumpt i ons are r e l axe d , 4 1  Al s o ,  the mode l s  a s s um e  that  consum e r s  have 
common l im i t  p r i ce s a nd u s e  f ixed s ampl e  s i z e  search s t r a t e g i e s .  The 
f o rmer a s sumpt i on i s  f a l se and t h e  l o t t e r  i s  a p l au s i b l e surm i s e ,  y e t  
t h e  p r e d i c t i ons o f  our homog e ne ous goods mode l ,  which u s e d  t he se 
a s sumpt i ons , a r e  cons i st ent w i th actual marke t b e h av i o r .  
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d i s c u s s  here two o f  the l a t e r  mode l s '  a s sump t i on s  t h a t  m ay s e em 
p a r t i cu l a r l y  probl ema t i c : ( 1 ) consumers can v a l ue the r i sks t h a t  
cont r a c t  t e rms a l l o c a t e-- they know the " odd s " ,  a n d  ( 2 )  consum e n  
ca nnot a f fe c t  t h e  odd s ,  on a s sump t i on which,  among other t h i n g s ,  
a l l ow s  u s  conv e n i ent ly t o  supp o s e  t h a t  consUL1 o r  p re f e rence s f o r  
w arranty a n d  s e cu r i ty int e r e s t  t e rm s  a r e  homo g e ne ous . The mode l s '  
r e su l t s  mus t b e  q ua l i f i ed i n  l ight o f  a more re a l i s t i c  app r a i s a l  of 
t h e s e  a s sumpt i on s , but the qua l if i c a t ions s e en1 l e s s s e r i ous than trny 
be though t .  
A. Impe r fe c t  In fo rn o t i on .!!! the F i r s t  Sens e :  !Cpowi ug 11!£. Ollds 
The typ i c a l  p e r s on ' s e s t im a te s of the odds of produ c t  f a i l u r e  
, or of h i s or h e r  own de f au l t se l dom w i l l  equa l the true v n l ue s .  F i rm s  
n r e  b e l i ev e d  t o  e xp l o i t  t h o s e  e rr o r s  b y  impo s i ng unw a n t e d  t e rm s .  
F i rm s ,  howev e r ,  re spond t o  consum e r s  i n  the  a gg r e ga t e ,  not a s  
i nd i v i du a l s ;  cons e quent l y ,  no f i rm l:nows o r  c o u l d  know the e s t i m a t e  o f  
the odds that  nny p a r t i cu l ar consm; c r  h o l d s . 43 l :e ncc , tho que s t i o n  i s  
whether consum e r s  i n  the a g g r e g a te trnke sys t 1m i. t i c  e rrors  such tha t 
f i rm s hove i n c e n t i v e s  to d e gr ade c o n t r a c t  cont e n t . lie n e x t  a r gue tha t 
sy s t e 1:111 t i c  e rror of th i s  s o r t  i s  uncommon. 
( 1 ) Ha rke t Ue spops o s  .1Q Consun1e r Errors
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J l a rke t s  w i l l  c o r r e c t  f or some forms o f  consumer e r r o r .  To 
show how th i s  occu r s ,  we sh a l l  b e g i n  w i th p r o duc t s  and m ake the more 
r e a l i s t i c a s sump t i on t h a t  a consum e r ' s  subj e c t i v e  probab i l i ty of 
pr oduc t f a i l ur e  is r e l a te d  t o  but is not e x c l u s i v e l y  de t e rm ine d by 
a c t u a l  f a i l ure probab i l i t i e s .  Le t " S" be the consume r ' s subj e c t ive 
be l i e f  o f  the l ike l ihood o f  p r oduct f a i l ur e ; "A" be t h e  actual odds 
a nd " e "  b e  a n  e rror t e rm re f l e c t ing the e x i s t ence o f  impe r f e c t  
inform a t i on ,  Then E ( S )  = E ( A )  + E( e ) ,  w h e r e  "E" i s  u s e d  t o  denote the
e xp e c t e d  o dd s ,  and e rr o r s  a re a s sum e d  t o  be a dd i t iv e .  I f  a consum e r  
i s  " op t im i s t i c" ,  b e l i ev ing the p r oduct t o  be m o r e  re l ia b l e t h a n  i t  i s  
i n  f a ct , e i s  on a v e r a g e  ne ga t iv e ;  E ( S )  < E ( A ) ; i f  t h e  consumer i s
"pe s s imi s t i c , " b e l i ev i ng the produ c t  t o  b e  l e s s  r e l i a b l e  t han i t  
a c t ua l ly i s ,  e i s  on a v e r a g e  pos i t i v e  E ( S )  > E ( A ) . For the unb i a s e d
c on s umer,  e i s  z e r o ;  E ( S )  = E ( A ) , Thi s  r e p r e s e nt a t ion o f  consum e r
p r e f e rence s seems  p l a u s i b l e for t w o  r e a sons . F i r s t ,  a consumer ' s  
s ubj e c t iv e  be l ie f  about produ c t  r e l i a b i l i ty p r ob a b l y  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  
a c t u a l  r e l iab i l i ty .  A n e w  c a r  or s t e r e o ,  f o r  e xamp l e ,  i s  unl ike l y  to 
be r a d i c a l ly aore or l e s s  r e l i abl e  than p r i or mode l s ,  A consum e r  
o f t e n  w i l l  have owned o p r i o r  mod e l or t a l ke d  w i th oth e r s  w h o  h ave
owu e d  i t  or who own the new a1o<le l .  i\ l s o ,  the charact e r i s t i c s  o f  many 
new mode l s  a r e  d i scus s e d  in m a g a z ine s a nd newspape r s .  Dence , the 
a c t u a l  odds a r c  1 ike l y  t o  i n f l u e nce the consumer ' s  e st im a t e  of wha t 
t h o s e  odds n r e . Se cond , b e c a us e consum e r s  l ac k  the exp e r t i se a nd 
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resources t o  t e st p r oducts, and because soae produc t charac t e ri s tics 
can only be revealed through use, a consum e r ' s  e s timate of the act ual 
odds will seldom be compl e t e ly nccurnt e .  1nus it is r ealis t ic t o  
r e p r e sent this e s t im a t e  a s  E ( S) = t ( A )  + E ( e ) ,  whe re t h e  e r ror t e rm o 
is ge ne rally p o s i t ive or nega tive . 
Three possibilities e xist re specting the e r r or t e rm when it i s  
viewed a s  a n  a g g rega t e  phe nomenon . First, S fluc t ua t e s  r a ndomly 
around t he true value A; e is "unbiased. " An e r ror t e rm is unbia s e d  
w h e n  positive a n d  n e gative estima t e s  o f  t h e  t r u e  value cancel out. 
'11t en, for consume r s  in the aggr ega t e  the mean e s timate E ( S) equals the 
true value E ( A). Since consume r s  in our models shop randomly across 
firms , e ach firm will p robably se e a r e p r e s e n t a tive sample of the 
marke t, The r e f ore ,  each f irm will r e s pond .!.§. if the consume rs 
visiting i t  knew the odds p e r f e c t ly; that is to say, the firm will 
satisfy the correct consumer choice s provid e d  t hat tho cond i t ion s 
de rived above f or sa tisfying .!!1!Y choice s a t  all o r e  m e t .  l l e nce, if 
consume r  e stim a t e s  of the odds o f  product d e f ec t s, or any o t h e r  odd s, 
fluc tua t e  randomly around t rue value s, that impe r f ect informa tion in 
the first sense exists d o e s  not c re a t e  a policy problem. 
Marke ts also correct for mos t  mani f e s t a tions of pe ssimism, To 
se e how, conside r  two c a se s ,  In t h e  fir s t ,  con sumers would w a n t  a 
warranty if they knew the act u a l  od d s ,  �nd also a r e  pe s simis t ic .  In 
t h i s  c a s e ,  pe s s imism is re flec t e d  in t he limit price, h\'/' which i s
hig h e r  than i t  would b e  were t h e  true odd s know n ;  pe s s imistic 
consum e r s  of this sor t  are willin e t o  pay exce s s ive price s for 
51 
w a r r a nties. Such pe s simism c r ea t e s no policy problems ind e p e nd e n t  of 
those tha t occur f rom insu f ficient compa rison shopping i tself. 
Init ially, since the con s um e r s  at i s sue would p r e f e r  a warranty were 
they informed, one poss ible problem is that firms might respond to 
insuf ficient shopping with disclaimers. This outcome, though, is � 
1iJs.ili to occur when consum e r s  are pe ssimistic than when they are 
inf o rmed; for when hW incr eases relative t o  hN ' the limit price for
t h e  p roduc t without a warranty, firms a r e  more likely t o  have a 
compa rative advant age a t  selling with warrantie s, Hence , when 
informed con s u m e r s  would want warranties and actual consumers also are 
p e s simistic, firm s are less likely t o  respond to insu f fici e n t  shopping 
by degrading cov e r a ge than when consumers are p e r fectly in f orme d  
re s p e c t ing ri s ks. Dccause hW is highe r  when p e ssimism exists, a 
secon<l conceivable problem is t hat firm s may charge p e ssimistic 
con sumers hieher price s for warranties than well informed c o nsumers 
would pay, Comparison s h oppinn p r events this outcome. Suppose that 
all firms o f f e r ed a war r anty at the limit p rice, l\i• which p e ssimism 
cause s to be a r t i f icially high. This price canno t constitute a n  
e q uilibrium becaus e  firm s have a n  incentive t o  und e rcut it. A firm 
can costlessly reduce i t s  price be low 'iv since its warranty expens e s  
a r e  a funct ion o f  the actua l odds, n o t  t h o  o d d s  that consum e r s  believe 
to e xi s t .  If the fim did cut its p rice by a small amoun t, i t  would 
cont inue to s e ll to the non shoppe r s  and also s e ll to e ve ry shop p e r  who 
visite d it, for it would h a v e  the low e s t  price in the m a rke t. The 
f irm could t h e r eby incre a se profits ov e r  those e a rne d by cha rging 1lv• 
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ev e n  when a sm a l l  amount of shopp i n g  o c c ur s .  Hen c e ,  hW coul d n o t  be 
a n  e qu i l ibr i um p r i c e , And by the l o g i c  of tho w a r r a n ty mode l s e t  out 
abov e ,  no o t h e r  p r i ce could cons t i t u t e  an e qu i l b r i wn exce p t  t h e  
compe t i t iv e  p r i c e ,  w h i c h  equa l s  e a ch f i rm ' s m in i mum av e r a g e  co s t ,  
Th i s  l a t t e r  p r i c e  r e f l e c t s  t h e  a c t ua l  odds o f  p r odu c t  f a i l ur e ,  Thus 
comp a r i son shop p i n g  c a n  e n s u r e  t h a t  c onsum e r s p a y  c o r r e c t  p r i c e s for 
warranty cov e r a ge , de s p i te p e s s im i sm ,  
T o  summar i z e ,  when consum e r s  who know t h e  odds w o u l d  p r e f e r  a 
w a r r anty and a c t u a l  consum e r s  a l so a re p e s s im i s t i c ,  no i ndependent 
p o l icy probl em e x i s t s  b e c a us e  ( i ) i f  i n s u f f i c i en t  comp a r i s o n  shopp i ri g  
o c c u r s  t o  su s t a i n  a compe t i t iv e  e q u i l ibr i um ,  p e s s im i s t i c  consum e r s  a r e
more l i ke l y  t o  ge t w a r r a n t i e s  t h a n  p e r f e c t ly i n f ormed c onsum e r s  a r e ,  
a n d  ( i i )  e v e n  mode s t  amoun t s  o f  compa r i s o n  s h opp i n g  w i l l  p r e v e n t  f i rm s 
f rom e xp l oi t i n g  t h e  g r e a t e r  w i l l i ngne s s  t o  pay of pe s s im i s t i c  
consum e r s  b y  c h a r g i n g  a r t i f i c i a l ly h i gh p r i c e s f or w a r r a n ty 
p r ot e c t i on .  I f  p e s s im i s t i c  c o n s um e r s  d o  not s hop s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  
s us t a i n  a compe t i t iv e  equ i l i br ium ,  a p r o b l er.1 o f  cour s e  e x i s t s ,  t o  
whi ch t h e  b e s t  s t a t e r e sponse i s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e c ompa r i s o n  s hopp i n g ,  
nut t l: i s  a l so i s  t h e  be s t  r e s po n s e  when we l l  i n f ormed consum u r s  e n g a g e  
i n  too l i t t l e  s h op p i n g .  Hence , pe s s i m i sm pre s e n t s no i n d e p e n d e n t  
pol icy p r o b l em i n  t h i s  f i r s t  c a s e ,  
A conce r n  may e x i s t  i n  the s e cond c a s e  when we l l  i n f ormed
c o n s um e r s  would 1lQ1 p r e f e r  a w a r r a n t y ,  but pe s s im i si:-, ro s p c c t i n r.  the
odd s o f  f a i l u r e  c a u H s a c t u n l  consum e r s  t o  want o ne , Com�· n r i �on 
s h opp i n �  wou l d  c a us e the r e s u l t a nt w a r r a nty p r i c e s to be w e l l b e h av e d ,
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b u t  cons ur.1 e r s  w oul d b e  pur ch a s i n g  e xc e s s i v e  cove r a g e , Th i s  p r ob l em 
doc s not s e e m  s e r i ous f o r two r e a s o n s . F i r s t ,  p e s s im i sm moy be 
un s t a b l e  b e c a u s e  f i rms h ave a n  i n c e n t ive t o  d i s s ipa te i t .  Pe s s im i s t i c  
c o n s ume r s  not o n l y  p r e f e r  unne c e s s a ry warrant i e s  when t h e y  buy , but 
a l so w i l l  buy l e s s  than they woul d v1e r e  t hey we l l  inform e d ,  Hence , 
f i rm s s h ou l d  m ake e f f or t s  to prevent or r e duce s y s t e ma t i c  p e s·s im i sm ,  
Se cond , pe s s im i sm a t  wor s t  c a us e s  consum e r s  t o  b e  ove r i n s ur e d .  
Consum e r s a r e  c ommonly thought t o  b o  much wor s e  o f f  i f  they a r c  
w i thout p r ot e c t i on a g a i n s t  produc t r e l a t e d  l os s e s  t h a n  i f  t h ey 
s om e t im e s  h a v e  too much p r o t c c t i on , 4 4  
A s im i l a r a na l y s i s  appl i e s  t o  con sumer ch o i c e s  f o r  a n d  a g a i n s t  
s e cu r i t y .  I f  c o nsumer e s t im a t e s o f  t h e  o d d s  o f  d e f aul t a r e  unb i a s e d ,  
f i rm s w i l l  r e s pond a s  i f  consum e r s  h e l d  c o r r e c t  e s t i m a te s ,  Re s pe c t i n g  
p e s s im i sm ,  supp o s e  f i r s t  that c o n s um e r s  woul d r e j e c t  s e cu r i ty w e r e  
they we l l  i n f o rm e d  a nd a c t u a l  consum e r s  a l s o b e l i ev e  de f au l t t o  b e  
more l i k e l y  t h a n  i t  i s  i n  f a c t . Th e s e c o n s um e r s  w i l l  b e  w i l l i ng . t o  
pay more t h a n  t he y  shoul d t o  a v o i d  s e cur i ty i n t e r e s t s ,  Comp a r i son
s h opp i n g ,  howev e r ,  wil 1 p r event f i rm s  f rom expl o i t i ng t h i s  g r e a t e r  
w i l l i ngne s s  t o  p a y  by c h a r g i ng e xc e s s iv e  i nt e r e s t  r a t e s .  Suppo s e  next 
that we l l  i n f o rm e d  consum e r s  wou l d  pre f e r  s e c ur i ty b u t  p e s s im i sm 
re spe c t i n g  t h e  odd s o f  de f a ul t c a u s e s  a c t u a l  consum e r s  t o  r e j e c t  i t .  
Th e n ,  wh i l e  comp a r i son shopping woul d c a u s e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f o r  
un s e cu r e d  l oa n s  t o  b e  c o�ipe t i t iv e ,  consum e r s  a r e  borrow i n g  under the 
1·1ronr; c o nt r a c t ,  'fh i s  p r obl cr.1 is not s e r i ous . Fi rm s  h av e  a n  incent ive 
t o  d i s s ip a t e  p e s s i o i sm b e c a u s e  p e s s im i s t i c  c o n s um e r s  not o n l y  w i l l 
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rej e c t  s e cur i ty ;  some o f  them a l so w i l l  no t b o r row o r  w i l l  b o r row 
l e s s .  Hen ce , s y s t e m a t i c  p e s s im i sm m ny be un s t a b l e .  A l s o ,  the 
p e r c e iv e d  po l i cy p r o b l em i n  t h i s area i s  that s e cu r i ty puts consume r s  
t o o  m u c h  a t  t h e  m e r cy o f  f i rm s ;  pe s s im i sm a t  w o r s t  c a us e s  consume r s  t o  
b e  l e s s  a t  t h e  m e r cy o f  f i rm s  t h a n  i n  t h e  f u l l inform a t i o n  c a s e . 
The t h i rd p o s s ib i l i t y  re spe c t i n g  t h e  odd s i s  t h a t  consum e r s  
a r e  op t im i s t i c .  I n  thi s event , a p o l i cy p r ob l em e x i s t s  b e c a u s e  
m ar ke t s  m ay c o r r ec t  p o o r l y  f o r  op t im i sm .  A s  r e g a r d s  w a r r a nt i e s ,  
s uppo s e  f ir s t  t h a t  consum e r s  woul d w a n t  a w a r r a n t y  i f  they knew the 
odds a nd a c t ua l  consume r s  a l so a r e opt im i s t i c .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  op t i m i sm 
i s  r e f l e c t e d  in t h e  l im i t  p r i c e ,  111 • wh i c h  i s  l ow e r  thon i t  woul d b e  
w e r e  t h e  t r ue o d d s  known; op t im i s t i c  consum e r s  hove a n  a r t i f i c a l ly l ow 
w i l l ingne s s  to p a y  for w a r r a n t i e s .  I f  i n s u f f i c i e n t  compa r i son 
shopp i ng occur s t o  sus t a i n  a compe t i t i v e  e qu i l i b r i um ,  f i rm s  are more 
l i k e l y  t o  d e g r a de c o nt r a c t  q ua l i ty than in t h e  f u l l inform a t i on c a s e . 
Th i s  i s  b e c ause when �·/ f a l l s  r e l a t iv e  to hN ' f i rm s  a re more l i ke l }' t o
hove a compa r a t i v e  advant a g e  a t  s e l l i n g  w i thout w a r r a n t i e s .  Hen ce , 
whe n w e l l informed consum e r s  wou l d  w a n t  w a r r a n t i e s  a nd a c t ua l  
consum e r s  a r e  op t im i s t i c ,  insuf f i c i en t  compa r i s o n  shopp i n g  i s  l i k e l y  
to y i e l d  b o t h  s up r a compe t i t i v e  pr i c e s a nd s ubop t i m a l  cov e r a g e . Th i s  
p r obl em c a n  b e  cur e � .  a t  l e a s t  i u  the ory , b y  f a c i l i ta t i n g  compa r i son 
shopp i n g ,  but opt im i s m  c a us e s  o s e cond p r ob l eru that is l e s s  e a s i l y  
tt e a t e d .  
I f  we l l  i n f orm e d  c o n s um e r �  wou l d  w a n t  w a r r a nt i e s  b u t  op t i m i sm 
c a u s e s  n c t u a l  c o n s m� c r s  .!!.Q1 to cemanc t hem,  w � r r a n t i c s  probably  w i l l  
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not a p p e a r .  F i rm s  s e e m i n g l y  l a c k  a n  i n c e n t i v e  t o  o f f e r  b r o a d e r  
w n r r a nt i e s  t h a n  consum e r s  d e m a n d  b e c a u s e  s u c h  w a r r a n t i e s  a r e  c o s t l y--a 
f i rm w o u l d  have to r e d e em i t s  w a r r a n ty prom i s e ,  Op t im i s t i c  consum e r s
m i g h t  r e s i s t  t h e  p r i c e  i nc re a s e s  n e c e s s a ry t o  cover t h i s  co s t .  On t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  opt im i s t i c  c o n s UJ;J c r s  who purcha s e  t oo n a r r ow warrant i e s  
w i l l  o f t e n  b e  d i s a ppo i nt e d ;  they w i l l e xp e r i ence s i g n i f i c a nt un i ns u r e d  
l o s s e s .  F i rm s  c o n s e q ue n t l y  w i l l  l o s e  g o o d  w i l l .  Hence , f i rm s  
s e e m i ngly a r e  b e t t e r  o f f  i f  consum e r s  wou l d  m a ke c o r r e c t  choi c e s ,  for 
t h e n  f i rm s can p r e s e rv e  good w i l l  by making a pp ropr i a t e  w a r r a n t i e s ,  
ye t r e cover the ful l c o s t s  t h a t  t h e se warrant i e s  c re a t e . Cur i n g  
c o n s um e r  op t im i sm ,  howev e r ,  c o u l d  b e  d i f f i cu l t .  F i rm s  wou l d  b e  
r e l u c t a nt t o  conduct a dv e r t i s i ng c ampa i gn s  who s e  t heme i s  "Our w id g e t s  
b r e a k  a l ot . "  A more p r om i s i ng r e s ponse i s  t o  m ake c o rr e c t  w a r r a n t i e s  
but bury t h e  c o s t  i n  t h e  tot a l  p r i c e  o f  the produc t . How o f t e n  t h i s  
i s  done i s  not known. Al s o ,  a t  l e a s t  some f i rms m i g h t  m a x i m i z e  
p r o f i t s  b y  exp l o i t i ng c on s um e r  op t im i sm in t h e  s h o r t  run .  Thus , 
s y s t em a t i c c o n s um e r  opt im i sm r e s pe c t i ng p rodu c t  f a i l ur e  r a t e s c r e a t e s  
a pol icy prob l e m ,  b u t  i t s  s e r i ousne s s  i s  unknown . 
I f  consum e r s  b e l i ev e  de f a u l t to be l e s s  l ik e l y  t h a n  i t  i s  i n  
f a c t ,  they w i l l n o t  r e s i s t demands f o r  s e cur i ty i n t e r e s t s  s t r on g l y  
e nou gh , f o r  t h e y  m a y  t h i nk t h a t  f or e c l osure w i l l  s e l dom o c c u r . W e  
show c t!  a b o v e  t h a t  f i rm s w i l l  no t demand s e c ur i ty whe n  con sume t s  a r e  
w i l l i n g  t o  pay t o  a v o i d  i t .  111 i s  occurs i f  h N  - hS > eN - c 8 • 
Op t in i s t i c  consum e r s  n ny s e t  hN t o o  l ow or h8 t o o  h i gh ;  in e i t h e r
ev e n t , the d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw e e n  hf.I and 1 : 8  w i l l  b e  S1.1a l l e r  t h a n  i t
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s houl d ,  wh i ch i n c r e a s e s  t h e  l ike l i hood t h a t  t h i s  d i f f e rence w i l l  no t 
e xc e e d  t h e  mar g i n a l  c o s t  to f i rm s  o f  d o i n r,  w i t hout s e c u r i ty ,  He nce , 
i f  c o n s um e r s  e r e  opt im i s t i c  r e g a r d i ng t h e  odd s of d e f a ul t ,  they 
seem i n g l y  w i l l make t o o  m any s e c u r e d  l oa n s . On the other hand, 
s e c u r i t y  gives f irm s a dv a n t a g e s i n  compe l l ing p a yme nt . Opt i m i s t i c  
consum e r s  who t h e n  de f a u l t w i l l  come t o  b e l  i e v �  t h a t  t h e s e  a dv a nt a g e s  
a r e  t o o  g re a t  o r  too f reque n t l y  emp l oy e d -- th a t  f i rm s a c t  "un f a i r ly . "  
Th i s  a l s o w i l l  c a u s e  good w i l l  l os s e s ,  t h a t  i t  m ay b e  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  
o f  f i rms t o  av o i d . F i rm s  c o u l d  e a s i l y d o  t h i s  by demanding s e c u r i ty 
only when t h e  a c t u a l  odds j u s t i fy i t .  J\ g a i n ,  how of t e n  they so a c t  i s
unknow n ,  He n c e , consum e r  opt im i sm re sp e c t i ng t h e  odd s o f  de f a ul t a l s o 
s e e m s  t o  be a p o l icy probl em o f  unce r t a i n  s e r i ousne s s ,  
To summ a r i z e ,  ag g r e g a t e  consum e r  e s t im a te s o f  t h e  odds w i l l  b e  
unb i a s e d ,  s y s t em a t i c a l ly pe s s im i s t i c  o r  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  opt i m i s t i c .  
The f orm e r  two p o s s i b i l i t i e s  d o  not c r e a t e  s e r i ous p o l i cy probl e1us 
i nd e p e ndent o f  t h o s e  c a u s e d  by ins u f f i c i e nt c o n s um e r  shop p i n g f o r  
f avor a b l e  t e rm s  i t s e l f ,  but t h e  l e t t e r  m i g h t ,  TI1us , we n e x t  a s k  
whe t h e r  r e a sons e x i s t  t o  be l i ev e  t h a t  consum e r s  a r e  s y s t em a t i c a l l y  
op t im i s t i c  r e sp e c t ing t h e  c o n s e quence s o f  comm e r c i a l  cho i c e , 
( 2 )  Consumer Opt im i s m :  The N a t u r e  o f  ill Prob l em 
\'h e t h e r  consum e r s  a r e  sy s t em a t i c a l ly opt i m i s t i c  r e s p e c t i n g  t h e  
odds t h a t  p r oduc t s  w i l l  f a i l  or t h a t  t he y  t h ec s e l v e s w i l l  de f a u l t o n  
l oa n s  i s  unknown ,  i\ l s o ,  r i g or o u s  t e s t s  o f  a n  opt im i sm l.ypo t h e s i s  s e em 
d i f f i cu l t  t o  conduc t .  Thu s ,  it i s  nece s s a ry to a s :c w h i ch a s s u1apt ion 
i n  r e g a r d t o  op t i i;d sm t!c c i s i onu a kc r s  s h o u l d  hol d ,  p c n t1 i n r. the
c a t h e r i nc o f  d a t a .  Ve s h a l l  i n i t i a l l y cons i d e r  t h i s  que s t i o n  for 
produ c t s ,  nnd t h e n  d i s c u s s  d e f aul t .  
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Impe r f e c t  i n f o rma t i on r e s p e c t i n g  p r oduct qua l i ty i s  p r im a r i l y  
a p r o b l em f o r  i n f reque n t l y  purch a s e d  i t em s .  Consum e r s  b u y  t oothpa s t e ,  
m i l k  a nd r a z o r  b l a de s o f t e n  e nough t o  know how r e l i a b l y  they p e r f orm , 
J\ l so ,  the l ow i s  conc e r n e d  w i t h e xp e n s i v e  m i s t a ke s ,  l!e n c e 1 t h e  
que s t i on i s  w he t h e r  consum e r s  b e l ieve t h a t  such i t ems a a  c a r s ,  s t e r e o s  
a nd r e f r i g e r a t o r s  p e r f orm b e t t e r  t h a n  t h e y  do i n  f a c t .  Th e r e  a r e  two 
u a y s  in w h i c h  such op t ic i sm coul d e x i s t .  Fi r s t ,  marke t s  m ay prov ide 
i n s u f f i c i en t  d a t a  on wh i ch r e l i ab i l i t y  can be g a u g e d ,  and p e r sons may 
re spond t o  u nc e r t a i nt y  w i t h  op t im i sm ,  S e c o n d ,  t h e  d a t a  e x i s t  but 
pe r s ons may e rr on e ou s ly make more o p t i m i s t i c  p r e d i c t i on s  t h a n the d a t a  
p e rm i t ,  W e  s h a l l  d i s c u s s  t h e  f i r s t  p o s s i b i l i ty h e r o  a nd t h e  s e cond i n  
P a r t  IV A ( 3 ) ,  i n f r a .
Ins u f f i c i ent d a t a  i s  common l y  t h ou g h t t o  e x i s t  b e c a u s e  when 
consun1e r s  pur ch a s e i n f re que nt l y ,  t h e y  c a nnot r e l y  on t h e i r  own 
e xp e r i ence ; new w a s h e r s  a r e  d i f f e r e nt f rom t e n  y e a r  o l d  w a s h e r s .  Du t 
c o n s un1 e r s  c a n  s e a rch f o r  i nform a t i o n  a b o u t  new w a s h e r s .  Th e r e f or e , 
i n s u f f i c i e nt d a t a  m i gh t  e � i s t  b e c a u s e  consum e r s  do not s e a r c h  f o r  them 
o r  b e c a u s e  no one has an i n c e n t i v e  t o  p r ov i de t hem . Ne i th e r
po s s i b i l i ty s e em s  p l aus i b l e ,  U o t h  e c onom i c  a n d  p sy c h o l o g i c a l  a na l y s i s  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  p e r sons w i l l  a t tempt t o  a cq u i r e  more i n f o rm a t i on about 
e xp e n s ive p r oduc t s  t han about cheap one s ,  l a r g e l y  b e c a u s e  pe op l e  want 
t o  avoid r i s k ,  e n d  r i s k  gene r a l l y  i n c r e a s e s  w i th p rodu c t  p r i c e . 
re spe c t i n g  an e c onom i c  a n a l y s i s ,  suppo s e : ( i ) P e r sons d i s l i ke the r i s k 
5 8 
asso ciate d with uncertainty and will incur c o s t s  to reduce it; (ii) 
Un certainty con cernin g pro duct reliability can be r e p r e s e n t e G  as a 
range of odds o f  a breakdown, a s :  "The probability that this product
will fail is between . 1  an d . 3 u ;  (iii ) The "odds range "  doesn ' t  shri nk 
as products become more expensive, which is only to say that e �pensivc 
goo ds ar c at least as dif fi cult to evaluate as cheap ones; (iv )  There 
are economies o f  scale to sear ch. ( v )  Consumers believe that they can 
reduce un certaint y  by acquiring more information a bout p ro du ct s . 
These assumptions imply that persons will search r e l a t iv e l y  mo r e  for 
reliability data w hen they buy expensive items. To see Ylhy , assurae 
that a product costs $100 an d be comes useless w hen it brea ks; a 
consumer believes the c hance of a brea kdown is between , 1  a n d  . 3 ;  an d 
in creased s ear ch could reduce this range to between . 1  and . 1 5 . 
Without search, the e xpected value of a loss ranges from t30 to �10 . 
Search could reduce the range by h s , to b e tw e e n  ho &nd h s , Now l e t
the product cost $1 , 000 . 13y a s s ump t i o n s  ( i )  a n d  ( v ) ,  c o n s ume r s  w i l l
b e  motivate d to sear ch in both cas e s  t o  r e du ce the r ange ; by 
assumption (iii) . t h e  e xpe c t e d  v alue of a loss i n  t he second C & S O  h a s
a range o f  hoo ,  an d can be r e du c e d  by ti so by se a r ch , wl, i ch c re ate s a 
si gn i fi cant incentiv e for consumers t o  s e a r ch ;  and b y  a s sump t i on 
search itsel f is more f ru i t fu l  i n  t h i s  s e cond c a s e  s i n c e  t h e  m o r e
e xpe n s ive is t he p roduc t ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  i s  t he r e t u r n p e r  do l l a r
i nv e s t e d  i n  s e ar ch i n  re du c i nc unce r t a i nt y  abo u t p o s s i b l e  l o s s e s .
l ' e r. c e , c o n s ume r s  s h o u l d  attem p t  t o  f i n d  o u t  re l a t i v e l y  r.ioro a b o u t
� r odu ct r el i n b i l i t y  11hen t h e y  l;uy e xp ens i v e  i te m s . 
( iv ) ,  
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I�e s p e c t i ng t he se assumptions, that expensive products by and 
l a r ?, e  arc ns di f fi cult to assess as cheap ones seems une xceptionable. 
'Jl1e a s suLip t i o n  tl1 a t  p e r s o n s  will i n c u r  costs to re du ce uncertainty i s
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th the p en chant o f  people t o  buy insuran ce, w hi c h  
su b stitute s  c e r t a i n  f o r  un c ertain o u t c om e s ,  a nd b y  behavior in 
finan cial markets, where investors frequently pay to re du ce the 
varian ce in e xpecte d returns. Finally, economies o f  scale to sear ch 
about reliability probably exist because a signi ficant portion o f  
these sear ch costs are fixed. For e xample, a consumer w ho wants to 
d is cover reliability data for electric can openers an d cars could in 
both cases, go to the public 1 ibrary an d read ratings in consumer
m a gazines. The cost o f  bot h searches i s  close to i dentical, but the 
dollar re du ction in the ran ge o f  possible losses is much greater for 
c a r s  be cause they cost mu c h  more; dollars investe d in searching for 
c a r s  t hus brin g relatively greater returns than dollars spent in 
s e a r ch i n g  fo r can openers. Therefore, greater search s hould o ccur for 
j us t  t h o s e  p r oduc t s  w he r e  t h e  assumption that consumers know the o dds 
s e eu s  most questionable , 
Psychol o g i s t s  h a v e  develope d t he concept o f  "per ceive d ris k. "  
Ac c o r d i ng t o  thi s con cept, consumers e xperience su bjective risk w hen 
t h ey purchase. This risl; i s  a function o f  uncertainty-- "will I be
s a t i s f i e d  w i th t h e  purchas c? "-- n nd cons c quences--"will a pur chase 
e r r o r  c o s t  me 11oney , physi c al h a r m ,  a l o s s  of s o c i a l  status?" The 
s i z e  of t h e  pe r c e iv e d r i s l; v a r i e s  d i re c t ly with the degree o f
Dn c c r t a i n ty a nd t h e  & r av i ty o f  t h e  po s s i b l e  bad co nse quen ces. Also, 
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p e o p l e a r e  supp o s e d  t o  d i s l ike r i s k  a nd b e  mot i v a t e d  t o  r e duce i t , 4 5  
Th i s  c a n  b e  done by re duc i n g  unce r t a i n ty--by acqu i r i n g  1ao r e  
i n form a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  purch a s e--or by reduc i n g  the po s s i b l e  b a d  
c o n s e q uence s ,  The f orm e r  a l t e rna t iv e  shoul d b e  cho s e n  more 
f requent l y ,  For e xampl e ,  r i ch p e o p l e  may b e  wor r i e d  about t h e  r i s k  o f  
purch a s i n g  e xp e n s ive c a r s ,  but n o t  m a ny w i l l  choose t o  r e duce r i s k  b y  
b u y i n g  s ub c omp a c t s ;  r a th e r ,  they w i l l a c qu i r e  i n f orma t i on about the 
expens ive cars i n  t h e i r  cho i ce s e t s .  H e n c e , the psych o l o g i c a l  mod e l  
a l s o p r e d i c t s  m o r e  s e a r c h  a s  p r odu c t s  b e come m o r e  e xp e n s iv e . 
The l i t t l e  e v idence t h a t  e x i s t s  i s  cons i s t e n t w i t h the 
p r e d i c t i on s  o f  b o t h  mode l s ;  p e op l e  a t t emp t t o  a cq u i r e  more i n f o rm a t i o n  
46 a bout e x p e n s i v e  goods than about cheap one s .  Thus , t h e r e  w i l l  be
i ns uf f i c i en t  i nf orma t i on on w h i c h  p e op l e  can a s s e s s  t h e  odd s o n l y  if 
f i rms h av e  i n s u f f i c i en t  i n c e n t ive s t o  r e spond t o  consmier r e que s t s .  
D e c a u s e  i n f o rm a t i on about p r o du c t  r e l i ab i l i ty h a s  pub l i c  g o o d s  
a sp e c t s ,  i t  i s  d i f f i cu l t  t o  s a y  t h a t  f irm s w i l l  produ c e  the op t iru n l  
amount o f  i t .  Neve r t he l e s s ,  impr e s s i oni s t i c  e v idence s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
there i s  much <l a  t a  about e xp e n s i v e ,  infreque n t l y purch a s e d  c o n s um e r  
good s .  The r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  i nd e p e nde nt r a t i n g  mugaz  ine s ,  a n d  m any 
suppo s e d ly d i s i nt e r e s t e d  publ i c a t i on s  r a t e a u t onot ive a ud e l e c t r on i c  
e q u i pment . A l s o ,  consum e r s  c a n  l e a r n  tiuch about p r oduc t s  b y  u s i ng 
them, so word o f  mou t h  s e e m s  a u s e ful inf orm a t i on sour ce , Stud i e s  
s u g g e st t h a t  consum e r s  f reque n t l y  u s e  i t .  na t a  se t s  o f  cour s e  w i l l
som e t im e s  b e  i n compl e t e ,  p a r t i cu l a r l y  a s  r c & a r d s  nov e l  produc t s ,  but
t h eory and e v id e n c e  s u g ge s t  tl: a t  the c a s e  f o r  s y s t cn. n t i c  c ousum o r  
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op t im i sm r e spe c t i n g  p r oduct r e l i a b i l i ty rau s t  r e s t  more o n  s om e  
i n ab i l i ty of consum e r s  to p r oc e s s  d a t a  t h a n  on the ab s e n c e  o f  d a t a  t o
p r o c e s s ,  
A sm n l l  b u t  s i gn i f i c ant e xc e p t i on t o  t h i s  con c l u s i on may 
e x i s t .  Supp o s e  an i ne xp e n s iv e ,  f reque n t l y  purch a s e d  p r o duc t t h a t  in 
r a r e  c a s e s  m a l fun c t i on s  in s uc h  a w ay t h a t  s e r i ous p e r s on a l  harm 
e n s u e s ,  The soda pop b o t t l e  t h a t  e xp l ode s i s  a n  e xamp l e ,  The 
p r op e r t y  of e xp l od i n e  i s  not an » e xp e r i en c e »  qua l i ty in the s e n s e  t h a t  
i t  i s  rev e a l e d  b y  u s e ;  r a t h e r ,  e xp l o s i ons j us t  h a p p e n .  A l so , 
e xp l o s i ons occur so i nf reque n t ly t h a t  consum e r s  may a c t  a s  i f  they 
never occ u r ;  t h a t  i s ,  consum e r s  act op t im i s t i c a l l y ,  Be c a u s e  the 
p r oduc t ls i ne xp e n s i v e ,  consum e r s  w i l l  not se a r c h  for much i n f o rma t i on 
about i t ,  so the e r r one ous b e l i e f  that c a u s e s  t h i s  a c t i on would n o t  b e  
d i s s i p a t e d  by i n f o rm a t i on a c c i d e n t l y  rev e a l e d  i n  t h e  cour s e  o f  a 
g e ne r a l  product e v a l u a t i o n ,  On t h e  o t h e r  hand , i f  con s um e r s  a r e  aware 
that produc t s  such as s o d a  b o t t l e s  can m a l fun c t i o n  in d a n g e r ou s  w ay s ,  
i t  i s  a s e p a r a t e  que s t i on w h e t h e r  they unde r s t a te t h e  r i s k  o f  t h i s  
h a rm ,  We t a ke up t h i s  que s t i on i n  P a r t  IVA( 3 ) , .i.nil:.! . 
An a r gume n t  t h a t  c o n s um e r s  a r e  sy s t em a t i c a l ly opt im i s t i c  
r e s p e c t ing t h e  odd s o f  de f a u l t a l so mus t r e s t  l a r ge l y  o n  c o n s ume r s '  
i n f o rn n t i on proce s s i ng c a p a b i l i t i e s .  The t h r e e  maj or c a u s e s  o f  
d e f a u l t on p e r so n a l  ob l ig a t i on s  n r e  poor f inanc i a l p l ann i n g ,  i l l  
h e a l t h and j ob l o s s ,  H e s p e c t i n g  the f i r s t ,  f i rms d o  b e t t e r  l e nd i ng t o  
p e op l e  l ike ly t o  r e p a y t h a n  t h e y  d o  l ending t o  p e op l e  l i ke l y  t o  
u e f nul  t a nd t h e n  r e po s s e s s i n g t h e i r  good s .  Hence , f i rm s  have
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ince nt i v e s  to r e f u s e  cre d i t  t o  opt im i s t s .  Two w n y s  for consum e r s  
s y s t enia t i c a l ly t o  i ncur obl i g a t i ons t h a t  the i r  f inanc i a l  c i rc UJ:J s t a nc e s 
should p r e c l ud e  then e x i s t , Fi r s t ,  f i rm s  rou t ine l y  l end t o  
unj u s t i f i e d  r i sks ; that i s ,  f i rm s  rout i ne ly make prof i t  r e du c i n g  
l oa na . Oc c a s ional  m i s t a ke s o f  t h i s  s o r t  o c c u r ,  b u t  t h e r e  i s  no r e a son 
to t h i nk t h a t  they are made s y s t em a t i c& l ly ,  Second,  c o n s ume r s  have 
more i n fo rm a t i on about the i r  repay�1ent p r o s pe c t s  than f irm s do; t h i s  
i n f orma t i on imp l i e s  a �  l ike l i hood o f  d e f au l t t h an t h e  
i nf orma t i on av a i l ab l e  t o  f irm s do e s ;  and consum e r s  s y s t ema t i c a l ly 
proce s s  t h i s  d a t a  i n  such f a s h i on a s  a c t ua l ly to ove r s t a t e  the  
l ik e l ihood o f  repayruent , Jn sum,  i f  consume r s  d o  draw exc e s s iv e ly 
favorab l e i nf e rence s a s  to r e p ayme n t  p r o sp e c t s  f rom the i r  own 
f i nanc i a l  c i rcum s t a nce s a s  t h e s e  e x i s t  when l oa n s  a r e  sought t h i s  
s e e m i n g l y  i s  b e c a u s e  consum e r s  hav e  r.:ore d a t a  about t h e s e  
c i rcums t anc e s  t h a n  f i rm s do b u t  m i sproce s s  i t .  
!l.e sp e c t i n g  t h e  l a s t  two caus e s  o f  de f au l t ,  consum e r s  have more 
i n f o ro n t i on r e s pe c t i ng the i r  own h e a l th prosp e c t s  than f i rm s d o .  
A l s o ,  t h e  c a s e  a s  t o  j ob l o s s  i s  amb i guous , � b a nk may know Rore
about t h e  p r o s pe c t s of the auto i ndus t ry than a po t e n t i a l  worke r 
d e b t o r  d oc s ,  b u t  t he worke r mny know more a bo � t L i s  a b i l i ty t o  av o i d
l ay o f f s  t h a n  the b a nk d oe s .  Dence , consume r s  cou l d  m i s t a kenly be l i e v e  
that  i l l  he a l th o r  j ob l o s s  i s  l e s s  l i ke ly to c a u s e  d e f au l t than these 
w i l l  i n  fact l arze l y  because they u i sprocc s s  i n f o rm a t i on ,  not b e c a u s e
t h e y  h a v e  sma l l e r d a t a  ba s e s  on whi c h  t o  m ute i n f e rence s than the i r
c r e d i to r s have , 
( 3 )  Cogn i t ive Errors a nd Opt im i s m  
! lo g e ne r a l  t h e ory o f  how p e op l e  m a ke i n f e rent i a l  j ud gme n t s  
e x i s t s .  I n  r e c e nt y e a r s ,  h owev e r ,  p sycho l o g i s t s  h av e  d ev e l op e d  a 
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g r e a t  d e a l  of ev idence  both f rom l ab o r a t ory experiments a nd f rom l i f e  
a s  to h o w  the s e  j udgtlcn t s  a r e  made . The c e n tr a l  t heme o f  t h i s  
re s e arch i s  t h a t  p e op l e  make s e r i ous , sy s t em a t i c  a nd p r e d i c t a b l e  
47 cogn i t iv e  e r r or s .  W i l l  the se e r r o r s  c a u s e  p e op l e  t o  m i sproce s s  
i n f orm at i on such t h a t ,  i n  t he a g g r e g a t e ,  they w i l l  unde r s t a te the odds 
o f  d e f ec t s o r  d e f aul t s ?  Thi s  s e c t i on a r gue s t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p a l
c o gni t i v e  e r r o r s  t h a t  s e em i ngly p l ague human i n f e rence i n  m o s t  c a s e s  
a r e  e i the r :  ( i ) i r re l ev ant t o  t h e  que s t i on whether pe op l e  g e ne r a l ly 
nre  op t im i s t i c  or p e s s im i s t i c  r e spe c t ing t h e  odd s ; or ( i i ) w i l l c a u s e  
p e op l e  t o  m a ke r a ndom e r r or s ;  o r  ( i i i ) in t h e  c a s e  o f  p roduc t s ,  may 
incl ine p e op l e  toward p e s s im i sm .  
( a ) The Odds .2f Produc t Defe c t s  
f<ou r  source s o f  cogn i t i v e  error could a f fe c t  peopl e ' s 
a s s e s sment of the  odds of p r oduc t d e f e c t s ,  cogn i t iv e  d i s sonance , 
m i suse  of t h e  "av a i l ab i l i ty" and " re p r e s e n t a t ivene s s "  h e ur i s t i c s  a nd a 
po s s i b l e  t e nde ncy to i gnore v e ry l ow probab i l i ty event s .  The 
c o gn i t iv e  d i s sonance i d e a  i s  d e r i v e d  f r om the the ory of c o gn i t i v e  
cons i s te ncy , According  t o  t h i s  t he ory , p e r sons r e s i s t  h o l d i ng i n  
a w a r e ne s s  two conf l i c t i n g  i de a s  s imul taneous l y .  Thus ,  they tend t o  
i gnore or d i s t ort e v i dence r e l ev ant t o  t h e  t r u t h  of one o f  tho s e  
i d e a s . 4 8  f o r  examp l e ,  p e op l e  are  s a i d  t o  b e l i ev e  t h a t  t hoy a r e  
i nt e l l i ge n t  a nd prudent , a nd cons e que n t ly w i l l  aakc inte l l i g e n t  a nd 
prudent c h o i ce s ;  h e n c e , the t h e o ry pre d i c t s  t h a t  p e op l e  w i l l  d e v a l ue 
e v i d e n c e  t h a t  i mp e a che s t h e i r  c h o i ce s a t' t c r  th e s e  choi ce s h a v e  be e n  
m a d e , A f a i r  amoun t o f  ev ide nce suppo r t s  t h e  theory . A s
i l l u s t r a t i on s , worke r s  t a k i n g  j ob s  i n  un s a f e  occup a t i on s  a pp a r e n t ly 
c om e  to be l i eve t h a t  t h e  i ndus t r i e s  a r e  s a fc-- sma r t ,  c a r e f ul p e o p l e  
woul d n o t  work i n  d a n g e rous p l a c e s ,  S im i l a r l y ,  some buy e r s  m ay have 
more a f f i rm a t iv e  a t t i t ud e s  t ow a r d s  produc t s  a f t e r  p u r c h a s e  t h a n  
h e  fore , 49 
Cogn i t iv e  d i s s onance s e e m i n g l y  c o u l d  n o t  c a u s e  pe r s o n s  t o  
64 
i 11nore un f avor ab l e  i n form n t i on i n  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  c o n c e r n s  u s ,  w h e n  t h e y  
a r c  de c i d i n g  w he th e r  to buy . Consw:1er p u r ch a s e s o f  ttaj or i t e rn s  a r e  
d i s c r e t e  event s t h a t  h av e  h i gh s n l i e n c c ; p e op l e  v i ew them a s  
b e g i n n i n g s--"r1y n e w  c a r . "  Di s sonance i s  un l i ke l y  t o  o c c u r  w h e n  p e op l e  
c ons c i ous ly g a t h e r  e v i d e n c e  i n  orde r t o  d e c i de . 
1be " a v a i l ab i l i ty h e ur i s t i c" c a n  c a u s e  p e r s o n s  to m n kc 
m i s t a ke s  about t h e  f reque ncy w i th w h i c h  e v e n t s o c c u r . One m a k i n g  
i n f e r e n t i a l  j ud g m e n t s  b y  u s e  o f  t h i s  h e ur i s t i c t e n d s  t o  i gnore 
s t a t i s t i c a l  data in f avor o f  ev i d e n c e  that s e erus g e rm a ne and is in 
awarene s s-- i s  av a i l a b l e .  For e xampl e ,  a pe r s on m ay unde r s t a t e  the 
c o rr e l a t i on be twe e n  c i g a r e t t e  smo k i n c  a n d  l une c a nc e r  b e c a u s e  h i s  
j u d gm e n t  o f  t h i s c o r r e l a t i on w a s  e xc e s s i v e l y  in f lue n c e d  b y  h i s  
know l e d g e  o f  two n e i ghbo r s ,  e a c h  of whom smoke d f o r  f i f ty ye a r s  and 
d i e d  o f  s t r ol:e ,  The av a i l ab i l i ty l 1curi s t i c  m i s l e a ds w h e n  the 
a s s o c i n t i on be tw e e n  cause a nd e f f e c t  t h a t  is in a w a r ene s s  o r  is  e a s i ly 
summ on c tl  up c o rr e l a t e s  poorly 11 i t h  t h e  f r eque ncy w i t h  w h i c h  p o s s i b l e  
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c a u s e s  a nd e f f e c t s  a c t u a l ly c ov a ry ,  a s  i n  t h e  c i g a r e t t e  e xamp l e ,  
P s y c h o l o g i s t s  b e l i ev e  t h a t  such m i s t a k e s occur f reque n t l y b e c a u s e  the 
e x i s t e n c e  of e v i d e � c e  i n  awarene s s  i s  i n  cons i de r a b l e  p a r t  a func t i on 
o f  i t s  " v iv i dne s s "-- i t s  e mo t i on a l  i n t e r e s t ,  ab i l i t y  to e v oke i m a g e ry ,
d 1 i . s o  c o n c r e te ne s s  n nd s p a t i a l  a n  t c m p o r a  p ro x  m 1 ty. 
n o t  ne c e s s a r i ly the m o s t  p r ob a t iv e  e v i de n c e . 
Viv i d  ev i d e nce i s  
I f  p e o p l e  a c t ua l ly a s s e s s  p r odu c t  r e l i a b i l i ty w i th tho 
av a i l ab i l i ty h e u r i s t i c ,  the i r  error term, when v i ew e d  in t h e  
a g g r e g a t e , s e e m i n g l y  should b e  unb i a s e d  o r  y i e l d  p e s s i m i s t i c  
c s t im n t e s .  Re s p e c t i n g  t h e  f i r s t  po s s ib i l i ty ,  l e t  p o te n t i a l  c a r  buy e r s  
a s s e s s t h e  r e l i ab i l i ty of n e w  S a n b s  not b y  vub l i s h e d  f re q ue ncy o f  
r e p n i r  d a t a  but by r e f e r e n c e  t o  w h a t  they know about c a r s  i n  g e n e r n l  
a n d  b y  wha t they c a n  r e c a l l about S n ab s .  Ev i d e n c e  o f  t h i s s o r t  w i l l  
i n c l ud e  t h e  e xp e r i ence o f  a c qua i nt a n c e s a nd rum o r ,  and i t  i s  l i ke l y  t o  
s u f f e r  f rom t h e  b i a s e s  o f  sm a l l  s am p l e  s i z e s ;  t h a t  i s ,  a ny one 
p e r son ' s s a mp l e  w i l l  have too f ew d a t a  p o i n t s to r e v e a l  the c o r r e c t  
o d d s  f o r  a p a r t i cu l ar mode l ,  On t h e  o t h e r  h a nd , t h e  me t h o d  w i l l
g e n e r a t e  e s t im a t e s t h a t  a r e  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  the true odd s , for two 
r e a s ons . Fi r s t , eve ryone h a s  some know l e d ge o f  how c a r s  in g e ne r a l  
p e r f orm , a nd t h e  p e r f orm ance o f  S n o b s  i s  n o t  e xc e s s iv e l y  d i s s i m i l a r 
f r om the no rm . S e cond , t h e  r e s u l t s  of e a ch p e r s on ' s s ampl e  w i l l  be
a f f e c t e d  by how re l i abl e Saabs a c t ua l ly a r e . I f  Sanbs a l ways b r o ke , 
no one c o d <l have a f r i c n<l \\' i th a g oo<l word to s a y ,  Fur t he r , ,  th i s
m e t h od o f  a cqui r i n g  i n f orm a t i on i s  un l i ke ly t o  s e n e r a t e  e r r o r s  t h a t  
a l w a y s  run i n  t l 1 e  s a me d i r e c t i on ;  s ome p e op l e  m a y  hav e h a d  g ood
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e xp e r i e n c e s w i th c a r s  o r  know p e op l e  w i t h  c o o d  S a ab s  whi l e  o t h e r  
p e op l e  m ny h a v e  h a d  b n d  e xpe r i e n c e s  o r  know peop l u  w i th b a d  S a n b s . 
Re n e e ,  i f  ·consum e r  e st im u t e s  o f  t h e  odd s a r e  i n f l ue n c e d  by the i r  use  
o f  the av a i l ab i l i ty heur i s t i c ,  t h o s e  pe r c e p t i on s  s e em i n g l y  should be
unb i a se d  i n  t h o  a gg r e g a t e .  
Consum e r  e r r o r s  may tond t oward p e s s imi s[1 r a t h e r  than 
r andomne s s ,  howev e r ,  because  ne g a t ive ev i d e nce is  o f t e n  more v i v i d  
t h a n  po s i t ive e v i d e nc e , Th i s  f a c t  i s  u s e d  t o  e xp l a i n  why p e op l e  t e nd 
t o  d r aw i n s u f f i c i en t ly s t rong i n f e r e nce s f rom event s t h a t  f a i l  t o  
5 1  happ e n .  I f  a p r o d u c t  p e r f orm s w e l l  m o s t  of the  t ime b u t  f a i l s  
n ot i c e a b ly , t h e n ,  p e o p l e  may b e l i e v e  i t  t o  b e  l e s s  r e l i a b l e  t h a n  i t  i s  
i n  f a c t  b e c a u s e  they g iv e  too l i t t l e  w e i g h t  t o  t h e  absence  o f  f a i l u r e , 
and t o o  much t o  i t s  pre sence , In a d d i t i on ,  psychol o g i s t s  r e f e r  to a 
f am i l i a r  " s c r i p t "  for de f e c t iv e  c a r s , S c r i p t s  o r e  d r am a t i c  s t o r i e s  
p e o p l e  t e l l  themse l v e s  t o  orga n i z e  thought  and e xp e r i ence . 
Onc e  evoke d ,  t h i s  [ automob i l e ]  s c r i p t  in turn c a n  e l ic i t  n w e a l  th 
of add i t i on a l  imag e s a nd s t or e d  e p i sode s about o t h e r  " l emons" ono 
h a s  known . The " l emon" s c r i pt is p a r t i cu l a r l y  r i ch and p o t e nt . 
W i th i t s  c a s t  of chara c t e r s  ( impa s s i v e  or ev a s ive s e rv i c e  
mana g e r s ,  bumb l ing mechani c s ,  s n i ck e r i n g  ne i ghbors w h o  t o l d  y ou 
t h a t  you c o u l d  h ave h a d  a n i c e  U l a tzmob i l e  f o r  h a l f the p r i ce ) ,  
and i t s  s t ock s c e ne s  ( wa i t i n g  for bu s e s  i n  t�e r a i n ,  b e g g i n g  
r i d e s ,  b r i n g i n g  the  c a r  home o n l y  t o  h e a r  some om i no u s  n e w  s ound 
as you pul l  i n t o  the driveway ) , the l emon s c r i p t is c apa b l e  o f  
s t r on r, l y  i n f l ue nc i ng o ne ' s  i n f e re nc e s  a nd b e h av i o r ,  He rc 
s t a t i s t i c s  de s c r i b i n g  d r i v e- t r a i n  de pe ndab i l i ty records o r  
av e r a g e  p e r-yea r  c o s t s  are  l e s s  l i l:e ly t o  ce l l  u p  the  r i ch a n d  
evoc a t iv e  l emon s c r i p t  and i t s  v a r i ous i n s t a nt i a t i on s  a �d e r e  
conscq ucn§�Y l e s s  l ike ly l o  i n f l ue n c e  o u r  i n f e re nc e s  a n d
b e h av i o r .  
I n  c o n s e q ue n ce o f  t h e  v iv i dne s s  o f  r.iuch i n f ori. 1 u t i on aboi: t  r,ro<lu c t  
f a i l ur e  R ll<l  t h e  r c l o t iv e  p u l l i Jnc s s  o f  i n f o ria a t i on r,. b o u t  re l i a b i l i t y ,
th e  error compone n t  o f  peopl e ' s  e s t im a t e s o f  the odds c o u l d  b e  
po s i t iv e  f o r  c o n s um e r s  i n  t h e  a r, g r e g a t e ; they !!lay ove r e s t i m a t e  the 
l i ke l i hood o f  d e f e c t s ,  
The " re p r e s e n t a t iv e n e s s  heu r i s t i c" al s o  may c a u s e  p e op l e  t o  
make m i s t a l:en probab i l i ty a s s e s sment s .  A cons i d e r ab l e  amount o f  
e v i d e n c e  s ug g e s t s  t h a t  peopl e ' s  s e a r c h  f or c a u s a l  c a nd i da t e s i s  
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e x c e s s iv e l y  i n f l u e nc e d  b y  superf i c i a l  s i m i l ar i t i e s  b e t w e e n  a sub s e t  o f  
the  po s s i b l e  c a us e s  o f  t h e  phe nomenon und e r  s t udy and t he phenom e no n  
i t s e l f .  A c rude i l l us tr a t i on i s  t h e  t h e ory t h a t  a c h i l d ' s  t im i d i ty i s
caus e d  by i t s  m o t h e r  b e i ng s ev e r e l y  f r i g h t e n e d  during  p r e gnancy . A 
more soph i s t i c a t e d  v e r s ion o f  the  be l i e f  t h a t  out c om e s  a c t ua l ly are 
s im i l ar t o  or " re p r e sent" t h e i r  und e r l y i n g  c a us e s i s  t h e  "gamb l o r '  s 
f a l l n cy . "  Each t ur n  o f  a f a i r  roul e t t e  whee l  or t h e  t o s s  o f  a f a i r  
c o i n  i s  uncorre l a t e d  w i t h  p r i o r  turns o r  to s s e s ;  hence , th e 
p r obab i l i ty that n p a r t i c u l a r  turn w i l l  b e  r e d  i s  s l igh t ly l e s s  than 
.5  ( a  z e ro and doubl e zero e xi s t ) , and the probab i l i ty o f  a heads i s  
app roxim ate ly one h a l f .  A v i c t im o f  the  gambl e r ' s f a l l a cy w i l l a s s i g n  
n much gre a t e r  probab i l i ty t h a n  . 5  to t h e  c h a n c e  t h a t  the n e x t  t ur n  
w i l l  produce a r e d  o r  the  n e x t  t o s s  a h e a d s ,  i f  a l ong r u n  o f  b l a cks 
o r  t a i l s  h a s  o c c ur re d .  Th i s  i s  b e l i ev e d  to o c c u r  b e c a u s e  pe op l e
pe r c e ive the p r o c e s s  t h a t  g e ne r a t e s  out c om e s  t o  b e  r andom, and r a ndom 
s e q ue n c e s  of r e d s  a nd b l acks or h e a ds a nd t a i l s  s e e m  more 
r e p r e s e n t a t iv e  o f  such a proce s s  than a l on g  run of bl a c ks o r  t a i l s , 5 3  
TI 1 c  app a r e n t  pervas ivene s s  o f  t h e  g ambl e r ' s f a l l a cy s u gg e s t s
t h u t  p e op l e  w i l l  mnkc p e s s im i s t i c  a s s e s sment s o f  produc t re l ia b i l i ty .
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Mo s t  produ c t s ,  po r t i cu.l ar l y  app l i a nce s ,  work r e l i a bl y .  Con s ume r s ,  
howev e r ,  know t h a t  a p p l iance s o r e  m ad e  by p e op l e ;  th a t  " huma n  e rr or" 
o f t e n  e x i s t s ;  and t h a t  i ndus t r i a l  worke r s  ru ay l a c k  t h e  s e n s e  of cr u f t
t h e i r  ance s t o r s  h a d .  A consumer who s e  e x i s t i n g  a pp l i ance s work we l l  
and who holds  t h i s  v i ew o f  the i ndu s t r i a l  proce s s  could b e l ieve tha t 
h i s  n e x t  purch a se w i l l  be l e s s  r e l i ab l e  than h i s  I n s t ;  cons i s t ent 
succ e s s  i s  unrepr e s e nt a t iv e  o f  a s y s t em in wh i ch human e rror and a 
l a ck o f  cra f t  s e n s e  w i l l  c a u s e  n non t r i v i a l  number of f a i lure s ,  In 
the gamb l e r ' s f a l l acy s impl i c i t e r ,  the consum e r ' s error i s  t o  
over s t a te t h e  corre l a t i on be twe en t h e  pre s e n t  a nd the p a s t-- a run o f  
h e a d s  imp l i e s  a t a i l s  n e x t  t ime ; i n  t h i s ver s i on ,  t h e  e rror woul d b e  
s im i l ar-- too m any product succe s s e s  imply a for thcom ing f a i l ur e .  
There i s  some ev i dence t h a t  conswn e r s  a c t u a l ly r.iuke t h i s  e rror.  A 
s tudy by the Mich i g a n  S urvey Re s e a r c h  Center r e po r t e d  t h a t  p e o p l e  
perce ived a ne e d  for repa i r s i n  n e w  home app l i ance s tha t w a s  
cons i d e r a b l y  g r e a t e r  than the repa i r s  t hey had e xp e r i e n c e d  i n  pa s t  
p e r i ods . 5
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J !ence , u s e  o f  t h e  repre se n t s t ivene s s  h e ur i s t i c  a l so m ay 
b i n s  p e op l e  towar d  p e s s im i sm ,  
F i n a l l y , p e op l e  some t im e s  t e nd not t o  i ns u r e  a ga i n s t  very l ow 
probab i l i ty e v e n t s ,  even when t h e s e  event s have h i gh ne ga t iv e  payof f s ,  
Fo r exampl e ,  p e r s o n s  buy l e s s  f l ood and e a r t hquake insur an c e  t h a n  t h e
obj e c t iv e  p robab i l i t i e s  warra n t . 5 5  �s app l i e d  t o  w a r r a n ty i s s ue s ,  
per sona l i nj u r i e s  a r c  a much l e s s  f r eq u e n t  c o n s e q ue n c e  o f  p r o d u c t  
d e f e c t s  tilan o r d i nary ii<n l fun c t i o n ,  The r e f o r e , p e r s o n s  m ay i ;; no re-- i n
e f f e c t  b e  o p t im i s t i c  nbout-- tl 1c o d d �  t h a t  p r o t!uc t s  w i l l  ha rr.1 t h e1'. , u nd 
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demand l e s s  w a r r a nty prote c t io n  a g a i ns t  p e r sonal  i nj ur i e s  than they 
s h oul d ,  Th i s  p o s s i b i l i ty c a nnot b e  d i sra i s s e d ,  but , apa r t  f rom an 
e x c e p t i on to b e  d i scus s e d  b e l ow ,  it wou l d  b e  unw i s e  to b a se pol i cy on 
i t .  Ini t i a l l y ,  the theory und e r l y i n g  the r e f u s a l  to insure phenome non 
is poo r ly und e r s t o o d .  One e xp l ana t i on i s  thot it r e f l e c t s cogn i t i v e  
d i s sonnnce . 5
6 A sma r t ,  prud e n t  p e r son woul d n o t  buy a f arm t h a t  b a s  a 
non t r iv i a l  r i s k o f  b e i ng de s t r oy e d  by a f l ood,  Thus , p e op l e  who own 
f arm s would i gnore ev i dence of f l ood d a n g e r ,  a nd s t ud i e s  s h ow t h a t  
peop l e  i n  t h i s  c i rcum s t a nce a r e  i na d e qu a t e l y  inf orm e d  about t h e  
po s s ib i l i ty o f  natural  d i s a s t e r s ,  The w a r r a n t y  probl em i s  s e t  i n  the 
ore pur c h a s e  cont e xt .  ttence , the na tura l d i s a s te r  c a s e  c o u l d  s upport 
n n  inference that op t im i sm e x i s t s  i n  o t h e r  a re a s ,  such as  the c a se o f  
pe r sona l inj ury f rom produ c t s ,  only i f  the p r i c e  o f  l and i t s e l f  doe s 
not r e f l e c t  the  r i s k  of f l oo d  or e a r thqua ke , Apparent l y ,  no one now 
knows whether i t  doe s or no t .  
The t e nde ncy to i gnore l ow probab i l i ty event s m ay a l s o  r e f l e ct 
u s e  o f  the av a i l ab i l i ty heur i s t i c ,  The se so r t s  of event s moy s e l dom 
be in awarene s s  b e c a u s e  they occur rare l y ,  so p e op l e  re spond 
i na d e qua t e l y  to t h e m ,  Some ground s  e x i s t  for be l i ev ing t h a t  the 
av a i l ab i l i ty heuri s t i c  i s  pa r t l y  re spons i b l e  for the phenom e non . For 
e xamp l e ,  whi l e  p e op l e  may be i n s uf f i c i en t l y  conce rne d w i th f l ood,  f i re 
a nd e a r thquake , there i s  gre a t  publ i c  conce rn about the r i sks o f  
�u cl e a r  power und Dt!A, though t h e  probab i l i ty that t h e s e  phenomena
�: i l l  cause ha rm i s  q u i t e  l ow .  'l'h i s  may b e  be c a us e  the s e  l a t te r  r i sks
arc  e a s i l y he l d i n  a w a r e n e s s ,  a s  t h e y  a r e  mucL � i s cu s s e d  and woul d 
c a u s e  awful harms i f  they m n t e r i a l i z e<l ; there may be " s c r i p t s "  f o r  
nuc l ea r  m e l tdowns a nd g e ne t i c  m ut a t i ons . 
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I f  t h e  ava i l ab i l i ty h e u r i s t i c  i s  a c t u a l ly a t  work ,  i t  i s  
premature to b a s e  p o l i cy o n  t h e  p e n c h a n t  of p e op l e  s ome t ime s t o  i gu o r c  
l ow p robab i l i ty event s .  \/ha t  is  ne e d e d  but doe s not e x i s t  i s  a way t o  
l i nk the e x t e nt t o  wh i ch events m a y  b e  i n  awarene s s  w i th the obj e c t iv e
probab i l i t i e s  t h a t  p e r s ons t e nd to i gnor e .  For e xamp l e ,  i f  a p r oduc t 
c a rr i e s  a . 0 1  r i s k  o f  caus i ng p e r sona l inj u r y ,  w i l l  p e o p l e  a c t a s  i f  
that r i s k  i s  z e r o ?  flow c a n  a d e c i s i orun a k e r  know when n r i s k  o f  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  harm i s  b e l ow t h e  thre shold of a t te n t i on? I f  p e op l e  a r e  
conce rne d a b o u t  nuc l ea r  pow e r  b u t  unconce rne d a bout f l ood s ,  c o u l d  t h e y  
b e  s im i l arly conce rne d a b o u t  c a r s  but no t a b o u t s ka te bo a r d s ? Tha t  i s ,  
i f  i t  i s  the a v a i l ab i l i ty heur i s t i c  t h a t  i s  m i s l e a d i n g  p e op l e ,  a r e  
g e n e ra l i z a t i on s  about odd s t h r e s h o l d s  w a rrant o d ? 57 Unt i l  c o gn i t i v e  
the ory dev e l op s  e nough t o  p e rm i t  a n sw e r s  t o  que s t i o n s  o f  t h i s s o r t ,  
th a t p e op l e  i ns u r e  i n s uf f i c i en t ly a g a i n s t  c e r t a i n  kinds o f  l ow 
probab i l i ty e v e nt s o n nnot s upport f a c t u a l  i n f er e nce s r e s pe c t i n g  o the r 
such e v e n t s .  And i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  of s u c h  i nf e r e n ce s ,  i t  s e em s  unw i s e  
t o  r c � u i r e  i n su r a n c e  b y  rnnn�a t i ne w a r r a nt i e s . 
An e xc e p t i on to t h i s conc l u s i o n  way e x i s t  f o r  f re q ue n t l y
pu r ch a s e d ,  ine xpe n s iv e  i t e m s  t h a t  c a u s e  s e r i ous p e r s o n a l  harm a ve ry 
sm a l l  pe r c e n t a ge of t h e  t im e . �o c a s e  for op t im i sm i u  t h e  p u r c h a s e  o f  
t h e s e  p r o duc t s  c a n  b e  d e r i v e d  f r 01'1 the r e pre s e n t a t ivene s s  o r
avai l ab i l i ty he u r i s t i c s ,  b u t  t h o  c " gni t i v c  u i s s o r. a nce pa r a tl i gm r. 1ay 
imp l y  op t im i sm . Th i s  i s  b e c a u s e  eons ur.; e r s  o f t e n  w i l l  l e a r n  a bo u t  tne 
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p o s s i b i l i ty o f  d a n g e r ous m a l fun c t i on a f t e r  they have made a comm i tm e n t  
t o  t t e  p r oduc t ,  for t h e y  f requ e n t ly p u r c h a s e  i t .  Such ne ga t iv e  
i n f o rm a t i on c o u l d b e  d e v a l ue d .  '111e r i s k  t h a t  s e r i ous p e r sonal harm 
n ay occur f rom u s i ng s u c h  p r oduc t s a s  soda i n  bo t t l e s ,  nonp r e s c r i p t i on 
d r u g s  an� f ood t h u s  could b e  in the c l a s s  of r i sks a g a i n s t  which 
i n s u f f i c i e n t  i nsura n c e  tends to be pur ch a se d . 
( b )  The Odds o f  D e f ault 
Are p e o p l e  o p t i m i s t i c  r e sp e c t i ng t h e  odds of the i r  own 
d e f a ul t s ,  s uch that they w i l l  re s i s t a c r e d i t or ' s  demand f o r  s e cu r i ty 
l e s s  than the i r  own b e t to r  i n f ormed p r e f e rence s woul d  d i ct a t e ?  Thi s  
que s t i on d i f f e r s  f rom the one j us t  a ske d about pr oduc t s ,  for there t h e  
i s s u e  w a s  whe t h e r  consum e r s  coul d corre c t l y  i n f e r  a n  obj e c t i v e  
f r e q u e n cy-- t h e  o d d s  t h a t  a produ c t  wou l d  f a i l .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  p e op l e  
t1us t p re d i c t  t h e  j o i n t  i n f l ue n c e  o f  t ho i r  own a b i l i t i e s  and obj e c t i v e  
c i r cuc s t a n c e s .  For examp l e ,  a p e r s o n  about t o  m ake a n  a u t o  l oa n  mus t  
co n s i d e r  whe t h e r  h e  o r  s h e  i s  n su f f i c i en t l y  prudent m a n a g e r  t o  be 
a b l e  to m nke the paywe n t s  unde r s t a b l e  pe r sonal  f ina nc i a l  
c i rcum s t a nce s ,  a n d  mus t a l so a s s e s s  the l ike l i hood o f  unempl oyme n t .  
Pe op l e  e e n e r n l ly hav e a s  much d a t a  a bout t he i r  own ab i l i t i e s  a s 
o u t s i d e r s  do ; we a l so h o v e  a r gu e d a b o v e  t h a t  they are l ike l y  to have
as rau c h  data a b o u t  t he i r  obj e c t i v e  c i rcum s t a nc e s  as others w i l l  hav e .
The q ue s t i on w e  t a k e  up h e r e  i s  whe t h e r  the c o gn i t iv e  e r r ors p e op l o  
� ny �nke i n  p r o c e s s i n g  t h i s  da t a  w i l l  b i a s  t h em i n  p a r t i cu l a r
d i r e c t ions . 
ne c e n t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  t h e ory s u i; g e s t s  tha t p e op l e  m a ke s e l f  
a s s e s sm e n t s  i n  the s a m e  way t h a t  t h ey a s s e s s  o t h e r  pe r s o n s . I n  
pa r t i cu l a r ,  p e op l e  s e e m i n g l y  sear c h  for ca u s a l  c a ndidate s  t o  a s s e s s  
t h e i r  own t r a i t s  a nd a c t i on s , u s e  theor i e s  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e s e , ond make 
i n f e r e n t i a l  j ud gme n t s  about t hcr.i f rom obj e c t ive e v e n t s ,  j u s t  a s  t h e y  
do when a s s e s s i n g  out s i de r s ;  s e l f  know l e d ge s e e m i n g l y  i s  a pr oeuc t o f  
r.iuch the same p r o c e s s e s  a s  know l e d g e  o f  o t h e r s .  As a n  i l l us t r a t i on ,  a 
p e r son m ay come to b e l i ev e  t h a t  he i s  p r u d e n t  not b y  c o n s u l t i n g  s om e  
p e cu l i a r l y  p r i v a t e  m e n t a l  source r ev e l a t o ry o f  h i s  t r a i t s  b u t  by 
i n f e r r i n g  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  t r a i t  of prudence f r om f a c t s r e l ev a nt 
to how he h a s  c o n du c t e d  h i s  own f i nanc i a l  a f f a i r s .  I f  pe op l e  a c t u a l ly 
mako s e l f  a s s e s sm e n t s in t J;. i s  f a sh i on, a n  out s i d e r  who o b s e r v e d  t h e s e  
same f a c t s woul d d r aw t h e  s ame c o nc l u s i on r e s pe c t i ng t h e  e x i s t e nce o f  
prud e n c e  t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n  h im s e l f  d i d .  And e v i dence s h ow s t h a t  when 
a c t o r s  a nd o b s o rv e r s  use the same t h e o r i e s  and e v i d e nce to a sse s s  t h e  
a c t o r s '  a t t i t u d e s  a n d  j ud gm e n t s ,  b o t h  a c t o r s  a nd o b s e rv e r s  r e a c h  
s im i l a r . conc l u s i on s . hn a c t o r ,  howeve r ,  l s  b e l i ev e d  t o  have a n
a dv a n t a g e  ov e r  a n  o b s e rv e r  b e c a u s e t h e  a c tor o f t e n  � a s  m o r e
i n f o rm n t i on .  
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Thu s ,  i f  a c t o r s  a n<l ob s e rv e r s  h av e  the sa"tc notion o f
prude n c e ,  a t yp i c a l  a c t or w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  s umt1011 u p  more i n s t a nc e s o f  
h i s  o r  h e r  own b e h av i o r  r e l ev a n t  to t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h i s  t r a i t  t h a n  
a ny ob s e r v e r  c a n .  
'J1d s a na lys i s  impl i e s  t h a t  a co11sutic r-- t h e  n c t or--w i l l 1 10.kc a t
l e a st a s  g o o d  a j ud gc c nt o f  riow t�c  intc r a ctioc be twe e n h i s  o r  n c r
t r a i t s a nJ c i r cur1 s t ance s w i l l in f l uence r c p ay111 e 1 ; t  r, r o sp c c t s  u s  a 
b a n k-- the o b s e rver-- n i l l ,  un l es s  t h e  c o n s um e r  u s e s  i nf e r i or t h e or i e s  
t o  a s s e s s  t h i s i n t e r a c t i on o r  u s e s the s am e  t h e o r i e s  a s  b a nks d o  b u t  
a pp l ies t hem b a d l y .  B o t h  po s s i b i l i t i e s  a r e  non t r i v i a l  b u t  ne i th e r  
woul d b i a s  c on s um e r s i n  p a r t i c u l a r  d i r e c t i o n s , 
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[1.c spe c t i n g  t h e  u s e  of i nf e r i or theo r i e s ,  p e r sons o f t e n  comm i t  
t h e  " fund ame n t a l  a t t r i b u t i o n  e rr or . "  A t t r i bu t i on t he ory i n  � s ych o l o gy 
" i s  conce rne d w i th the a t t e mp t s  of o r d i na r y  p e o p l e  to unde r s t a nd t h e  
c a us e s  u nd imp l i c a t i on s  o f  the event s they w i tne s s . 11
5 9  The 
f un da m e nt a l  a t t r i b u t i on e r ror i s  to put t oo much we i gh t  on 
c h a r a c t e r o l o R i c a l  f a c t o r s  and too l i t t l e  we i g h t  on s i tu a t i o n a l  one s 
when a s s e s s i ng or p re d i c t ing b e h av i o r .  For examp l e ,  p e op l e t e nd t o  
a t t r i b u t e  a n  h one s t  a c t  t o  a n  hone s t  d i spos i t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  t h e  
existence o f  f a c t o r s  t h a t  e n courage hone s t y ,  s u c h  a s  t h a t o ne ' s  
b e h av i or i s  c a r e f ul l y  mon i t o r e d  o r  t h a t  one ne e d s  t h o  a p p r ov a l  of 
those w ith whotn one d e a l s .  A t t r i b u t i on s  a r e  s a i d  o f te n  t o  b e  m i s t a k e n  
i n  l i f e  l nr e e l y  b e c a u s e  p s y c h o l o g i s t s  h ave b e e n  a b l e i n  l ab o r a t o r i e s  
t o  i nduce a c t o r s  t o  p e r form w i d e l y  d iv e r g e n t  b e h av i o r s  b y  v a r y i ng 
s i t ua t i on n l  f a c t o r s .  Anot h e r  w ay to p u t  t h i s  i s  t h a t  e n v i ronm e n t s  
a pp n r c n t ly e x e r t  g r e a t e r  i nf l ue nce o v e r  b e h av i o r  t h a n  i s  commonl y  
b e l i e v e d .  
A s  a p p l i e d  t o  de f a u l t  i s s ue s ,  a c t o r s  m ay be though t ,  i n  
p r c dictina t h e  odds , t o  p l ace t o o  m uc h  w e i g h t  on t h e i r  o w n  t r a i t s ,  
s u c h  a s  prude n c e ,  a n d  too l ittl e  we i gh t  o n  s i t ua t i on a l  f a c t o r s ,  s u c h
a s  n s h a ky c c o 1101�y; hence , i f  p e r sons routinel y  th i n k  we l l  o f  the i r  
ab i l i t i e s  t Ley wi l l  b e  wore s a nguine about t h e i r  rcpayfit e n t  p r o sp e c t s  
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than t he i r  c i rcu�1 s t ancc s a c t ua l ly warrant . The funtl 1101en t a l  
a t t r i bu t i on e r r o r ,  how ev e r ,  pa r t ly de r iv e s  f rom t h e  av a i l abi l i ty 
heur i s t i c : p e o p l e  common ly have more s a l ience for obs e rv e r s  t h a n  
s i tua t ions h av e ;  i n  consequenc e , ob s e rv e r s  e v a l ua t i ng behavior tend t o  
f o cus more on t h e  inf l uence of a c t o r s  t h a n  o n  t h e i r  environmen t s .  I f  
th i s  e xp l ana t i on i s  corre c t ,  p e op l e  s h ould c omm i t  t h e  fundame nt a l  
a t t r ibut i on e r r o r  l e s s  when a s s e s s ing the i r  own b e h a v i o r  than the 
behavior of o t he r s ;  the a c t o r ,  be i n g  a lways p r e s e n t , has re l a t ive ly 
l e s s  s a l i ence for h im s e l f  than c i r cums t a nce s clO ,  The e v i de nc e  i s  
c on s i s t e n t  w i th th i s  pre d i c t i on,  show ing t ha t  a c t o r s  t e n d  t o  s e e  t h e i r
own b e h av i o r  a s  s i t ua t i ona l ly d e t e rm ined w hi l e  o b s e rve r s  s e e  the s ame 
b e h av i or a s  d i spo s i t i on a l l y  de t e rm ine d , 60 l l e n ce , a t  t h i s  e a r l y  s t a ge 
in t h e  unde r s t anding of t h e s e  i s sue s ,  there s e e m s  a n  insu f f i c i ent 
b a s i s  on w h i ch t o  p r e d i c t  that p e op l e  w i l l  be sy s t em a t i ca l ly 
opt im i s t i c about the odd s b e c a us e ,  thinking w e l l  of the i r  ab i l i t i e s ,  
they a r c  l ed b y  t h e  fundament a l  a t t r ibut i on e r r or t o  g ive those  
a b i l i t i e s  undue w e i gh t ,  
Lay pe r so n s  a l so t e nd t o  s l ight s t a t i s t i c a l  da t a ,  Por 
examp l e ,  a b ank o f f i c e r  i s  l ike ly to use s t a t i s t i c a l  p r e � i c t o r s  such 
as p a s t  r o t e s of d e f a u l t  i n  s i m i l a r  con s ume r u n iv e r s e s t o  guide
l endi ng p r a c t i c e s ,  61 wh i l e  i n d i v idua l d e b t o r s  m uy re ly on l e s s
p r ob a t iv e  f a c t o r s ,  such a s  the i r  own a n d  t he i r  f r i ends ' hi s t or i e s , 
The e rr o r s  t h a t  such ne thot!s cou l d  c a u s e  s e em r a ntlor.1 . /1 s a n
i l l u s t r a t i on,  mos t  p e op l e  l�now th a t j ob l o s s  i s  a n  i1:iport a n t c a u s e  o f  
de f au l t ,  If t h ey ev a l ua t e th i s  po s s i bi l i ty �y c s c  of t n e  av a i l a b i l i ty 
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h e ur i s t i c ,  t h e y  may ove r s t a t e t he l ike l ihood o f  j ob l os s  i f  they
pe r sona l ly know un enp l oyed p e r so n s  a nd unde r s t a t e  i t  i f  they <lo not , 
! ' c n c e , i f  p o t e n t i a l  d e b t o r s  use the ava i l ab i l i ty h e ur i s t i c ,  some of 
them could b e p e s s in i s t i c  r e spe c t ing t h e  odds whi l e  o t h e r s  m ay b e  
opt imi s t i c ,  A l s o ,  p e op l e  u s i ng the repre sent a t ivene s s  heur i s t i c  may
a s !: t i' cm s e l v e s  whe t h e r  the i r  own t r a i t s  and c i rcum s t ance s a r e  l ike-­
nre " repre s e n t a t iv e  of"-- h i g h  r i s k  o r  l ow ri sk d eb t o r s ,  r a ther than 
us e s t a t i s t i ca l  d a ta a s  t o  d e f aul t r a t e s .  Th i s  i n f e re n t i a l  proce s s  
w i l l  m i s l e a d  u n l e s s  t h e  tra i t s  t h a t  c onsume r s  be l i eve p r e d i c t  de f au l t 
cor r e l a t e  s t r on g l y  w i th the t r a i t s  t h a t  a c tua l ly do p r e d i c t  i t ,  
lfn f o r tuna te l y ,  n o  one knows whe the r consume r s  rout ine l y  focus o n  the 
wrong t r a i t s ,  nor is  it  known in w h i ch d i r e c t i on t he i r  e r r o r s  may run. 
111us , if consum e r s  do use the r e p r e s e n t a t iv e ne s s  h e ur i s t i c  h e r e , 
r a t h e r  t h a n  r e l y  on b a s e  r a t e  d a t a , there  i s  no way t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  
J i re c t i o n  o f  the i r  e r r or s ,  
I n  s um ,  pe opl e som e t im e s  may u s e  i n f e r i o r  theor i e s  t o  e v a l u a t e  
t h e  odd s o f  t h e i r  own de f aul t ,  b u t  no r e a son e x i s t s  t o  b e l i eve t h a t
the s e  theor i e s  rout i ne l y  w i l l  b i a s  the u s e r s  t o  b e  opt i m i s t i c .  A l so ,  
p e op l e  t o  some e x t ent w i l l  u s e  t h e  some t he o r i e s  t h a t  b a nks d o ;  in 
a s s e s s ing t h e i r  a b i l i ty t o  a s s um e  f inanc i a l  ob l i g a t i o n s , pe rsons o f t e n  
l ook a t  the i r  own i nc om e s  n n d  j ob h i s t or i e s ,  j u s t  a s  l end i n g  o f f i c e r s  
tlo ,  Po t ent i a l  d e b t o r s  probab l y  r.iake LJOre m i s t a ke s  when u s i n g  tho 
r i gh t  t h e or i e s  t h a n  do f inn s ,  b e c a us e  the d e b t o r s  h av e  l e s s  e xp e r t i se . 
J lut a g a i n ,  t h e r e  i s  no re a son t o  t h i nk t h a t  t h e s e  M i s t a ke s  l e a d  t o  a 
sy s t cn a t i c a l ly op t im i s t i c  b i n s ,  no r i s  there  a 11y way to knoVI how 
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s e r i ous they a r c . 
4 .  Summa ry 
The mode l s  s e t  out i n  P a r t s  I I  nnd I I I ,  s up r a ,  sllow e d  t h a t
f i rm s a r c  m o r e  l ike l y  t o  r e s pond t o  t h e  e x i s t e r. c e  o f  impe r f e c t
i nf o rm a t i on i n  t h e  s e c o nd s e n s e--con s um e r  i gn o r a n c e  o f  pr i c e s  a nd 
t e rms--by c h a r g i n g  s up r a compe t i t i v e  p r i c e s ,  not by d e gr a d i n g  c o n t r a c t  
qua l i ty .  I t  s e em i n g l y  fol l ow e d  f rom t h i s  t h a t  r e gu l a t i on t o  " improve" 
c on t r a c t  qua l i ty is o f te n  m i s c once i v e d ,  Th i s  norm a t iv e  imp l i c a t i on 
r e s t e d  c r uc i a l ly on tho a s s ump t i on t h n t  impe r f e c t  i n f o rm n t i on i n  t he 
f i r s t  s e n s e  d i d  n o t  e x i s t-- t h n t  c o nsume r s  knovi t h e  o d d s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
w e l l t o  choo s e  c o n t r a c t  t e rm s  c o r re c t l y ,  P a r t  I I IA ( l )  n e x t  a r g u e d  
t h a t  whi l e  i nd i v i du a l  consum e r s  m a y  m n k e  m i s t a ken a s s e s su e n t s o f  t h e  
odd s t h a t  produc t s  a r e  de f e c t ive or t h a t  they w i l l  d e f au l t on l oa ns ,  
i t  i s  wronc t o  f o c u s  o n  i nd i v i dua l s ,  R a t he r ,  t h e  q ue s t i on i s  whe t h e r  
consum e r  ch o i c e s i n  t h e  a g gr e g a t e a r c  c o r r e c t  b e c a u s e  f i rm s ,  in t h e  
c i rcum s t a nc e s d i s c u s s e d  h e r e ,  re spond t o  c o n s um e r s  i n  the a g g r e g a t e ,  
n o t  a s  i n d iv i du a l s .  I t  turns out t h a t  i f  c o n s ma e r  e r r o r s  r c s p c c t i n r, 
t h e  odds a r e  unb i a s e d  or p e s s im i s t i c ,  f i rm s  g e ne r a l ly re s p o n d  a s  i f  
con s um e r  ch o i c e s n r e  corre c t .  J � u t  f i rms r.i uy e xp l o i t  c o n s ur.i c r s  i n  t h e
s e n s e  o f  impo s i ng unw a n t e d  c o n t r a c t  t c r� s  or dc l c t i n c  p r e f e r r e d  t e rms 
if c o ns un: c r  e r r o r s  a r c  opt i m i s t i c  i n  the a g g r e g a t e . Hence , ti1c
n o rr1 a t i v e ly re l ev a n t  que s t i o " i s  w L c t h e r  g e n e r a l  op t i m i sm r e s pc c t i nr; 
t h e  oc!d s  e x i s t s .  !.,a r t  1 I I A ( 2 )  t h e n  n r r u e c, t h n t  c o n s uL:c r s  commo n l y
hnvc t h e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  a c c; u i re ,  nnd s c e r.i i n g l y  po s s e s s ,  e no u t;h ,:a t u  t o
m n ke r e n s o n n b l y  n11p r o x i m a t c  r r c r' i c t i o r. s  Q b o n t  t nc oc.!u s .  Fi 1,a l ly ,  i'a r t  
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I I I A ( 3 )  a r gu e d ,  u s i ng c o g n i t i v �  the ory , t h a t  wh i l o  c o n s um e r s  a r e  
l ike l y  t o  m i sp r o c c s s  t h i s  d n t a , t h e i r  e r r o r s  i n  t h e  a g g r e ga t e 
r e s p e c t i n g t h e  odds o f  d e f e c t s  or de f a u l t s  s e em i n g l y  w i l l  be unb i a s e d  
o r  pe s s im i s t i c .  Th o s e  t w o  a r i:um e n t s  a r e l e s s  l ik e l y  t o  h o l d  i n  one 
impo r t n nt c i r cum s t a n c e , i nv o l v i n g  f r eque nt l y  pur c h a s e d ,  i ne xp e n s iv e  
produc t s  t h a t  o n  r a r e  o c c a s i on s  c a u s e  s e r i ous p e r s o n a l  h a rm .  
C'on s une r s  may b e  opt i m i s t i c  r e spe c t i ng the r i s k  o f  h a rm f r om such 
p r o du c t s ,  e i t h e r  be c a u s e  t h e  r i s k i s  s o  s l i g h t as not to b e  in a ny 
c o n s ume r ' s  c o n s c i ousne s s  or b e c a u s e  cogn i t iv e  d i s s o n a n c e  c a u s e s  
c o n s um e r s  t o  un de r s t a t e  the r i s k ' s m a g n i tude . In t h e  rem n i n i n g  c a s e s ,  
t h e  p r e l im i na ry norm n t iv e  imp l i c a t i on s  o f  our mode l s  h o l d u p  unde r 
� o r e  r e a l i s t i c  a s sump t i o n s  abont w h a t  consum e r s  a c t ua l ly know , 
n . ill As sur.1pt i on !.hll.1 Consume r s  Ca nno t A f f e c t  lli Odd s 
Ve sup p o s e d  t h a t  c on s um e r s  c o u l d  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  odds t h a t  
produ c t s  w i l l  f a i l  o r  tha t t h e y  t h em s e l v e s  w i l l  de f a u l t .  I f  t h i s  
a s s ump t i on i s  r e l axe d ,  two p o s s i b l e  d i f f i cu l t i e s  m ay a r i s e : f i r s t ,  
� o r a l  h a z a r d  c o ul d e x i s t ;  s e c o n d ,  c o nsum e r  p r e f e re n c e s f o r  c on t r a c t  
t e rm s  c o u l d  b e  h e t e r o g e ne ous . The f o rme r  p o s s i b i l i ty h a s  l i t t l e  
e f f e c t  on t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  r o a ch e d  abov e ,  but t h e  l a t t e r  p o s s i b i l i ty 
c o u l d  s o� c t i m o s  m ake i t  d i f f i cu l t  to u s e  our m od e l s  to e v a l u a t e  a c t u a l  
irn r ke t s .  
? e spa c t i ng m o r a l  h a z a r d  i n  connc c t i or. w i th produ c t s ,  a 
v; � r r a Ht y  i s  nn i ns u r a t!c e po l i cy a g a i n s t  p r o d u c t  r e l a t e d  h a rm s .  The 
n a r R i n a l  c o s t  to n c o n sun c r  of u s i n g  n produ c t  c a r e f u l l y  a l w a y s  i s  
p o s i t iv e  ( t i n e  and e f f o r t  a r e  c o s t s ) , whi l e  t h e  w u r g inn l g a i n  o f
further c a r e  s ee m i n g l y  i s  z e r o  t o  a c on s um e r  who h a s  a l r e a dy vurcha s c d  
a w a r r a n t y ,  f o r  t h e  c onsumer i s  ful l y  i n s u r e d f rot1 t h e  mom e n t  o f  s n l c ,  
Hence , c o n s um e r s  w i th wurrant i e s  c o u l d  b e  l e s s  c a re f ul i n  t h e i r  u s e  of 
produc t s--c o u l d  i nc r e a s e  the odds o f  d e f e c t s- - ,  a s  cont r a s t e d  w i t h 
consum e r s  who do n o t  have w a r r a n t i e s ;  the warranty 1.1ay c r e a t e  n "mora l  
h a z a r d . "  
f,)or a l  haz a r d  i s  not impo r t a n t  t o  t h e  a na l y s i s r.1 adc a bove for
two r e a s o n s . F i r s t , i t  is unl i ke ly t o  e x i s t  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t . The 
st a n d a rd m ar ke t r e s p o n s e  to moral h a z ard is c o i nsurance ; the i n s u r e d  
b e a r s  p a r t o f  tho r i s k  o f  a c c i d e nt s ,  a s  w i th rieduc t i b l e s  i n  i n s u r a nce 
po l ic i e s .  I n  t h i s e v e nt , the i n s u r e d  h a s  a n  i n c e n t i v e  t o  t a ke 
p r e c a u t i ons . He s p e c t i ng w a r r a n t i e s ,  a f orm o f  c o i n s u r a nce a c t ua l l y 
e x i s t s .  Consumer durab l e s  a rc b o u g h t  f o r  u s e , and the buye r s  s e l dom 
ke e p  s pa r e s ,  A l s o ,  f irm s r e qu i r e  many wa r r a n t y  r e p a i r s  t o  b e  m u d c  o f f  
t h e  c o n s umer ' s  prer.1 i s e s .  Con s e q u e n t l y ,  de f e c t s  impo s e  s u b s t a nt i a l  
co s t s  o n  c o n s ume r s  i n  l o s t  u s e , e v e n  when f i rm s a dh e re f u l ly t o  
wa rranty ob l i g a t i o n s ;  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c a i n o f  b e i n g  c a r e f u l  i s  a l w � y s  
po s i t iv e  a n d  o f t e n  l ar g e . D e c n u s c  o f  t h i s ,  mor a l  h a z a r d  s h o u l o  s e l dom
be a s e r i ous p r ob l c n .  
Sc conC:, t h e  e x i s t ence o f  1;,or a l  h a z a r d doe s n o t  con t r av ene a n d
m ay r e i nf orce our conc l us ions a s  t o  h o w  w o r r a n ty marke t s  work,  
I n i t i a l ly ,  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  t1o r a l  h a z a r d  w i l l  i nc r e a s e  the l i k c l ihool!
t h a t  c oc:pe t i t i v e  e q uil ibr i a  are s u s t a i na b l e .  \ihcn a l l  c o n s ume r s
p r e f e r  w o r r a n t i c s ,  a ne c e s s a ry a n d  s u f f i c i e n t  c o nd i t i on f o r  an 
e q n i l  i b r i um t o  occur i n  w h i ch only l':n rr an t i c s  arc o f f  e r e <\ nt  
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c or.1 pe t i t iv e  pr i c e s  i s  u1 s1.' � rrd n ! a1.1 , aH ) . lle r e ,  s\'I , the l ev e l  o f
o1't;rnt i n  co1�pc t i t i v c  e q u i l i b r i um f o r  a f i rm s e l l ing w i th w a r r a n t i e s ,  
equa l s  s ( l-11 ) , I f  consum e r s  a r e  tiore c a re l e s s  when they h a v e  
w a r r a n t i e s  t h a n  when they d o  not , !I r i s e s  and s\'I f a l l s ;  i n t u i t i v e ly ,
f i rr.: s w i l l  have t o  p r ov i d e  more r e p l a c e m e n t s a t  a ny volume o f  s a l e s ,  
\•l: i ch c a us e s  output t o  f a l l .  Al s o ,  t h e  c ompa r a t i v e  a dv a n t a g e s t o  
f irm s o f  s e l l ing w i th and w i thout w a r r a n t i e s  r e s pe c t iv e l y  a r e : 
o.W = F+fo ' /�y - cw a nd c<1,1 = F/h.N - c . I f  mor a l  h a z a r d  e x i s t s ,  
w a r r a n t i e s  a r e  more impo r t a n t  t o  consum e r s  b e c a u s e  warra nt i e s  w i l l  
s a v e  c on s um e r s  g r e a t e r  pr e c a ut i on c o s t s ;  c o n s e que nt l y ,  hW ri s e s  more 
tirnn c\.' ' the r e by c a u s ing aw t o  f a l l . Sho u l d  i t  c o s t  re l a t iv e l y  l i t t l e  
t o  m ake n wa rra nt y  ( F '  i s  s m a l l ) , howeve r ,  sW w i l l f a l l f o s t e r  than
u\I'. TI1e n ,  from the t h e o r em a compc t i  t i v c  e qu i l  i b r i un1 is m o r e  1 ike l y
t o  obt a i n ,  Th i s  i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  m o r a l  haz a r d  i s  d e s i rab l e ;  b e c a u s e  
i t  i n c re a s e s  d e f e c t s ,  i t  i n c re a s e s c o s t s a n d  t h u s  p r i ce s ,  H u t  t h e s e  
p r i c e s ,  a r e  m o r e  l ike ly t o  b e  compe t i t i v e .  I n  a d d i t i on ,  when m o r a l  
ha z a r d  e .i:i s t s ,  f i rm s  a r e  m o r e  l ik e l y  t o  r e spond t o  i n s u f f i c i en t  
s h opp i n r. by rai s i n [l  p r i ce not by r e duc i n g  c ov e r a ge . Th i s  i s  b e ca u s e
m o r a l  h a z a r d  c n u s e s consum e r s  t o  hove a g r e a t e r  d e s i re f o r  w a r ranty 
p r ot e c t i on ,  and the l i ke l i hood that f irm s w i l l  have a coaipa r a t iv e  
a dv a n t a ge a t  s c l l i n c  w i th w a r r a n t i e s  i s  i n  cons i d e r ab l e  p a r t  a 
f un c t i on o f  tho s t r e n g t h  of consum e r  p r e f e r e nce s f or the m ,  In a more 
t e ch n i c a l  v e i n ,  r.1o ral  h a z a rd c a us e s  h1,1 t o  r i s e  and thus c a us e s  a11 t o
f a l l ,  b u t  l ea v e s  ltM nnd c o n s e q u e n t l y  u.n una f fe c t e c  ( moral h a z a r d
c a r.no t e x i s t  w '. 1cn  no w n r r a n t i o s  arc m u dc ) ,  3 ince a1,1 f a l l s  r e l a t iv e  to
<ii • f i rm s a r e  m o r e  l i ke l y  to h a v e  a comp a r a t i v e  a t!v a n t a r,e a t  s e l l ing
w i t h  w a r r a nt i e s .  In sum, our a na l y s i s  a c c or.1mo d a t c s  t h e  p o s s i b l e  
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e x i s t e nce of mor a l  h a z a r d ;  s h o u l d  i t  o c c u r , compe t i t i v e  e q u i l ib r i a  n r e  
more l ike l y  a n d  f i rms a re m o r e  l ik e l y  t o  p r ov i d e  w a r r a n t i e s  when 
consum e r s  w a n t  them , t h o ugh in e i th e r  c a s e  p r i c e s w i l l  be h i gh e r  than 
when consum e r s  are a pp r opr i a t e l y  c a r e ful . 
The e x i s t e n c e  of a s e c u r i ty i n t e r e s t  w i l l  no t i n c r e a s e  the 
l ev e l  o f  moral h a z a r d  t h a t  o t h e rw i s e  e x i s t s  i n  l oa n  t r a n s a c t i ons . A 
c o n s um e r  who h a s  g r a nt e d  s e cu r i ty i s  a t  a d i s a dv a nta g e  a f t e r  d e f a ul t 
r e l a t iv e  to c o n s um e r s  who h a v e  no t ,  s i nc e  s e cu r i t y  g i v e s  a f i rm 
g r e a t e r  p ow e r  to c ompe l payL1ent . Th us , consum e r s  who g r a n t  s e c u r i ty 
w i l l  b e  a t  l e a s t  as c a re ful r e s p e c t i n g  r epaywent p r o sp e c t s  a s  t h o s e  
who d o  no t .  
U.e spc c t i ng t h e  s e c o nd d i f f i cu l ty ,  i f  c o n s um e r s  c n n  a f f e c t  t h e  
odds o f  p r oduc t d e f e c t s ,  t hey m a y  have h e t e r og e ne ous p r e f e r e nc e s  for 
warranty covera g e , Fo r e xantpl e ,  a c o n s um e r  w i t h  ten ch i l d r e n  may 
p r e f e r  a s t r on c e r  warranty on a w a sh ing m a c h i ne t h a n  a c o n s um e r  w i t h 
no ch i l dr e n .  111 e e x i s t e n c e  o f  he t e r og e neous p r e f e r e n c e s w i l l  not 
a f f e c t  our ana ly s i s if f i rm s t h a t  o f f e r  w a r r a n t i e s  do n o t  c ompe t e  w i th 
f i rm s t h a t  s e l l  w i t hout w a r r a nt i e s ,  Warranty a n d  nonw a r r a n t y  w a r ke t s  
6'• 
w i l l  " s c gt: e n t "  un l e s s  two con d i t i o n s  a r c  m e t : ' � F i r s t , c o nsume r s  who 
p r e f e r  w ar r n n t i e s  w i l l  .1J.yy proc!uc t s  w i t h o u t  w a r r a n t i e s  i f  the i r  
shopp i n g  d i s c l o s e s  oGly f i rm s  t h a t  re f u s e  t o  w a r r a n t ,  an� c o n s um e r s
w h o  do rwt p r e f e r  w a r r a i, t i c s  w i l l  lu!_y w i tl 1  t 1tem i f  t h e i r  s c n r c h
d i s c l o s e s o n l y  f i rw s  t t a t  o f f e r  w a r r a n t i e s .  I f  t h i s  c on � i t i on i s  no t 
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ne t ,  in e f f e c t  two m a r k e t s  w i l l  e x i s t ,  in e a ch of which f i rm s s e l l  
ltorn o g e r.oous good s--produc t s  w i th n nd p r o du c t s  w i thout w a r r a n t i e s ,  
� c c o n d , the u a r g i n a l  c o s t  t o  f i rms o f  m a k i n g  w a r r a n t i e s  e x c e e d s t h e  
w i l l i n gne s s  t o  p a y  f o r  t h e m  o f  c o n s um e r s  who d o  not p r e f e r  w a r r a n t i e s  
but i s  l e s s t i . a n  t t e  w i l l i n gne s s  t o  p a y  for t hem o f  c o n s um e r s  who d o .  
T o  un d e r s t a n d t h i s  cond i t i on ,  supp o s e  t h a t  the m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  makinc 
w a r r a n t i e s  e xc e e d s t h e  w i l l ingne s s  t o  pay for them o f  c o nsum e r s  who do 
a nd who <lo no t want w a r r a nt i e s :  t h e n ,  no one w ou l d  buy a p r oduc t  w i t h 
a w a r r a n t y .  Supp o s e  ne x t  t h a t  the m a r g i n a l  c o s t  of w a r r a n t i e s  w a s 
l e s s  t l: a n  t l:e w i l l i n gne s s  t o  p a y  for t hem of n l l consum e r s ;  t h e n ,  a l l  
consum e r s  wou l d  buy n i t h  w a r r a nt i e s ,  I f  mnrke t s  s e gm e n t  b e c a u s e  t h i s 
s e cond con d i t i on i s  no t m o t ,  a l l  c o n s um e r s  in a p a r t i cu l ar m arke t 
w o u l d  p r e f e r w a r r a nt i e s  or non e  woul d :  t h i s in f a c t  i s  t h e  s i tua t i on 
r.1odc l e<l in P a r t  I I ,  supr a .  S i n c e  ne i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  c o nd i t i on s  f o r
» non s e gm c n t a t i on» i s  t r i v i a l  a nd b o t h  m u s t  be s a t i s f i e d ,  a n  a na l y s i s  
t h a t  suppo s e s  c o n s um e r s  t o  h a v e  h om o g e ne ou s  p r e f e re nc e s r e s p e c t ing 
w a r r a n t y  cont e n t  s c e m i n r, l y  a p p l i e s  i n  m a ny c a s e s .  
\!he n  w u r r a n t y  and nonw a r r a n t y  marke t s  d o  i n t e r a c t ,  a 
compe t i t iv e  e qu i l ibr i um w i l l  o c c u r  in b o t h  if enough c o n s um e r s  
compa r i son shop , 6 3 b u t  marke t i n t e r a c t i on p o s e s t w o  p r ob l em s . F i r s t , 
c ocpe t i t iv e  equi l ib r i a  a r c  � o r e  d i f f i cu l t t o  s u s t a i n . Some f i rm s i n  
t h e s e  m n r �e t s  s e l l  w i t h  w a r r a n t i e s  a nd s om e  w i thout t hem . Such 
h e t c r o g e n i c t y i n  m nr ke t  o f f e r i u� s  d i l l u t c s t h e  e f f e c t iv e ne s s  o f  
s e a r ch , To s e c  why , supp o s e  t h a t  a l l  shopp e r s  v i s i t  no m o r e  t h a n  two
s t o re s .  I f  a s hopp e r  who pr e f e r s  w n r r a n t i e s  v i s i t s  one s t o r e  t h a t
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o f f e r s  them a nd a no t h e r  t h a t  doe s  not , he or she  i s  e f f ec t i v e l y  a 
nons hopp e r  for b o t h  p r oduc t s ;  i t  i s  a s  i f  a l l  f i rms o f f e r e d  w u rrant i e s  
and t he consum e r  went only t o  one o f  them , The e f f e c t  i s  i de n t i c a l  
for consum e r s  who d o  not p r e f e r  warrant i e s .  I n  shor t ,  i f  cons\Unt>r
shopp i n g  s ampl e  s i z e s  are  h e l d  cons t a n t , the e f f e c t ivene s s  o f  s e arch 
v a r i e s  i nv e r s e l y  w i t h  produc t n nd cont r a c t  v a r i e ty .  S ince c ompe t i t iv e  
equi l ib r i a  are a func t i on o f  s e a r c h  e f f e c t ivene s s ,  t h e y  a r e  l e s s  
l ike l y  t o  occur w hen marke t s  i nt e r a c t . 
A s e cond p r ob l em is t h a t  no one h n s  y e t  char a c t e r i z e d  t h e
equi l ib r i a  t h a t  c a n  o c c u r  i n  m arke t s  i n  w hi ch both p r oduc t s  a nd 
consum e r s  a r e  h e t e r og e ne ous and insuf f i c i ent snopp i n g  o c c u r s  t o  
sus t a i n  comp e t i t iv e  out come s ,  The p 1· a c t i ca l  impo r t a nce of t h i s  
f a i l in g  i s  t h a t  ne i t h e r  the r e sponse o f  f irm s to i n s uf f i c i ent s e a r ch 
no r the f e a ture s that chara c t e r i z e  unde s i ra b l e  e qu i l ib r i a ,  and by 
whi ch they can b e  recogn i z e d ,  ore now known pre c i se l y .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  
hand, n o  r e a son e x i s t s  t o  b e l i ev e  t h a t  i n t e r a c t iv e  m arke t s  b e h av e  much 
d i f f e r e n t l y  than the marke t s  mode l e d  abov e ,  and we a l so know that 
r e duc i n g  the c o s t s  o f  compa ri s o n  shopp i n g  i s  l i ke ly t o  improve m a t t e r s  
6 4  i n  such marke t s  a n d  usua l l y  w i l l  n o t  hur t .  
Consum e r s  a l so coul d h ove h e t e r o g e ne ous pre f er e nce s r e s p e c t i ng 
s e cu r i ty ,  though the e s s e nt i a l s im i l a r i ty of l o a n  t rans a c t i ons impl i e s
tha t t h i s  i s  l e s s  l ike l y  than h e t e r ogene i ty re sp e c t i n c  pr oduc t s .  If 
i t  occur s ,  the  a n a ly s i s  j us t  m ade a p p l i e s ,  
V .  (ie n e r o l hat ions .!!.lli! f..Q.lli.x Imp l icat ions 
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V a r r a n t y  terms a l l oc a te the r i s k  of product d e f e c t s b e tween 
f i rm s a nd consum e r s  a nd s e cur i ty i n t e r e s t  t e rm s  can m ake l oa n s  more or 
l e s s  ri s ky for ther.1 . The a na l y s i s  made above t hus a p p a r e n t l y  app l i e s  
prima f acic to a ny cont r a c t  t e rm who s e  func t ion is to a l l oc a te r i s L: ,  
W i t h  re s p e c t  to a ny s uc h  term,  the e x i s t e nce of compa r i sdn shopp ing 
toge ther w i t h  a su f f i c i en t  w i l l ingne s s  on the part  of consum e r s  to p ay 
for p r e f e r r e d  t e rm s  s e em ingly shou l d  c a u s e  f irm s t o  s a t i sfy c o nsum e r  
p r e f erence s ,  And c onsum e r s  a r e  un l ike l y  to a s s e s s  t h e  r i sks t o  which 
such terms r e l a t e  in ways that d i f f er w i de l y  f rorn those de s c r i b e d  
abov e .  
Th i s  sug g e s t s  t h a t  much regul a t i on o f  t e rm s  i n  c on s um e r  
cont r a c t s  o n  impe r f e c t  inform a t i on g roun d s  i s  m i sconce i v e d , The 
r e gul a t i on t h a t  wc d i sa pp r ove a s sum e s  indiv idual  consum e r s  o f t e n  t o  
r.1 ake m i s t aken r i sk a s s e s sment s ,  supp o s e s  f irm s t o  e xp l oi t  t h e s e  
in i s t a l:o s b y  o f f e r i ng unw a n t e d  t e rm s ,  and re sponds to t h i s supp o s e d  
e x p l o i t a t ion b y  ena c t i n g  i n t o  l aw those t e rm s  t h a t  consum e r s  
p r e sumably clo o r  shoul d want . Howev e r ,  w i th r e s p e c t  t o  c l au s e s t h a t  
s h i f t  r i s k s ,  c on sume r  p r e f e r e n c e s s e e m  ent i t l ed t o  cont r o l l i n g  w e i g h t ,  
� n t.l  t h e  m o s t  l i ke l y  r e sponse of f i rm s  t o  t h e  e x i s t ence o f  imp e r f e c t
inform a t ion i s  t o  s a t i s f y  t h o s e  pref e rence s a t  e xce s s iv e  p r i ce s r a t h e r  
than f ru s t r a t e  t Lcru . R e g u l a t i on s h o u l d  t h e n  be devo t e d ,  t o  a much 
c r e a t e r  e x t e nt t h a n p r e v i ous l y ,  t o  a sc e r t a i ni n g  when p r i c i ng p r ob l em s  
e c t ua l l y exi s t  and t o  remedy i n g  t h e m ,  D e f o r e  making s ugge s t i on s  a s  t o
h ow t h e s e  a r e  b e s t  �one , w e  s h a l l f i r s t  d i scu s s  a n  obj e c t ion t o  our
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a r gum en t , wh i ch i s  t h a t  o u r  no t i o n  o f  a c o r r e c t  c h o i c e  i s  t o o  
r e s t r i c t iv e ,  Ac c o r d ing t o  t h i s  o b j e c t i o n ,  a c h o i c e c a nn o t  be c o r r e c t  
un l e s s : ( i )  i t  r e f l e c t s  a c o r r e c t  a s s e s sment o f  t h e  o dd s ,  ( i i )  i t  
r e f l e c t s  a c o rr e c t  app r e c i a t i on o f  the m u rke t opp o r t un i ty se t ;  and 
( i i i )  t h e  p e r s o n  h o l d i ng t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  t h a t  g e n e r a t e d  t h e  c h o i c e  
c o rre c t ly p r e d i c t s  t h a t  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  w i l l  p e r s i s t  o v e r  t im e , W e  
ne g l e c t  t h i s p o s s ib l e  t h i rd a sp e c t  o f  a c o r r e c t  choi c e . A r e  w e  
j us t i f i e d i n  d o i n g  s o ?  
A. Imp e r f e c t  I n forma t i on in .l!. Th i rd S e n s e
A c e n t r a l  t e ne t o f  l ibe r a l  the ory i s  t h a t  p e r s on s ' c ho i c e s  
s h o u l d  c o n t r o l  p o l i t i c a l  and m a r ke t out c ome s .  Th i s  t e ne t i s  e a s i l y 
d e r i v e d  f r om u t i l i t a r i a n i sm a s  i t  i s  cor.;ruonly un d e r s tood , from J:a n t i a n  
mor a l i ty and f r om Jude o- Ch r i s t i a n  e th i c s , 6 5 L i b e r a l  theory 
a c c ommo d a t e s t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of imp e r f e c t  i n f o rm a t i on by r e c o gn i z i n g  two 
e xc e p t i on s  t o  c o n s m1 e r  s ov e r e i g n t y ,  t h o s e  d i s cu s s e d  a b o v e : p e r s o n s  may 
be i gn o r a n t  o f  t h e  oppo r t un i ty s e t •  or o f  r i sl:s that they f a ce . \'/hen 
e i ther e xc e p t i on a pp l i e s ,  s t a t e i n t e rv e n t i on o f  s oc1e s o r t  i s  
j us t i f i a b l e w i th i n  t h e  t h e o r y ,  I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  a t h i r d  form o f  
impe r f e c t  i n f o rm a t i o n  ha s b e e n  t houi;ht t o  e x i s t ,  The e f f e c t s  o f  t ;any 
de c i s i on s  t h a t  p e opl e m ake n r e  f e l t  y e a r s  h e n c e , and p e op l e ' s  
p r e f e r e n c e s c h a n g e  over t in e , Co n s e que n t l y ,  a p e r s on d e c i d i n g  wh e t h e r  
t o  buy , b o r r ow or vote r�us t  cons i d e r  whe t h e r r r e s c n t c L o i c e s w i l l  
s a t i s f y  f u t u r e  p r e f e r e nc e s a s  w e l l  u s  p r c G e n t  one s ,  r c op l c  a r c  s a i o
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y L o  g e t tl: i s  d e c i s i o &  wronc ; t h e y  o f t e n  Co not know wha t 
t h e y  w i l l  cone to pr e f e r .  \/L e n  pr i v a te de c i s i on s  i n v o l v e  an ilopo r t a n t
t empo r a l  a sp e c t  a n J  inpe r f e c t  i n f o rm a t i on i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  b e i n g  
i g no r a n t  o f  one ' s  fut ure s e l f  e x i s t s ,  the s t a t e a l so i s  t h ough t t o  
h a v e  a l e g i t i m a t e  j u s t i f i c a t i on f o r  i n t e rv e n i n g , De c i s i o m1 ake r s  
shoul d n u ke l aw s  t h a t  w i l l  s a t i s f y  p e o p l e ' s  futur e  pr e f e r e n c e s when 
those a r c  l ike l y  t o  b e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th p e op l e ' s  pre s e n t  
p r e f e r e n c e s , 6 6 
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Th i s  t h i r d a s p e c t  of t h e  impe r f e c t  i n f o rma t i o n  c o n c e p t  c a nnot 
j us t ify r e gul a t i o n  of cont r a c t  t e rm s  b e c a u s e  it d e r i v e s  f rom a f orn of 
ut i l i t a r i a n i sm t h a t  i s  unworka b l e  i n  t h i s c o n t e x t . 6 7 F o r  t h i s  s o r t  o f  
u t i l i ta r i a n i sm t o  w o r k  d c c i s i ooo1ake r s  ( Hp l annc r s " )  mus t  h a v e  a 
c ompa r a t iv e  a dv a nta ge over p e r s o n s  i n  p r e d i c t i n g  f u t u r e  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  
A s  r e g a r d s  p e r s o n a l  c o n s ump t i on de c i s i o n s  t h i s  a dv a nt a ge s e e m s  
none x i s t e n t , A p e r s on ' s f u t u r e  p r e f e r e n c e s a r e  a fun c t i on o f : ( i ) how 
h i s  or h e r  p r e s e n t  s e l f  w i l l  c h a ng e  a s  o re sul t of i n t e r n a l  g r ow t h  a n d  
e xt e rna l c i r cum s t a n ce s ,  and ( i i )  t h o s e  e x t e r na l  c i r cum s t a nc e s .  
lte spc c t i ng t h e  f i r s t  f a c t o r ,  t h e  b e s t  p r e d i c t o r o f  how the s e l f  w i l l  
m e t amorph i s c s e e m i n g l y i s  p a s t  c h a n g e s ,  P e r s o n s  have m u c h  more d a t a  
about the i r  p a s t s  t h a n  p l anne r s  w i l l .  F o r  e xamp l e ,  a p e r s o n  w h o  t o d a y  
p r e f e r s  p u r c h a s i n g  a hous e t o  r e n t i ng a n  a p a r tment h a s  a l i f e t im e  o f  
e xp e r i e n c e s  o n  whi c h  t o  draw w h e n  a s k i n g  h e r s e l f  whe t h e r  t h i s  
p r e f e r e n c e  w i l l  pe r s i s t ,  �he knows how s h e  h a s  come t o  f e e l  a b o u t  
p r ev i ous dwe l l i n g  p l a c e s ;  how t h o s e  dw e l l ing p l a ce s fur t h e r e d  o r  
r e t a r d e d  h e r  l i f e ' s  p l a n  o r  o t h e rw i s e  a f f e c t e d  her h a p p i ne s s ;  h o w  h e r  
m aj or c o n s ump t i on d e c i s i on s  h a v e  t ur n e d  out , a n d  s o  f o r t h .  N o  p l a nne r 
c o u l d  know a s  m uc h .  I Jence , p l anne r s  c o u l d  h av e  a compa r a t i v e  
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adv a nt a g e over p e r s o n s  i n  pr e d i c t i n c  f u t u r e  p r e f e r e n c e s o n l y  whe n the 
p l anne r s  o r e  be t t e r  a b l e  to p r e � i c t  the o c c u r r e n c e  o f  f u t u r e  e v e n t s 
t h a t  mny n i t e r  t h e s e  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  
The f u t u r e  event s t h a t  coul d a l t e r  p r e f e r e n ce s r e spe c t i n g  p a s t
c o n s unipt i on c h o i ce s ,  how e v e r ,  a r e  l i ke l y  t o  b e  p a r t i cu l a r  to 
i n d i v i du a l s ,  For examp l e ,  a p e r s o n ' s p r e s e n t  p r e f e r e n c e  f or an 
a p a r tment over a house seems m o r e  l i ke l y  t o  chanoe as a re s u l t o f  h i s  
o r  h e r  a c q u i r i ng more w e a l th ,  a f am i l y  o r  a uew hobby , t h a n  b e c a u s e  o f
a pub l i c  c omm i t tm e n t  to nuc l e a r  powe r .  P e op l e  i n  g e ne r a l  a r e  b e t t e r  
p r e d i c t e r s  o f  c h a n g e s i n  the i r  own c i r cum s t a n ce s t h a n  p l anne r s  a r e . 
Th us , p l anne r s  s e e m  b e t t o r  a b l e  to p r e d i c t  f u t u r e  pr e f e r e n c e s a s  
r e g a r d s  c o n sump t i on c h o i ce s  o n l y  i n  t h e  unu s u a l  c a s e s  w h e n  tho s e  
p r e f e r e n c e s m a y  a l t e r  a s  a re s u l t o f  e v e n t s o f  w ide s p r e a d  c o n s e q ue n c e ,  
t h a t  p l anne r s  a r e  b e t t e r  a b l e  to a n t i c i p a t e  a n d  c ompr e h e n d . 
F.v cn t h i s  a p p a r e n t  a d v a n t a ge d i s s o l ve s un tle r a n a l y s i s .  Th e 
p l a nn e r  h a s  no s p e c i f i c i n f o rm a t i on a b o u t  e a ch of the u a ny p e op l e  
whose p r e f e r e n c e s a r e  a t  i s s ue , and s o  h i s  t a s k  i s  t o  d e c i de b ow the 
typ i c a l  p e r s on ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s w i l l  a l t e r  as n r e s u l t o f  maj or c h a n g e s 
in pub l i c  p o l i cy o r  s o c i a l  re l a t i on s . To rn n kc s u c h  p r e d i c t i on s  
r e q u i re s n t h e o r y ,  o f  a p s y c h o l o g i c a l  or p s y c h i a t r i c  s o r t ,  u s  t o  how 
p r e f e r e n c e s a l t e r  over t im e  in r e spon s e  to p a r t i cu l a r  e x t e r na l  s t imul i 
or p a r t i c u l a r  c h n n r; e s i n  t h e  e x t e r na l e nv i ronm e n t . !lo s u e r. t h e o r y
e x i s t s .  I n  c on s e q u e n c e , the l i ke ly out come o l  u t t e m � t s  to p r e � i c t  
f u t u re p r e f e r e n c e s w i l l  b e  t h o  s u � s t i t u t i on o f  the p l a nne r s '
p r e f e r e n c e s f o r  t h o s e  o f  t h e i r  c o n s t i t ue n t s ,  Fo r exai:.pl c ,  a p l a nne r 
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who t h i n k s  t h a t  s e cu r i ty int e r e s t s  s h o u l d  be b a nne d b e c a u s e  t h e y  w i l l  
op e r a t e h a r s h l)' a g a i n s t  c o n s um e r s  i n  the c om i n g  h a r d  t im e s  i s  s t r o n g l y  
pr e d i s p o s e d  t o  p r e d i c t  t h a t  i f  s e cu r i ty int e r e s t s  are b a nn e d  c o n s ume r s  
w i l l  come t o  p r e f e r  th e i r  a b s e nc e ,  Regu l a t i on m a d e  i n  t h i s  f a sh i on 
n u s t  be j u s t i f i e d  by r e f e r e n c e  to t h e  p l a nne r ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  no t t h o s e  
o f  the p e r so n s  whose d e c i s i on s  m a y  be ov e r r i d d e n .  
T o  s umm n r i z e ,  r e g u l a t i n g  c on s ump t i on d e c i s i o n s  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  
p e r s o n s ' f u t u r e  p r e f e r e n c e s i s  a r b i t r ary,  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  no 
p 3 r t i cu l a r  r e gul a t i o n  c o u l d  be j us t i f i e d by the ut i l i t a r i a n i sm t h a t  
p u r po r t s  to j us t i fy t h e  e n t i re proj e c t  o f  r e gu l a t i ng o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  
f u t u r e  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  Th i s  i s  i n i t i a l ly t h e  c a s e  b e c a u s e  p e r s o n s  h ave 
more da ta than p l anne r s  do a b o u t  the i r  own s e l v e s  a nd how the se are 
l i ke l y  to a l t e r  i n  re s p o n s e  t o  f u t ur e  c i r c um s t a nc e s ,  a n d  c ommon l y  are 
b e t t e r  a b l e t o  p r e d i c t  the o c c u r r e nc e  o f  f u t ur e  p r e f e re n c e  a f f e c t i n g  
e v e n t s .  Al s o ,  w h e n  p l anne r s  a r c  b e t t e r  ab l e  t o  p r e d i c t  o r  un de r s t a nd 
t l e  o c c u r r e n ce of eve nt s o f  w i de s p r e a d  c o n s e q u e n c e  t h a t  c o u l d  
i n f l ue n c e  pre f e r e nce s ,  t h e y  a r c  s t i l l  unab l e  t o  p r e d i c t  p r e f e r e n c e  
c h n nge s b e c a u s e  t h e y  l a c k  a the ory r e l n t i ng e v e n t s  t o  c h n n g e s .  When 
p l a nne r s  are a u t h o r i z e d  to n e t  but l a ck b o t h  d a t a  a nd a the ory t b a t  
c o u l d  c u i d e  t h e i r  n o t i on s , they m o s t  p r o b a b l y  w i l l p l a n by r e f e r e nc e  
t o  tle i r  own c o n c e p t i on o f  the common g o o d ,  I n  c o n s e q ue n c e , 
r e g u l a t i on o f  c o n s um p t i on de c i s i on s  on the ba s i s  o f  supp o s e d  
p r e d i c t i ons o f  pe r so n s ' f u t u r e  p r e f e r e n c e s c a nn o t  b e  j us t i f i e d  by 
u t i l i t a r i a n i sm a t  a l l ,  for such r e gu l a t i o n  w i l l  be r e l a t e d  to t h e s e  
p r e f e r e n c e s o r: l y  b y  l inpp c n s t n n ce , N o r  i s  i t  e a sy to d e r i v e  a 
j us t i f i c a t i on f rom d e ont o l o g i o c l  s c h e m e s  now in f re<;_ue n t  u s e , s u c h  a s  
t h o s e  p r em i s e d  o n  r e spe c t  f o r  p e r s o n s , Un de r p r e v a i l ing not i o n s  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  mora l i ty ,  t h e n ,  p e r s o n s '  pre s e n t  p r e f e r e n c e s r e s pe c t i n g 
c o n t r a c t  t e r m s  s h o u l d  be r e g a r d e d  a s  cont r o l l ing u n l e s s  impe r f e c t  
i n f o rm a t i on i n  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  s e n s e s d i s cu s s e d  a b o v e  e x i s t s ,  
D ,  Po l i cy Impl i c a t i o n s  
Impe r f e c t  i nf o rm a t i on t o  w h i ch the s t a t e s houl d r e spond niay 
e x i s t  in two f o rms--consun1 e r s  are i g no r a n t of the oppo r t un i ty s e t s  
they f a c e  o r  o f  the odd s o f  m i s f o r t une impl i c i t  i n  p a r t i cu l a r c h o i c e s ,  
Th e s t a t e  c a n  re spond t o  e i th e r  f o rm by b a nn i n g  a p a r t i cu l a r  t e rm or 
r e q u i r i n g  d i s c l o s u r e  r e spe c t i n g  i t .  We s h a l l  d i s c u s s  e a ch p o s s i b l e  
r e spons e .  
( 1 )  Bann i ng Con t r a c t  Te nts
A d e c i s i onm a ke r  may ban a p a r t i cu l a r t e rm a l toge t he r ,  Fo r 
e xa mp l e ,  some s t a t e s h a v e  p r oh i b i t e d  d i s c l a im e r s  i n  s a l e s  of c o n s um e r  
g o o d s , Ve r e f e r  t o  t h i s  a s  a " g e ne r a l  b a n . " The d e c i s i om1 a k e r  a l s o  
c a n  t a ke a c a s e  b y  c a s e  approa c h ;  h e  o r  s h e  coul d ,  a s  a n  i l l u s t r a t i on ,  
b a n  d i s c l a im e r s  o n l y  whe n f i rm s  i n  a p a r t i cu l a r ttar l::e t  have a 
compa ra t iv e  n d v u nt a g e  a t  s e l l in g  w i t hout w a r r a n t i e s  a n d  t o o  l i t t l e  
comp a r i son s h op p i n g  o c cu r s  t he r e  t o  s u s t a i n  n cor.1pe t i t iv c  e q u i l i b r i lltl .  
W e  r e f e r  t o  t h i s  a s  a " p a r t i cu l a r  b a n" .  
n e ne r a l  b a n s  s c l dott are a n  appropr i a t e re s p o n s e  t o  the 
e x i s t e n ce o f  impe r f e c t  i n f o rma t i on in i t s  i &n o r a n c c  o f  c h o i c e  s e t s
a sp e c t ,  F i rm s  o r e  more 1 i ke ly t o  r e sponcl t o  t h i s  fon1 o f  irJpe r f c c t
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i n f o rrn n t i o n  b y  r a i s i n g  p r i c e s  f o r  t h o s e  t e r m s  t h a t  c onsum e r s  d o  w a n t , 
r a t h e r  t h a n  by o f f e r i n g unw a nt e d  t e rm s , Hence , g e n e r a l  b a n s  a r e  
1 i kc l y  t o  b e  i n c on s i s t e n t  w i t h c o n s um e r  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  A l s o ,  i t
a pp a r e n t l y  t a ke s  a re l a t iv e l y  srn n l l  amoun t o f  coop a r i son s h opp i ng t o  
p r e v e n t  f i rm s  f rom a l t o ge t h e r  ne g l o c t i ng c o n s um e r  p r e f e r e n c e s 
6 !l  r e s p e c t i n g  cont r a c t  t e rm s .  Th e r e f or e ,  i f  a w i de s p r e a d  d e g r a d a t i o n  
o f  cont r a c t  q u a l i ty r e sponse by f i rm s  t o  i n s u f f i c i en t  c o n s um e r  
s h opp i ng i s  s us p e c t e d ,  a d i s c l o s u r e  s o l u t i on p r o b a b l y  w i l l  y i e l d  a 
s a t i s f a c t o ry out come , 
Gene r a l  b a n s  o f  t e r m s  t h a t  a l l o c a t e  r i s ks b e c a u s e  c o n s um e r s  
c a nnot a c c u r a t e l y  v a l ue t h e s e  r i s ks w i l l  b e  i n a pp r op r i a t e  i n  m o s t  
c a s e s .  The r e l ev a nt que s t i on s  a r e  whe t h e r  c o n s um e r s  sys t em a t i ca l ly 
un d e rc s t i m n t e  t h e  true otl<l s ,  a n d  whe t h e r  t h e i r  i g norance w i l l  p e r s i s t .  
An sw e r s  t o  tho s e  que s t i on s  a r c  c o n t e x t  d e p e n d e n t  a nd d i f f i cu l t .  U s i n g  
p r odu c t s  a s  o n  e xamp l e ,  w e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  p e op l e  m ay b e  p e s s im i s t i c  
l a r g e l y  be c a u s e  they t e n d  t o  a t t a ch exc e s s i v e  we i g h t  t o  v i v i d  d a t a ; 
ne g a t iv e  i n form11 t i o11, such a s  a sp e c t a c u l a r  a c c i de nt ,  i s  more v iv i d  
t h a n  t h e  s imp l e  a b s e nc e  o f  f a i l ur e ,  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  v iv i d  p o s i t iv e  
d a t a  n b o u t  a p a r t i cu l a r  i t ent c o u l d  come t o  dom ina t e  f o r  a t ime , A new
p r o d u c t  c o u l d  have obv ious a t t r a c t i on s  but s ub t l e  d r awb a c k s . 
Co n s e quen t l y ,  a de c i s i onm nkc r shoul d p r e s ume p e s s im i sm or unb i a s e d
e s t im a t e s o s  r e g a r d s  warr a n t i e s ,  b u t  b e  op e n  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i ty o f  
c o n s um e r  op t im i sm i n  p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s ,  I n  s u e r. c a s e s ,  howev e r ,  t h e  
s i tua t i on a l  f a c t o r s  t L a t  a f f e c t  c on s um e r  r i s k  a s s e s sm e n t s c o u l d  
c h a nge . T o  r e c u r  t o  the e xamp l e  a b ov e ,  i f  the n e w  p r odu c t  b e g i ns t o  
90 
f a i l  in d r am a t i c  f a s h i o n ,  op t im i sm coul d b e come p e s s im i sm .  Such 
c h a nge s i n  s i t ua t i onal f a c t o r s  a r e  cl i f f i cu l t ior <lc c i s i onm a k c r s  t o  
p r e d i c t ,  Thi s  ana ly s i s  S U f: g e s t s  t h a t  gene r a l  b a n s  o f  t e rr.i s b e c a u s e  
consum e r s  w i l l  make i n c o r r e c t  cho i ce s r e s p e c t i n g  thet1 n r e  j u s t i f i ab l e  
only when s y s t e m a t i c  o p t im i sm i s  l ike l y  b o t h  t o  e x i s t  a nd p e r s i s t .  We
h a v e  i de nt i f i e d  one such c a s e ,  i uv o l v in(l f reque n t ly p u r ch a se d ,  
ine x p e n s i v e  i te m s  t h a t  m a l f un c t i on s o  n s  t o  c a u s e  p e r sonal  inj ury a 
v e r y  l ow p e r c e n t a ge of the t ime . S t r i c t  l i a b i l i ty i s  approp r i a t e  for 
t r a ns a c t i ons i nv o l v ing s u c h  p r oduc t s ,  O t h e rw i s e ,  g e n e r a l  bans o f  
t e rm s  .Q!! info rmat i on ground s a r e  w i thout j us t i f i c a t io n , 6 9
C a s e  by c a s e  de t e rm i na t i ons , s u c h  a s  t h o s e  t h a t  cour t s  � ake 
under the uncons c i onab i l i ty do c t r ine , s e em more j u s t i f i ab l e  but s h o u l d  
s e l dom e a u s e  t e rm s  t o  b e  b a nne d o n  inform a t i on cr ound s ,  for t h r e e  
r e l a t e d  r e a sons . F i r s t ,  it�p e r f e c t  i n f o rm a t i on i n  e i t h e r  a s p e c t  w i l l  
c a u s e  f i rm s  t o  de t e r i or a t e  cont r a c t  con t e nt only i n  a m i no r i ty of 
c a s e s .  Firms r e spond to t h e  i gnorance o f  oppor t un i ty s e t s  a sp e c t  r:iorr 
by ra i s in g  p r i ce s t h a n  by o f f e r i nc unw a nt e d  t e rm , ,  and r e spond 
unde s i ra b l y  to the i gnorance of the odds a sp e c t  only when sy s t e rJat i c  
o p t im i sm e x i s t s ,  which appa r e n t l y  o c c u r s  i nf re q ue nt l y ,  '111us , when a 
cl a u s e  i s  ch a l l en g e d  on i n f on1 11 t i on g r oun ll s ,  cour t s  s h o u l d  a s sUt.1 e ,  i n  
t h e  a b s e n c e  of e v i d e n c e  to t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h a t  the t e rm a c c u r a t e l y  
re f l e c t e d consum e r  p r e f e rence s ,  S e c o n d ,  c o ur t s  w i l l  have d i f f i cu l ty 
a c q u i r i n !l  tl1e d a t a  requi r e <.'. to ov e r come t h i s  p r o s m:ip t i o n ,  'fhe 
e x i s t e nce of so1i1c c o n s um e r s  who d i d  11 o t  s h op or ol m!.!ny c o nsur.J c r s  WHO
m i g h t  �rnvc m i s t a l:e n t h e  odds a r c ;: n  i nsu f f i c i cr. t b a s i s  on wid er. to t a n  
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n t e r m .  Ra the r ,  c o u r t s  mus t a sc e r t a i n  w h e t h e r  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t
c o r r e l a t e  w i th p o o r  mnrl e t  p e r f ormance , s u c h  a s  l i t t l e  c omp a r i s o n  
s hopp i n g ,  a w e a k  w i l l ingne s s  t o  p a y  for p r e f e rr e d  t e rm s ,  and a 
p e rv a s iv e  un d e r e s t im n t ion of the o d d s ,  e x i s t e d  when the t e rm w a s  u s e d .  
Law s u i t s  i nv o l v i n g  consume r s  w i l l  s e l dom b e  about s take s t h a t  w i l l  
induce t h e  l i t i g ant s t o  i ncur t h e  cons i d e r ab l e  expense o f  p t ov id i n g  
e v i de n c e  r e l ev ant t o  t h e s e  f a c t o r s . Th i r d ,  o s e n s i b l e  j ud i c i a l  
re sponse t o  t l:e  f a c t  t h a t  f i rm s g e ne r a l ly w i l l  s a t i s fy consum e r  
p r e f e r e n c e s r e s p e c t i ng t e rm s ,  b u t  t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f i cu l t t o  l:now when 
f i rm s have not done so , is to a l l ow d e c i s i o n  to be i nf l ue nc e d  by the 
g r a v i ty o f  t h e  r i s k  at i s sue , For e xamp l e ,  the p r e sump t i on a g a i ns t  
ba ns m ay b e  r e l a x e d  o r  aba ndone d when t h e  c on t r a c t  h a s  s h i f t e d  t o  a 
consumer a r i s k  o f  l ar ge m a gni t ude , such a s  buying a c a r  t h a t  i s  a 
l em on .  I t  i s  i n  j us t  t h e s e  c a s e s ,  howeve r ,  t h a t  consuin e r a  a r e  l i k e l y  
to s e arch f o r  inf o rm a t i on a bout t h e  p r oduc t ,  a n d  t o  p a y  a t te n t i on t o  
t h e  i n f o rm u t i on t h e y  g e t .  The p r e s ump t i on t h a t  f i rm s  a r e  s a t i s fy i n g  
c o n s urJer p r e f e r e n c e s thus s h o u l d  b e  s t r e n g t h e ne d  r a th e r  t h a n  w e a ke n e d  
w h e n  t h e  s t a J;e s i n c re a s e . 7 0  Th i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a c o u r t  should b a n  a 
t e rm on i nform a t i on grounds when t h o  r i s k  t h a t  t h e  t e rm s h i f t e d  h a s  a 
r e l a t iv e ly l ow v a l u e  but the t e rm i s  w i d e l y  u s e d ,  so t h a t the p o s s i b l e  
tot a l  e f f i c i ency l o s s  i t  c a u s e s c o u l d  b e  l ar g e , .l!.lll! the e v i d e n c e  
s u 1;g e s t s  t h a t  i t  i s  the wronr; t e r m .  !Jow n1a ny such c l au s e s  t h e r e  a r e  
s c e Q s  untnown , n o r  w i l l  such c a se s b e  l i t i ga t e d  f reque n t l y .  And t h e s e  
t h r e e  r e a so n s ,  t n ken t o �c the r ,  ir.1pl y  t h a t  thoui;h p a r t i c u l a r  b a n s  c a n  
be j u s t i f i ab l e ,  dc c i s i onLl akc r s  s h o n l d  be l e s s  i n c l ine d t o  e n a c t  t hem 
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than t hey have b e e n ,  
( 2 )  Requ i ri ng D i s c l osure 
The apparent s o l u t i on t o  tl:c i gnorance o f  the odd s p r ob l eru i s  
t o  r e q u i re the odds t o  b e  d i s c l o s e d ,  De c i s i onmake r s ,  however,  wou l d  
f a ce s i gn i f i cant p r a c t i ca l  d i f f i cu l t i e s  i n  o b t a i ni n g  odds i nf orma t io n ,  
dev e l op ing conc i s e  a nd comprehens i b l e d i s c l o s u r e  f orma t s ,  a n d  c a u s i n g  
i n f o rm a t i on t o  be p r e s e n t e d  i n  such f a s h i on t h a t  consum e r s  w i l l  pay 
a t t e n t i on t o  i t . Fo r examp l e ,  a car could f n i l  i n  s e v e r a l  ways a nd in 
vary i ng d e gr e e s ,  A g g r e g a t i n g  d i f fe r e nt f a i l ur e  probab i l i t i e s  i n t o  a 
compo s i te f a i l ure probab i l i ty s e e m s  v e ry d i f f i cu l t ,  whi l e  pre s e n t i ng 
consn�1e r s  w i th a s e r i e s  of d i s c r e t e  e s t im n t e s may be more confus i n g  
t h a n  u s e ful . A l s o ,  i f  produ c t  r e l i a b i l i ty i s  v i ewed a s  a n  outpu t , 
bo t h  the f i rm and the consw:1c r  p r ov ide inpu t s  to i t ;  that  i s ,  f a i l ure 
in a f un c t i on both o f  manu f a c ture and o f  u s e , Decause  f irms c a nn o t  
ob s e rve u s e  pa t t e rn s  e x c e p t  a t  grea t c o s t ,  t h e y  may be una b l e  t o  
d i s c l os e  " tr ue "  f a i l ure probab i l i t i e s . 7 1  F u r t h e r  a�a l y s i s  may show 
such d i f f i cu l t i e s  t o  b e  l e s s  s e r i ous than t bey now appe a r  but  in i t s  
a b s e nce we suspe c t  t h a t  s t r i c t  l i ab i l i ty i s  a t1ore e f f i c i e n t  s o l u t i on 
to a ny ignorance of the odds p r ob l em s  that  now e xi s t .  
ite sp e c t inp, i gnorance o f  1:1nrko t cl: o i c c  s e t s ,  the e x t e nt of 
conp a r i son s h opp i n g  v ar i e s  i nv e r s e ly w i t h the cos t s  t o  consumers o i  
cor.1p a r i n r; 1� n rke t a l t e r r.n t i vc s ,  i lcncc , t h e  que s t ion is  how to r e c! u c c
the se c o s t s .  U c  s u �g c s t  t hree llic tbo� s .  F i r s t ,  co n t r a c t  t e rus t h a t  
1 .. a y  b e  of c o n c e r n  s h o u l d  ·u c d i s c l o s c L1. i n  s t a Et;u r d  f a s h i o•1 , A l l
s e cur i ty i n t e r e s t  c l aus e s ,  for exn r::;i l c ,  sli o u l <I be ro qtd r c d  t o  r c a tl  i n
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the s ame way ,  e x c e p t  i n  s o  far as i ndiv idu a l  i t ems dom in a t e , such a s  
de s c r i p t i ons o f  t h e  c o l l a t e r a l . S t a nda r d i z a t i on i s  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  
JJ l a i n  l a nguage l aw s ,  whi ch coun10nl y  requ i r e  d i s c l o s ure s t o  b e  t111de i n  
c l e a r  a n d  s impl e  f a s h i on ,
7 2  
Th e goa l  he r e  i s  t o  f a c i l i t a te 
comp a r i sons � f i rm s ;  t h i s  i s  b e s t  done by requ i r i ng f i rm s to use 
the s ame l a nguage , Th i s  l a ngu a ge may be more a b s t r a c t  o r  c ompl e x ,  and 
thus more d i f f i cu l t  to r e a d ,  t h a n  the cont r a c t s  that a p a r t i cu l a r  
p l a i n  l anguage s t a t u t e  n1ay requ i r e .  The r e l evant comp a r i s o n ,  howeve r ,  
i s  n o t  b e tw e e n  t lte c o s t s  t o  a c o n s umer of r e a d i ng Q!!£ cont r a c t  w r i t te n
i n  r e l a t iv e l y  d i f f i cu l t  o r  i n  r e l a t iv e l y  s impl e  l angu a ge . The 
st a ndard c ont r a c t  woul d be u s e d  by a l l  f i rm s ,  and once m a s t e r e d  i s  
m a s t e re d  forev e r , Hence , the c omp a r i son i s  b e tween the c o s t s  e nt a i l e d  
in r e a d i ng many d i f f e r e nt s impl e cont r a c t s  o r  i n  r e a d i ng o n e  s t a ndard
c ot1p l ex c o nt r a c t ,  The l a t t e r  t a sk s eems cheaper than the f ormer and 
is  t hus more l i ke ly to b e  done , 
A s e cond me thod of reduc i n g  s hopp i n g  c o s t s  i s  t o  requ i re f irms 
to g iv e  p r i c e  and impo r t a nt cont r a c t  t e rm quo t e s ove r  the phone , The 
q uo t e s ne e d  be e f f e c t iv e  only for short  pe r i ods--#our p r i ce i s  $100 
unt i l  F r i day"; a l s o ,  f irm s c o u l d  c h a r ge l e s s  but no t more than the 
quo t e d  p r i c e s ,  Ma ny f irm s now quo te p r i c e s by phone , s o  t h e  propo s a l  
i s  n o t  f a r f e t ch e <l ,  The obv i ous d i f f i cu l ty i s  t h e  consum e r  who c a l l s  a 
d e p a r tment s t ore a n d  reque s t s  i n fo rm a t i on about t h i rty i te m s ,  but 
p r ob l eJ.J s  o f  th i s  sort could be ame l iora t e d  by p e rm i t t i n g  f i rm s to 
l im i t  t h e  numb e r  of q uo t e s per c a l l er or by requ i r in g  t hem t o  p rov ide 
q i: o t c s  only f o r  expens ive i te 1;1 s .  The c o s t  r e duc i n g  p o t e n t i a l  of 
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tel ephone shopp i n g  seems gre at  eno ugh for th i s  re f orm to b e  t r i e d . 
A third r e f orm i s  to aub s i d h e  the produc t i on a nd d i s tribut i on 
of l i s t s  of t he price s and important contra c t  term s that f irms o f f er. 
I f  consumer s have thi s i nformat i on b e fore they b e g i n  to  s hop, f i rm s  
w i l l  face cons iderab l e  pre s s ure t o  o f f er compe t i t ive  pri ce s a nd 
preferred t e rm s ;  and t ho ev idence shows that prov iding c ompara t ive  
pri oo data y ie ld s  lower pri c e s .  We have d i scus s e d  e l sewhere t h e  
73  pract i c a l  d i f f i ou l t i o1 i nvolved i n  prov iding this  informat ion and
want t o  call  a t t e nt i on here to two vehi c l e s  f or the  transm i s s i on of  
comparat ive data  whose use has b e e n  insuf f i c i ently expl ored ,  
• t e l e te x t "  and "vtde ote x . •7 4  
Te l e text  i s  a one w ay commun i c a t ion system that broadc a s t s  
inform'a t i on o r  s ends  i t  o n  cab l e  t o  home s where i t  appe ars o n  1V 
sore e na ;  v ideote x  i s  a two way commun i c a t ion sy s t em, whereby a p e r s o n  
reque s t s  informa t i on by phone , which is  then transm i t t e d  t o  appear on 
a 1V screen.  Comparat ive prioe a nd t erm da t a c o u l d  b e  s e nt i n e i ther 
medium, and would p l a i nly f ac i l i t a t e  i ntorf irm compari sons. Cab l e  
te l e v i s ion compan i e s  d o  som e t imes  transm i t  pri ce d a t a , s o  t h i s  
propo s a l  a l so ha s a rea l  world ana l o gue . Thero are a l arge number o f  
cab l e  channe l s ,  a n d  twenty e ight percent of Ameri can hom e s  now have 
cab l e ,  a perc e n t a g e  which i s e xp e c t e d  to i n c r e a s e  cons i d e r a b l y .  When 
shopp ing prob l ems are perce ived to  e x i s t ,  the s t a t e  shou l d  there f o r e  
seriously cons ider t r a n sm i t t ing c om pa r a t ive p r i c e  a nd term data  over 
s e l e c t e d  c ab l e  channe l s ,  or over t e l e t e x t  shoul d it b e come more w i d e ly 
us ed .  
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Concl u s ion 
Consum e r  c o n t r a c t s  a r e  f re q ue n t l y re gul a t e d  on i mpe r f e c t  
i nf o nn n t i o n  sroun d s ,  b u t  t h i s  r e g u l a t i on i s  i t s e l f  un i nf o rm e d ,  
Imp e r f e c t  i n f orma t i on e x i s t s  w h e n  c o n s um e r s  choose c on t r a c t  t e rm s  
i n cor r e c t l y  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  un i n f o rm e d  a b o u t  r i s k , o r  w h e n  c o n s um e r s  
a r e  i g norant o f  t h e  f u l l  array o f  choi ce s t h a t  f i rm s c a n  o f f e r .  lie 
s h ow t h a t  f i rm s a r e  l i ke l y  to r e s pond to t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of impe r f e c t  
i n f o rm a t i o n  i n  t h i s  l a t t e r  s e n s e  b y  ch a r g i n g  s up r a corup e t i t ive pr i c e s  
f o r  t h o s e  c o n t r a c t  t e rm s  t h a t  c on s um e r s  p r e f e r ;  f irm s w i l l  l e s s  o f t e n  
o f f e r  unw a n t e d  t e rm s ,  The b e s t  r e m e dy f o r  t h i s  s e c o nd a s p e c t  of the
imp e r f e c t  i n f orm a t i on p r ob l em i s  t o  reduce the co s t s  to c o n s um e r s  o f  
compa r i n g  t h e  o f f e r s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  f i rm s ;  c ompa ri s o n  shopp i n g  d r i v e s  
p r i c e s down a n d  r e du c e s  f u r t h e r  t h e  l i ke l ihood t h a t  f i rm s w i l l  
f r u s t r a t e c o n s um e r  p r e f e r e n c e s r e s p e c t i n g  t e rm s ,  
Impe r f e c t  i n f orm a t i on i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  incor r e c t  c h o i c e  i s  
t h ough t t o  b e  p e rv a s iv e ,  b u t  t h i s i s  b e c a u s e  d e c i s i onmake r s  and 
coramcn t n t o r s  focus on r e p r e s e n t a t iv e  i ndiv i du a l  c o n s ume r s ,  each of 
whom n1ny l a c k  t h e  d a t a  a nd s ki l l  t o  c a l cu l a t e  r i s k s  p e r f e c t l y .  Fi rm s ,  
how e v e r ,  commonly re spond t o  consum e r s  i n  t h e  a g g r e g a t e , n o t  a s  
indiv i du a l s ;  h e n c e , the que s t i on i s  whe t h e r c on s um e r  m i s t a k e s  
r e s pe c t i n g  p u r c h a s e  r i s k s i n  t h e  a g g r e ga t e  a r e  s y s t erun t i o a l ly b i a s e d  
s u c h  t h a t  f i rm s  w i l l  n e t  a s  i f  e a c h  c o n s um e r  w i l l make i n c o r r e c t  
c h o i c e s ,  I f  c o n s um e r s  a s  a g r oup m a ke e r ror s r e s p e c t i n g  t h e  odd s t h a t  
n r c e i th e r  s y s t o 1J n t i c u l l y pe s s im i s t i c  o r  unb i a s e d ,  f i rm s g e ne r a l ly 
v i l l  re spond a s  i f  t h e i r  c ho i c e s w e r e  corr e c t , Al s o ,  p e s s im i s t i c  
c ho i c e s  s e l dom s e r i ou s l y  d i s a dvant a ge consumer s .  F i rr.1 s  h av e u n
i n c e n t i v e  to c z:pl o i t  consum e r s  o n l y  i f  cons uiacr s rout i n e l y  unde r s t a t e 
t h e  a dv e r se c o n s e quence s o f  purch a se choi c e s ,  and a n  a n a l y s i s  of the 
p s y c ho l o g i c a l  l i t e r a ture d e a l i ng w i th cogn i t iv e  e r r or sugg e s t s  t h a t  
such s y s t em a t i c  consumer op t im i sm re spe c t i ng the odd s e x i s t s  only in a 
sma l l  s e t  o f  c a s e s .  
Much re gu l a t i on o f  cont r a c t  t e rm s  o n  i n f o rm a t i on r;roun<ls i s  
devo t e d  t o  " impr ov i ng" c o nt r a c t  qua l i ty by b a nn i ng c o n t r a c t  t e rm s  t h a t  
a r e  t h ought t o  be the produ c t  o f  incor r e c t  consumer c h o i c e s .  The 
a n a ly s i s  above s h ows t h a t  the pre sum e d  e x i s t e n c e  of irar• e r f c c t  
i n f o rm a t i on c a n  s e l dom suppo r t  s u c h  b a n s ; c o 11sUJ:1 o r  cont r a c t s  b y  and 
l ar g e  c o r r e c t ly re f l e c t  c o nsum e r  w ant s .  Cour t s ,  howev e r ,  should b e  
f r e e  t o  b a n  t e rm s  i n  u s e  in p a r t i cu l ar marke t s  when impe r f e c t  
i nf o rma t i on e x i s t s  t he r e ,  though w e  b c l  i cv c  that a p p r op r i a t e  c a  s o s for 
such a c t i on a r i s e  l e s s  f re que n t ly than is  com only suppo s e d ,  111c 
p r i n c i p a l  iap e r f e c t  infor1a a t i on probl em, i n s t e a d ,  i s  t h a t  i t s  
e x i s t e nc e  i s  l i ke l y  t o  c au s e  cont r a c t  t e rm s  t o  b e  o f f e r e d  a t
sup r a c ompe t i t iv e  p r i ce s ,  D i s c l osure re gul a t ion s e cru i nnly re s ponds t o  
thi s p r ob l em ,  but a g o o d  p a r t  of such l e g i s l a t i on t h a t  i s  now i n  pl ace 
i s  devot e d  t o  e xpl a i n i nr. p a r t i cu l ar trans a c t i on s  t o  consum e r s  r a ther 
than f a c i l i t a t i n g  t he a bi l i ty o f  con sum e r s  to shop compa r a t iv e ly for 
p r i ce s a nd t e rm s ,  Such r e gul a t i on i s  a t  b e s t  n p ar t i a l  re sponse t o  
t h e  imp e r f e c t  inform n t i or, probl cr.. ,  The r e f or e ,  a t te n t i on s houl tl r.ow 
t u r n  t o  the cnr c so l v e� t h e o r e t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i nv o l v e d  i n
r e c o gn i z i n g  when Ll a r kc t s  a r c  b e h a v i n g  b a d l y  f o r  i n f ormu t i on a l  re a s ons , 
and to the  p r a c t i c a l  d i f f i cul t i e s  i nv o l v e tl in impl eme n t i n g  the mos t  
r>r om i s i n g  r o1:icdy , n r e duc t i on i n  t h e  c o s t s  o f  compa r i s o n  s hopp i n g ,  
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Marke t s  6 3 5-3 9 ,666-7 1 .  Wo do not d i scuss  two po s s ib l e  obj e c t i ons 
t o  thi 5 prom i s e ,  The f i r s t ,  us ing p roduc t s  as a n  examp l e ,  i s  
that  poor consumers may prof  e r  t o  g iv e  up warrant i e s  1 0  that  they 
may buy de cent she l t e r ;  t o  de scr ibe a marke t out come that  
r e f l e c t s this  preference a s  de s i rabl e is  mor a l ly wrong , Thi s  
obj e c t i on i s  i rre l evant t o  our ana l y s i s .  The poor cons umers in  
t ho i l l u s t r a t i on are  a s sumed t o  make infoimod choice s ,  and we are 
concerned hero only with tho que s t ion when the e x i s t ence of 
uninformed cho i c e s should ground regul a t ory intervent ions . 
Requ i r i ng f i rm s  t o  mako warrant i e s  a l so woul d not he l p  c onsumers  
put  t o  t h o  choice  b e tween she l te r  and  warrant i e s ;  the se consumers 
would b e  made worse off  by tho requi rement for thoy prof  e r  tho 
former but aro compe l l ed  t o  t a ke the l a t t e r .  Pot e nt i a l ly be t t e r  
solut i ons t o  t ho wea l th d i s t r i bu t i on concern t h a t  gene r a t e s  t h i s  
obj e c t i on a r e  t o  make transfer pay�en t s  t o  poor consumers  or  t o  
sub s id i z e  t h e  produc t ion o f  warrant i e s .  The l a t t e r  po s s ib i l i ty 
i s  d i scus s e d  i n  Schwar t z ,  A Re- egamination Q.[ Nonsub s tapt ive 
Uncopscionab il ity, 63 Va. L. Rev,  1053 , 1 063-64 ( 1 977 ) . A se cond 
sot o f  obj ect i on s  t o  our prem i se tha t compe t i t ive equi l ibria  are 
.2!'.1m! i!!.2.i£ d e s i rabl e  fol l ows  from the v iew that it is moral ly
prob l ema t i c  for the s t a te to give cont rol l ing w e i gh t  t o  pre se n t l y  
h e l d  preference s ,  Initial ly , such preferences  may b e  " adaptive , H  
An adap t iv e  p r e f erence refl e c t s  a more or less uncons c i ous 
adj us tment on the part of the preference ho lde r t o  e v i l  social  
cond i t ions , For  examp l e ,  pe rsons may come to prefer  d i scipl ine 
1 00 
a s  a w ay to make ty ranny p sy c ho l o g i c a l ly t o l e r ab l e .  Such 
preference s h ave little normative v alue . Se e ,  .!l.· .ll. · ,  El ste r ,  Sour
Grapes - Utilita rianism and the <ienesis o f  \/ants in 
lltilitarianism and ll ey on<l 2 19 ( e d s ,  A, Sen and E .  llilliams 1 9 82 ) . 
Simil arly , pe ople sometimes may consume in a manne r inconsistent 
with their actual best inte r e sts; they may , that is, consume 
e xcessiv ely or without regard to the ef f e c t  of their consUtJption 
decisions on oth ers whose interests they profess to hold 
impo rtant .  Th i s  occurs beca use the ideology of a marke t e conomy 
re gards s el f  inte reste d consumption a s  de s i rab l e behav ior,  and
the re by prev ents pe r sons f rom reco gnizing that their p resent 
p r e f e rences a re inconsiste nt w i th the i r  real  want s a nd ne eds , 
See R, Guess , � Idea o f  .J! Critical Theory ( 1 9 81 ) , We make the
p e rhaps strong a ssumption tha t  the se v arieties o f  f a l se 
conscious ness do not e xist . We do not know how to d i s t ingu i sh 
" ordinary" pre fere nce s for contract t e rm s  f rom a daptive or 
otherw i s e f alse pre ference s .  Giv e n  t h i s  inab i l i ty ,  the question
is wheth e r  to rega rd p a rticular p re fe r e nce s as prov i sionally true 
or false , We re g a r d  them as true because this is more consistent 
with a respect for the a utonomy of p e r s o n s . P a r t  V A ,  infra,  
<loes discuss a final dif ficulty with allowing p rese nt preference s 
to control , th at they may be unstable ov er t ime , 
3 .  111 cse state s  a r e  i':a nsas, ii.nine , l larylnnd , llassachuse tts, Vermont
a nd V e s t  VirRinia . 
4 .  R S  �ta t .  2103 , s e c t i on 1 0 8  
5 ,  S e e  A. Schw a r t z  nnd R .  Sc o t t ,  Comm e r c i a l  Law : P r i n c i p l e s  and 
Pol i c i e s  200--6 ( 1 9 82 ) . 
6 ,  C a l .  Civ i l  Code s e c t i on 1 7 93 . 2 as amende d by As s embly D i l l  no . 
1 7 87 ( "Warrant i e s-!Io tor Veh i e l e s-l!ep a i r s " )  ( 1 9 82 ) . 
7 .  S e e , � · �· · Schw a r t z , � no t e  2 .  
8 ,  Unif orm Consum e r  Cr e d i t Code s e c t i on 3 . 3 0 1 ,  
1 0 1  
9 ,  111 e s e  l aws a r e  summa r i z e d  a n d  d i scus s e d  i n  Schw a r t z  The 
Enfo r c em e nt of Se curity I n t e re s ts .in Con sume r Good s ,  2 6  J .  L.aw 
a nd Econ ,11)( 1 9 83 ) . Re s t r i c t i ons on t he t a king o f  s e cu r i ty 
i n t e r e s t s  o f t e n  a r e  j u s t i f i e d  on noninform n t i on a l gr oun d s , such 
us t h a t  c r e d i t o r s  a l l e g e d l y  fail t o  m a x i m i z e  t h e  p r o c e e d s  f rom 
r e po s s e s s e d  c o l l a t e r a l .  TI1e Schw a r t z  p a p e r  a r gue s t h a t  s u c h  
j us t i f i c a t i ons a r e  unp e r sua s iv e ;  h e nc e , the s e cu r i ty int e r e s t
l e g i s l a t i o n  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h e  t e xt i s  e v a l ua t e d  h e r e  i n
i nform a t i on a l  t e rm s ,  
1 0 , Se e Lande r s  a nd Rohne r ,  � Punc t ional Ana lys i s  o f  Tru t h  i n  
Lend i ng ,  2 6  U , C , L A. L .  Rev . 7 1 1  ( 1 97 9 ) ; I n t e rv e n i ng i n  J i a rke t s  
677 , Th i s  p a p e r  d i scus s e s  two a sp e c t s o f  the impe r f e c t
i nform a t i on conce p t ,  t h a t  consum e r s  a r e  i g n o r a n t  o f  r i s ks o r
marke t oppo r t un i ty s e t s .  La•!ye r s  som e t im e s  c l a i m  t h a t  a third 
a sp e c t  e x i s t s :  c ons ume r s do no t un d e r s t and t h e  l e ga l 
re l a t i on s h i p  t h a t  obt a i n s  b e t w e e n  them and f i rr.1 s b e c a u s e  they 
c a nnot r e a d  the l angu a g e  in c o n s um e r  c o n t r a c t s ,  S e e ,  £• .ll. • ,  llav i s
ne Vlll'lp ing Cons ume r C re d i t  La11, 6 f.  \'a .  L !ccv . 1 3 3 3 ( 1 9 82 ) . \'IC 
b e l i ev e  t h a t  t t i s  c l n i m  i s  ov e r s t a t e d ,  a t  l e a s t a s  r e s a r d s 
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w a r r a n t i e s  and s e cu r i ty i n t e r e s t s .  S e e  note 3 5 ,  i n f r a ,  and t e xt 
a t  no t e  7 2 ,  i n f r a . The typ i c a l r e s p o n s e  to th i s  imp e r f e c t
i nf o rm a t i on p r o b l e1u i s  t o  make c o nt r a c t s  more compre h e n s i b l e .  
Se c s t a t u t e s c i t e d  i n  Da v i s ,  s upr a ,  a t  u , 4 8 ,  p . 1 3 45 a n d  n . 5 4 ,  
p . 1 3 47 . 
1 1 . Por r e p r e s e nt a t iv e  e xp l a na t i on s , s e e G r o s s m a n ,  Ill! I n form a t ional 
f!o l e  o f  Warran t i e s  a n d  P r i vate Disc l osure .A2.2.!!1 Produ c t  Quality, 
2 4 J. Law and Ec o n ,  4 0 1 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; Spe nce , Consumer l l i sp e rc ept ion s ,  
Produc t P a ilure and Produc e r  L i ab il i ty, 4 4  Rev .  of E c o n .  S t ud i e s  
5 6 1 ( 1 97 7 ) . 
1 2 , S e e  Pr i e s t , A The o ry o f � Consumer Produc t Warranty, 90 Ya l e  L .
J .  1 2 97 ( 1 9 81 ) . 
1 3 . S e e  Schw a r t z  and S co t t ,  supra no t e  9 at 1 89-94 , 1 96-206 . 
1 4 .  1be we l f a r e  e f f e c t s  o f  s i gna l l i n g  e q u i l ibr i a  are v e ry h a r d  t o  
c v h l ua t e . Such equ i l ibr i a ,  when t hey e x i s t ,  r e f l e c t  only the 
s u s t a i ne d  c onf i rm a t i o n  o f  a p a r ty ' s b e l i e f s .  Thus ,  if consum e r s  
b e l i e v e  w a r r a n t y  covera g e  t o  c o r r e l a t e  p o s i t iv e l y  w i t h  p r oduc t 
cl u r a b i l  i ty an<l i f  s e l l e r s  w i th more dura b l e  produc t s  i ncur l ow e r  
c o s t s  i n  m a k i n g  w a r r an t i e s  than d o  s e l l e r s  w i t h  l e s s  d u r a b l e  
p r oduc t s ,  t he f orme r  s e l l e r s  h a v e  a n  i n c e n t ive t o  m a ke more 
e x t e n s i v e  w a r r a n t i e s .  I f  they a c t u a l ly d o  s o ,  a s i g na l l i n g  
e q u i l i b r i um r1 i gh t  a r i s e i n  whi ch w a r r a n ty cov e r a ge v a r i e s  
d i re c t l y  w i th du r a b i l i ty ;  i n  t h i s  e v e n t , the inf orma t i on a l  
content t h a t  consum e r s  a t t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  w a r r anty s i g n a l  i s  
c o n f i ri:i e u  by the s i gn a l s they s e e .  Th i s  e q u i l i b r i um woul d b e
1 0 3  
e f f i c i ent , h ow e v e r ,  only i f  t h e  inc r e a s e d  c o s t s  t o  f i rm s o f  
sending s uc h  w a r r a nt y  s i g na l s  a r e  l e s s  t h a n  the we l f a r e  g a i n s  t o  
o o n s uru c r s  o f  b e i ng a b l e  t o  d i s t i ngu i s h  more a c c u r a t e l y among 
p r o du c t s  on the b a s i s  o f  durab i l i t y .  'i'h i s  cor.tp a r i son i s  v e ry 
d i f f i cu l t t o  m ake . 
1 5 ,  Early but s t i l l  i nt e r e s t i n g  c ompa r a t i v e  a dv a nt a ge e xp l an a t i on s  
a r e  f ound i n  G ,  C a l ab r e s i ,  The Co s t  o f  Ac c i de n t s ,  1 6 1 -
7 3 ( 1 97 0 )  ; 0 i ,  fu Economic s o f  Produ c t  ..fu!.ftlx, 4 Be l l  J .  3 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;
llcKe a n ,  Products L i a b i l ity : Trend s  and Icpl ica t i ons , 3 8  U, Ch i .  
L ,  Rev. 2 5 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . 
16 . U , C , C .  s e c t i on s  2-7 1 2  - 2-7 1 5 , 
17 . S e e  Pr i e s t ,  s upra no t e  1 2 , 
1 8 .  I d ,  a t  1 3 47 . 
1 9 .  I d ,  
2 0 , The s e a r c h  t h e o r e t i c  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  r e c e n t ly rev i e w e d  i n  Scltw G. r t z  
and W i l d e ,  I mpe r f ect I n formation,  Monopo l i s t i c Compe t i t i o n ,  and 
Pub l i c f.Q.!.!£.y, 72 Ame r .  Eco n .  l:ev. 1 8 ( l' a p c r s  and P r o c e e d i n g s  
1 9 8 2 ) . 
21 . 'l11 e s c  mode l s  u s e  the Na s h  equ i l i br i um c o nc e p t . �·ach a c t or in a n  
e n v i rom1 e n t  s u c h  a s  n m a r !,e t i s  a s s um e d  t o  pur sue a spe c i f i e d  
s t r a t e gy ,  de s i A nc d t o  a ch i e v e  a p a r t i c u l a r  obj e c t iv e ,  such a s  t o  
m i n i m i z e  p u r ch a s e  c o s t s  o r  max i m i z e  p r o ( i t s .  A s e t o f  s t r a t e g i c s  
i s  i n  n N a s h  c q u i l  ibr i um when r:o a c t o r  h a s  a n  i n c e n t i v e  t o  n l  t e r
h i s  o r  h e r  s t r a t e gy ,  g i ven t h a t  the o t h e r  a c t o r s  c o n t i nu e  to 
pursue t h e i r  s t r a t e g i e s ;  b e c a u s e  no one h a s  an i n c e n t i v e  to
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c h a n g e , a m a r ke t out come d e s c r i b e d  by such a M a s h  e qu i l ibr i um se t 
of s t r a t e g i c s  i s  s t a b l e ,  Conv e r s e l y ,  when a t  l e a s t  one a c t or h a s
a n  i nc e n t i v e  to a l t e r  h i s  o r  h e r  s t r a t e gy ,  g iv e n  t h a t  o t he r  
n c t o r s  cont i nue to pur s u e  the i r  s t r a t e g i e s ,  a marke t outcome 
d e s c r ib e d  hr such a s t r a t e gy s e t is  no t i n  e qu i l i b r i um ;  the
o u t c ome is un s t a b l e ,  From 11 no rm a t iv e  v i ewpo i nt ,  t h e  equi l ib r i a  
i n  a mod e l  re f l e c t  t h e  m o de l ' s  p re d i c t i on s  o f  what t h e  wor l d  i s  
l i ke . They a r e  thus u s e f u l  t o  de c i s i onmake r s  i n  unde r s t a nd i n g  
a n d  e v a l u a t i n g  m a r ke t out c om e s .  Fo r a ful l e r e xp l ana t i on ,  s e e  
I n t e r v e n i n g  i n  Ma rke t s  640-41 . 
2 2 . Th i s  mod e l  i s  s e t  out i n  W i l de and S c hw a r t z ,  Equil ibrium 
Compa r i s on Shopp i ng ,  4 6 Rev . Econ. S t ud i o s  5 4 3 ( 1 97 9 ) . 
2 3 . S e e  I n t e rv e n i ng i n  llarke t s  6 4 6-4 9 ,  
2 4 , Sada n a nd a nd W i l d e ,  Ji Gene r a l ized HW1 .Qf P r i c ing flu: 
!!oaoge n e ous Good s Unde;r Impe rfe c t  I n formation,  4 9  Rev . Eco n ,  
Stud i e s  2 2 9 ( 1 9 82 ) . 
2 5 .  If e a ch consum e r  i s  a s s um e d  t o h a v e  a n  i nd i v i du a l  l im i t  p r i c e ,  
one c ou l d  d e r iv e a demand f un c t ion f o r  every f i rm f rom the 
d i s t r i bu t i on o f  i nd i v i du a l  l im i t  p r i c e s ;  t h e  tiode l woul d t h e n  
b e h a v e  s im i l a r l y  t o  t h a t  f o un d  i n  S a d a nand a nd W i l d e ,  supra no t e  
2 4 .  S e a r c h  mode l s  ty p i c a l l y d o  n o t  d o  t h i s b e c a u s e  t h e i r  r e s u l t s  
a r e  qua l i ta t iv e l y un cl: a n g c <!.  un d e r  t h e  s impl i fy ing a s s um p t i o n, 
:>. 6 .  For e xamp l e ,  two r e s e a r c h e r s  p r ov i d e d  c o n sume r s  w i th s ome
comp a r a t iv e  pri c e  i n f o rm a t i on a nd w i th n w e i g h t e d  i nd e x  of pr i c e s  
o n  G 5  c orr.man f ooc! i te m s  for sup e rmarke t s  i n  a Cana d i an c i ty f o r  a 
1 0 5  
f iv e-we e k  p e r i od .  Pr i c e s in t h e  samp l e  marke t de c l i n e d  
s ub s t a nt i a l ly a nd p r i c e  di spe r s i on d e c r e a s e d  during t h e  
exper iment a l  p e r i od ,  whi l e  pr i c e s a nd d i spe r s i on were l ar g e l y  
una f f e c t e d  i n  the c o n t r o l  marke t .  S e e  Dev ine and M a r i or., The 
Influ e nc e  o f  Cons ume r P r i c e  In forma t ion .2.!J. J(e t a il Pricing and
Consum e r  B e h a v i o r ,  61  Am .  J ,  of Agr i c .  E c o n .  2 2 8 ( 1 9 7 9 ) . 111 i s
s t udy w a s  r e p l i c a t e d  i n  llcCracken,  Boynton and H l al;e , 11!£. � 
o f  Comp a r a t ive Food Price In f ormat ion on Consume rs ..!l.llil Groc e ry 
He t aile rs :  Some PrcliRinary F ind ings o f ..!!. F i e l d  Expcri1:1e nt,  16 J .  
Con s .  A f f a i r s  2 2 4 ( 1 9 82 ) . Othe r  s t ud i e s  r e po r t  s im i l a r  f inding s .  
S e e  McNe i l ,  Nev i n ,  Trub e c k  and f li l l e r ,  l la rl;e t  D i s c r i m i n a t i on 
Aga ins t !.ill!. Poor and t h e  Imp a c t  o f  Consuaer D i s c losure Laws : The 
U s e d  Car I ndu s t ry, 1 3  Law. and Soc . Hev,  6 9 9 ( 1 97 9 ) ; l!u s s o ,  
Kr e i s e r  a n d  1 1 i y a su i t a ,  An E f fe c t ive D i splay of Unit � 
I n forma t ion, Journa l o f  llarke t i n g  ( Ap r i l  1 97 5 ) , ut 1 1 . Sev e r a l  
s t ud i e s  a l so r e po r t  l ow e r  p r i ce s whe r e  p r i c e  a<lv c r t i s i nz i s  
p e rm i t t e d  t h a n  whe re i t  i s  no t ,  S e c  C r a swe l l ,  Tu- ins : ill 
Consur.1er P ro t e c t ion Aspe c t s ,  6 2  ! los t ,  U .  L .  11.ev .  66 1 , 6 7 6
n . 6 3 ( 1 932 ) ( s \1.t:lna r i z inr, s t u� i e s ) . 
2 7 . Schw a r t z  and V.l i l d e ,  Compe t i t ive Egu i l ib r i u  i n  l l a rl;e t s  for 
H e t e rogeneous Se a rc h  Goods Unde r  Irape rfe c t  I n foriaut i on : A 
Theore t i c a l  Ana lys i s  w i t h  Po l i cy Ir.1pl ic a t ions, 1 3  lJe l l  J .  Eco n ,
1 81 ( 1 9 &2 ) . 
2 f, ,  Te chn i c a l  vc: r s i on s  of t ii i s  r.wC: c l  appe a r  in Schwa r t z  a nd W i l de ,
Con sunc r ! ! a r!<e t s  for \la r r a n t i c s ,  Ca l .  Ins t .  of Te el: , Soc i a l  
1 06 
'.:c i cnce 1:o r k i n {l  P a p e r  no . 4 4 5 ( 1 9 82 ) ;  Schw a r t z  and W i l de , liarrnnty 
'. c a rko t s  and Pub l ic Po l icy, 1 J, of Inform a t i on I:con , 8nd Pub . 
Po l icy __ ( 19 8 3 ) ( forthcoci i n g ) . The p r e s e n t  d i scus s i on i s  m e a nt 
to make the te c hri i c a l  ana ly s i s  a c ce s s i b l e  to l awye r s ,  and t o  
s t r e s s  i t s  norm a t iv e  impl i c a t i on s . 
2 9 .  \!e make th i s  a s sump t i o n  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  a na ly t i c a l ly t r ac t ab l e .  
I t s  e s s e n t i a l  f ea t ure i s  t h a t  t he maki ng o f  a warranty r a i s e s a 
f i rm ' s  margina l c o s t  a nd reduce s i t s  e f f e c t iv e  output ( b e c a u s e  i t  
m u s t  prov ide f o r  r e p l a c e m en t s ) . Any warranty t h a t  h a s  the s e  
f ea t ure s ,  such a s  a prom i s e  to r e pa i r  or repl ace , i s  c a p t u r e d  by 
our mode l .  
3 0 .  Under t h e  lfagnu s s on-Ho s s  Ac t ,  a f i rm make s a f u l l warranty i f  i t  
a g r e e s  t o  remedy d e f e ct iv e  p ro du c t s  a t  no c h a r g e  "wi t h i n  a 
r e a sonab l e  t ime" , not l im i t  the dura t i on o f  imp l i e d  warrant i e s ,  
a nd repl n e e  a ny d e f e c t iv e  produ c t s  i t  c a nnot f ix .  Le s s e r  
warran t i e s  mus t  b e  denom i na t e d  " l im i t e d . "  S e e  Magnu s s o n-Ho s s  A c t  
s e c t i ons 1 0 3 ; 1 04 . 
3 1 .  The t e x t  de s c r ib e s  mode l s  o f  w a rra nty m arke t s  i n  two spe c i a l  
c a s e s ,  when a l l  consum e r s  p re f er warrant i e s  a nd when none d o .  We 
have no t mode l ed the i n t e rm e d i a t e  c a s e , when some consum e r s  
p r e f e r  w arrant i e s  but o t h e r s  <l o  no t ,  Th i s  c a s e  i s  l e s s  impo r t ant 
norm a t iv e ly than the mode l s  set out abov e ,  is  qui t e  t e d i ous t o  
n n n l)• z e  a n d  i s  unl ike l y  to y i e l d  d i f f e r e n t  re sul t s ,  The two 
po l a r c a s e s  impl)' out cot.1 e s  tha t run i n  the s ame d i rc c t i on-- f i n1 s  
i n  bo t h  c a s e s  contaon l y  re spond t o  insuf f i c i e nt shop p i ng w i th 
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hi ghe r p r i o e s r a ther than l owered cont r a c t  qua l i ty i  an 
i nt e rme d i a t e  c a se is un l i ke ly t o  imply out come s t h a t  run i n  a 
d i f ferent d i r e c t i on ,  In a r e l a t e d  mode l ,  we chara c t e r i z e d  
ne ce s s ary a n d  su f f i c i ent cond i t i on s  f o r  compe t i t ive e qu i l ibr i a  t o  
obt a i n  i n  marke t 1  for goods o f  d i f f e re nt qua l i t i e s  when consum e r s  
have he t e rogene ous qua l i ty pre f e rence s .  See Schw a r t z  and W i l d e ,  
..!ll21l not e  27 . Thi a  mod e l  y i e l de d  re sul t s  that a r o  cons i st e n t
w i th t h o s e  d e scribed above , The re l evance o f  hete rogene i ty to 
our conc l us i on s  is further pursued i n  Pa r t  IVB, .i!!IJ:.l. 
3 2 .  Soe text a t  not e s  68-7 0 ,  .inl.£!, 
3 3 , Th i a  p a t t o rn used to de scribe consumer and commer c i a l  warrant i e 1 ,
but the former have b e e n  mod i f i ed b y  the Magnuss on-Mou Ac t ,  
whi ch proh i b i t s  d i s c l a i m e r s  o f  imp l i e d  warrant i e s  i f  f i rm s  make 
exp r e u  warrant i e 1 ,  and by the s t r i c t  l i ab l l  i ty i n  tort doc t r i ne •  
which requ i r e s  f irms t o  b e a r  the r i s k o f  c on s ume r s ' pe r 1on a l  
tnj uri e 1 ,  See a l so UCC 2-7 19 ( 3 ) , Warranty p a t t e rn s  are
de s c r i b e d  i n  Schwartz and Scot t ,  � no t e  5 ,  at 1 89-94 and
Pri e st ,  .llll!.IA not e  12 , 
3 4 ,  Th i s  i l l us t r a t i on suppo s e s  n to be , 01 ,  Then , i f  c = t4S , cw � 
t46 b e c a u s e  ow = �· 
J S ,  Searching f o r  warrant i e s  m a y  b e  more c o s t ly t h a n  s e a rchi ng f or 
p r i ce s ,  and t h us l e s s  t e rm s e a r ch may occur , b e c a u s e  it o f t e n  
w i l l  take m o r e  t ime t o  ab sorb and compare i nforma t i on about t e rm s  
t h a n  about p r i c e s .  S e e  Intervening i n  Ma rke t s 660 , The 
i l l u s t r a t i on sugge s t s  t h a t  when t h i s  c o s t  d i f f er ence i s 
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s i � n i f i c n nt ,  the l ike ly re s u l t i s  sup r a compe t i t iv e  p r i c i n g  f o r  
terns r n t h o r  t h a n  prov i s i on o f  the w rong t e rm s ,  I f  consum e r s  
c a r e  n lm o s t  n o t  a t  a l l  about t e rm s ,  howeve r ,  tho i r  l im i t  pr i c e s 
f o r  cont r a c t s  w i th a pa r t i cu l ar t e rm w i l l  be qui t e  c l os e  to the i r  
l im i t  p r i ce s for t h o s e  cont r a c t s  w i thout t h e  t e rm ,  I n  th i s  c a s e ,  
f i rm s  a r e  l i ke ly t o  have a comp a r a t iv e  advantage n t  s e l l i n g  
w i thout t h e  term.  S t ud i e s  o f  consum e r  aw arene s s  o f  w a r r a n t r  
te rm s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  consULlc r s  c a r e  enough about w a r r a n t i e s  t o  mnke 
th i s  p o s s ib i l i ty ne g l i g ib l e ,  S e e  Darden and Rno, A 1.i.ru1.ll 
Cov a r i ate r.!ode l  o f  Warranty Att i tu d e s  and llohavi ors , 1 6  J, M a r k ,  
lie s .  4 6 6 ( 1 97 9 ) ; Whi t f or d ,  fil..W.1 Products L i ab i l i ty .!.lll! lli 
Automobile Indu s t ry :  lluch Ado A!2.fil!1 Noth ing, 1 96 8 Wi s .  L. Rev .
� 3 , 1 46-51 , Al s o ,  n o  one c l a im s  t h a t  consum e r s a r e  unaware o f
the i r  c r e d i t or s '  r i g h t  to r e po s s e s s  on d e f aul t when s e cur i ty 
i n t e r e s t s  e x i s t , Ho s t  comm e n t a tor s be l i ev e  t h a t  c o nsume r s  h a v e  
pre f e r e n c e s  re s p e c t i n g  t h e  se cur i ty t o rm .  
3 6 , The l�en a u l t A l l i a n c e , for e xampl e ,  i s  unl i ke l y  to comp e te w i t h
tho f,�e r c e de s 3 00SD, The ex i s t e n c e  a n d  r e l evance o f  p roduc t a n d  
consum e r  he t e rogene i ty a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  more d e t a i l  i n  Pa r t  IVE , 
i n f r a ,  
3 7 , A t e ch n i c a l  v e r s i on o f  th i s  mod e l  i s  g iv e n  i n  Schw a r t z  nnd W i lde , 
Some l�e s u l t s  .Q.!! ConsuL1c r  Financial Marke t s  .l!.!l.ll Security I n t ere s t s  
Und e r  Inpe r f e c t  I n forma tion, ( 1 9 32 )  which is  a t t a ch e d  as an
append i x .  S ev e r a l  e x p l ana t i on s  o f  why s e cu r i ty is g i v e n  e x i s t ,  
s uch as  t h a t  s e cu r i ty reduc e s  ne t l en d i n g  c os t s  o r  s i gna l s  t h e
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creditworth i ne s s o f  debto r s .  None o f  the s e  e xplanations i s  
per s ua s i v e ,  See S chwartz , Secur ity Inte r e s t s  .!!..!!l! Uankruptcy 
Pr iorities : A Review of Current The or i e s ,  10 J. Le g .  Stud.  
1 ( 1 98 1 ) , We  are conc e r ne d  h e r e , howev e r ,  not w ith why s e c u r i ty 
i s  use d but only with whether impe r f e ct inform ation w ill cause it 
to b e  use d in way s that f rustrate consumer p r e f erence s ,  
3 8 ,  Th i s  a s s umpt i on i s  made for conven i e nc e . The mode l ' s qual i tative 
re sults are unchang e d  i f  oth e r  conm1on f orm s o f  s e cu r i ty arc 
as sumed ,  
3 9 .  Fi rm s  have more d i f f i culty re cove r i n c  consum e r  goods i n  
bankruptcy than th i s  a s sumption sugge s t s ,  partly b e cause 
bankruptcy courts can stay the enfor cement o f  s e cu r i ty inte r e st s ,  
and also be cause consum e r s  i n  some ca s e s can keep the collate ral 
if they make spe c i f ie d  payment s on i t ,  Sec Ban kruptcy Code 
s e ction s  3 6 2 , 5 2 2 ( F ) , 1 3 22 and 1 3 2 5 , Th i s  d i f f i culty in 
f or e clo s ing can b e  capture d by substitutine for V an e xp e cted 
value for the collate ral, E ( V) , whe r e  E ( V) <V.  The ana lys i s tne n
g o e s  th roup,h unaf f e cte d .  
4 0 . S e c  Inte rv en ing i n  l.!arke ts 656-5 3 .  
4 1 .  See Sadanand and W ilde , s upra note 2 3 . 
4 2 . S e e  author i t i e s  c i te d  i n  note 2 6 , s upr a ,  
4 3 , The te xt a s sum e s  that f i rm s  ca nnot learn e nough a b o u t  c o n s um e r s  
i n  typical consum e r  t r a n s a c t i on s  t o  o f f e r  each consumer a 
d i f f e r e n t  contr a c t ,  ba s e d  on that cor.sur.ic r '  s soph i s t i c a ti on .  Th e 
pe rvas ivene s s  o f  stand a r d  f o rr1 con t r a c t s  i s  c ons i s t e n t  w i th th i s
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s upp o s i t i on .  S e c  Le f f ,  Contract As Thing, 19 Ame r .  Univ . L. Hev. 
1 3 1 ( 1 97 0 ) , To be cle a r  about the argument that f ollow s ,  thi s  
p a p e r  a d op t s  the standard a s sumption that consume r s  hold bel i e f s  
a bout the o<ld s ,  a n d  that the se bel i e f s  i nflue nce purchase 
choi c e s :  consume r s  who think p roducts arc rel iable w ill care le s s  
about warrant i e s  than con s wa e r s  who th i nk p rodu c t s  are l ikely to 
f ai l ,  oth e r  th ings  equnl ,  
4 4 . W e  a s s ume that all consume r s  i n  a market hold s im ilar views 
r e s pe cting tho odd s ,  but the shopp e r s  may hold d i f fe re nt v i ew s .  
Firm s  re spond to tho shopp e r s ,  s o  a que s t i on ar i s e s  whether the 
analy s i s  i s  af f ecte d i f  the shoppe r s  and nonshopp e r s  d i f fe r .  The 
answer i s  no b e cause the shoppe r s  w ill probably be more 
pe s s im i st i c  than the nons hoppe r s  when the two group s d i f f e r ,  To 
under stand th e e f fe c t  o f  thi s  relative pe s s im i sm ,  cons id e r  three 
c a se s .  �i r st ,  oll consum e r s  would p r e f e r  warrant i e s  w e re they 
prope rly inform e d ,  the nonshop p e r s  hold unb iased or p e s s im i st i c  
v i ews r e sp e c t i n g  the odd s ,  and the shoppe r s  arc p e s s im i st i c ,  
Since f i rm s  r e spond t o  such pe s s im i st s  who shop as  i f  they make 
correct cho i ce s ,  when the nonshoppe r s  hold unbiase d o r  
p e s s im i st i c  v i ews the relativ ely gr eater pe s s im i sm o f  the 
shopp e r s  i s  i r relev a nt ;  in both cas e s ,  f i rm s  w ill act as i f  all 
consume r s  make correct choice s ,  Second, all consum e r s  would 
p r e f e r  war r a nt i e s  were they p rope rly infon1e d ,  the non shoppe r s  
a r e  opt im i s t s ,  and the s uopp e r s  are pe s s im i st i c .  As  w e  ne xt 
show ,  if all consum e r s  arc optimists  a pol i cy problem e x i s t s ,  but 
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t h e  e f f e c t  o f  opt imi sm by the non s hop p e r s  m ny be mod e r a t e d  by the 
r e l a t iv e l y  gr e a t e r  pe s s im i sm o f  the shoppe r s .  For c xarap l c ,  f i rm s  
moy o f f e r  w a r rant i e s  in re sponse  t o  tho shoppe r s '  p e s s i m i sm .  
Th i r d ,  no consum e r s  wou l d  p r e f e r  w a r r a nt i e s  w e r e  t h e y  prope r l y  
inform e d ,  t h e  nonshoppe r s  ho l d  corr e c t  or opt ir.i i st i c  e st im a t e s in 
the a g g r e g a t e  nnd the shopp e r s  n r o  p e s s im i st i c .  F i rm s  m ay 
r e s pond to the s hopp e r s  by o f f e r i n g  unwante d  warrant i e s ,  but the
text a r gue s that t h i s  is not a s e r i ous p r ob l em .  H e nc e ,  i f  
shopp e r s  and nonshoppe r s  h o l d  d i ffe r ent v i ews r e s p e c t ing tho 
odd s ,  but  the s hopp e r s  a r e  re l at iv e l y  more p e s s ia i s t i c  than the 
nonshopp er s ,  the ana ly s i s  above is una f f e c t e d ,  The s h opp e r s  
probab l y  w i l l b e  more pe s s i m i s t i c  t h a n  the nonshoppc r s  when the 
two groups d i f f e r  b e c a us e ,  a s  we l a t e r  show , a n  impo r t a nt 
mot i v a tor of s e arch b e h av ior i s  the p e r c e p t ion by consum e r s  that 
purch a s e s  a r e  r i sky ,  Con s um e r s  s e a rch for inform a t i on about 
produ c t s  i n  part to reuucc the psych o l o g i c a l  d i s comfort t h a t  
wou l d  o t h e rw i se b e  e xp e r i e nc e d b y  b e a r i n g  r i sks . S e c  t e x t  a t  
no t e s  4 5 -4 6 , i n f ra . S ince pe s s i Ll i s t s  a re l i ke l y  t o  e xp e r i ence 
th i s  d i scomfort whi l e  opt ici s t s  a re l ike l y  no t to,  s h opp e r s  a s  a 
c l a s s  w i l l  if any th i ng be more pe s s im i s t i c  than nonshoppe r s ,  
4 5 .  The perce i v e d  r i s l: l i te r a ture i s  surv eye d  i n  l{o s s ,  Pe rceive<! tU s l: 
and Consume r Dchavio r :  A C r i t ic a l  l!e v i ew ,  i n  Vol w,1c 2 Adv anc e s  i n
Consumer 1 '.e s c a rch 2 52 ( 1 97 5 ) . 
4 6 ,  Sec P o s s ,  supra no te 4 5 ;  I n t c rv c n i n r,  in I ' arke ts 64 ll .  A r e c c 1:t
s t udy a l s o  repo r t e tl  c o n s i de r a b l e  s e a r ch for c onsum e r  dur a b l e s  a r,<l 
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for t h e  c r e <l i t  w i th w h i c h  t o f i nance the i r  vurch a s e . The average
nunh e r  o f  s tore v i s i t s  b y  consum e r s  i n  the r e s e a rche r s '  sampl e 
w a s  3 . 4 9 , a nd the se cons um e r s  aver a g e d  one a dd i t iona l  v i s i t  to a 
" c c sh l oan sourc e , "  such a s  a bank,  B e c a u s e  the s tore s a l s o  
o f f e r e d  c r e c! i  t ,  t h e  con sum e r s  in f a c t  made sev e r a l  v i s i t s  to
credi tors a s  we l l  as to store s .  S e e  Shay and Brand t , Consume r 
Cred i t  Pro t e c t ion Leg i s l a t ion filll! Consumer Credit Shopp ing : 
Tru th- in-Le nding filll! Equ a l  Credit Opportunity A2.ll i n  The Co s t s
nnd JJe no f i t s  o f  Pub l i c  llegul a t ion o f  Consumer F i nanc i a l  Serv ice s 
163 , 2 42-43 ( Re po r t  f o r  N a t iona l Sc i ence Founda t ion und e r  
t lSF/ RANN G r a n t  NSF-C7 6-1 85 48 1 980 ) , See  a l so ,  \'/e s t brook a nd 
Forne l l ,  Pa t t e rns o f  Informat ion � !!!JI.JI£ Am.2.n& Durable Goods 
Buye r s ,  1 6  J .  N a r k .  lte s .  3 03 ( 1 97 9 )  ( 6 8 , 6<:'1 o f  cons um e r s  i n  s ampl e 
v i s i te d  two or more s t or e s  when shop p i n g  f or dur a b l e goo d s ; 4 6 . 2� 
a l so u s e d  " ne u t r a l "  inform a t i on source s such a s  books a nd 
n n ga z ine s ) . 
4 7 . '11i i s  p sycho l o g i c a l  l i te r a ture i s  thoroughl y  reviewed i n  R. 
N i sbe t t  and L .  I!o s s ,  Human Inference : S t r a te g i e s  a nd S ho r t com i n g s  
o f  Soc i a l  Judgment ( 1980)  ( he r e i n  c i te d  a s  "Human I n f erenc e " ) . 
llnotli e r  valuabl e source i s  Judgment Unde r Unc e r t a i nt y ;  llue r i s t i c s  
nnd !J i a se s ( e els .  [) , l<ahneman;  P .  S l av i c ;  A. Tve r s ky 1 982 ) ( he r e i n
c i te d  a s  "Judgment Und e r  Unc e r t a i nt y" ) . Whe t h e r  a p e r son i s  
maki n g  a c o gn i t iv e  e r r o r  mus t be d e c i d e d  b y  r e f erence to the t a s k  
t h e  p e r son i s  a t t empt ing to s o l v e .  Thought p roce s s e s  t h a t
rout i ne ly g e ne r a te e r r o r s  when p e r s o n s  u r c  per form i n g  d i s c r e t e ,
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r e l a t iv e l y  s impl e t a s k s  m n y  b e  fun c t i on a l  in e nr i vomu c n t s  i n  
w h i ch t h e  a c t o r s  m a ke cont i nuous d e c i s i ons a n d  r e c e iv e  f e e d b a c k ,
o r  in env i ronment s " o f  g r e a t  co1np l e x i ty , "  Se c E i nh o r n  n n d
Hoga r t h , Dehav i o r a l  D e c i s i o n  The o ry :  Proc e s s e s  o f  Jydg1�eut .!ill!! 
Cho i c e ,  3 1  Ann , Psych o ! . H.ev . 5 3  , 7 3 ( 1 9 81 ) ; H o g a r t h ,  !Jcyond 
D i s c re t e  B ia s e s ;  Func t i o n a l  a n d  llys fuuc t i onal Aspec t s  o f  
Judgme n t a l  He u r i s t i c s ,  9 0  Psychol . Dul l ,  1 97 ( 1 9 81 ) ;  Lope s ,  Some 
Though t s  .Q!l. the Psychological Concept o f  11lll& . 9 J ,  Expe r .
Psych o l ogy : Human Pe r c e p t i on and Pe r f orm ance 1 3 7 ( 1 9 83 ) ,  I n  t h e  
d i scu s s i on tlt a t  fol l ow s ,  11e a s sume t h a t  the t a s k  o f  c h o o s i n g  
c ont r a c t  t e rm s  i s  d i s c r e t e  a n d  r e l a t iv e l y  s impl e ,  s o  tha t the 
t hough t proce s s e s  that h a v e  b e e n  s hown t o  produce e r r o r s  i n  o t h e r  
cont e x t s  w i l l  p r o du c e  t h e  s a m e  e r r o r s i n  t h i s  c o n t e : d , Al s o ,  the 
c o n c e pt o f  ra t i ona l i ty has at l e a s t  two a s pe c t s : a p e r s o n  i s  
b e h av i ng i r r a t i ona l ly i f  h e  c h oo s e s  m e a n s  t h a t  a r e  cn l i k e l y  t o  
a c h i ev e  hi s e n d s  o r  i f  he pur sue s c r a z y  ends , The l i t e r a t u r e  o n  
c o gn i t i v e  e r r o r  pre supp o s e s  t h e  r a t i ona l i ty o f  p e r s on s ' e n d s  i n  
t h e  e nv i ronmen t s  i n  w h i ch the s e  p e r s o n s  a r c  s t ud i e d, b u t  c l a i m s  
t h a t  pe o p l e  pur sue the s e  e n d s  i r ra t i ona l ly b e c a u s e  they 
s y s t ema t i c n l ly make Ll i s t a te s .  Ve a d o p t  t h i s approach h e r e , f o r
w e  s upp o s e  consum e r s  t o  h o l d  r a t i o n a l  p r e f e r e nc e s for cont r a c t  
t e rm s  a n d  t h e n  a s l: whe the r cor. s m,1 0 r s  w i l l  1.ia l�e c o r re c t-­
r a t i ona l-- c h o i cc s wLen a c t i n B  on t h e s e  pre f e r e n c e s ,  �he ent i r e
l i ne o f  p s y cL o l o g i c a l  r e s c u r c h  u s e �  h e r e  i s  s t r o n � l y ,  thou�h i n  
o u r  v i ew n o t  p c r s u ii s iv e l y ,  c r i t i c i z e d  i n  Col: e n ,  A r c  i 'co1; l c  
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Prograr.med to Cowa i t  F a l l a c i e s ?  Fyrth e r  Thought s Mull!l ili 
I n t e rpr e t a t ion Qf Expe r im e n t a l  IJq t a  o n  Probab il i ty Judgme n t ,  1 2  
J ,  for the Th eory o f  S oc i a l  L e h av i or 2 5 1 ( 1 9 82 ) , 
4 8, An n nn ly s i s  of c o gn i t iv e  d i s sonance a s  i t  may upply t o  e conom i c
i s sue s i s  f ound i n  Al:e r l o f f  a n d  Di c k e n s , lli Eqonoc:i c  
Cons equenc e s  Qf Cogn i t ive D i s s on a nqe , 7 2  Ame r .  Econ . ll e v .  
3 07 ( 1 9 82 ) . 
4 9 , 14, 
5 0 , llum nn I n f e r e n c e , 4 5 -5 9 ,
5 1 . I d .  a t  4 5- 4 9 . 
5 2 , I d ,  at 5 4 .  It a l s o i s  appa r e n t ly the c a s e t h a t  consume r s  a t t a ch 
d i sp r opo r t i on a t e  we i g h t  to ne g a t iv e  i n f o rm a t i on a b o u t  p r oduc t s ,  
See t ! i z e r s ki , An At t r ibut ion Exp l a n a t ion fil .lil.£ Di spropor t ionate 
I n f l u e n c e  o f  Un favo r a b l e  Info rma tion, 9 J ,  Con s .  Re s ,  3 0 1 ( 1 9 82 ) , 
5 3 . S e e , £ • .&• • Kahne m a n  and Tve r s ky ,  Sub i eqtiye Probab il ity : A 
Judgment fil l�epre s e n t n t iyenc s s ,  i n  Judgment Unde r Unc e r t a i nty a t  
3 2 ;  Zu k i e r ,  The D i lu t i on E f f e c t :  lli Role of ili Correlat i on !.lli1 
ill D i spe r s ion Qf Pre d i c to r  Var i ab l e s  i n  ili .!!.ll fil Nond i acnos t ic 
I n f o rna t i o n ,  43 J ,  o f  Pe r sona l i ty and S oc i a l  Psych . 1 1 6 3 ( 1 9 82 ) , 
5 4 ,  'l11e s t udy i s  c i t e d  in Courv i l l e  a nd H ausman, Warranty S c ope .!!lli! 
!·'.e l i ab i l i ty Und e r  Impe r f e c t  I nforma t i on .Jill.!!. Alternat ive 1 ! 11 rke t 
S t ruc t u r e s ,  92 J ,  Bus , 3 6 1 ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Th e a ut h o r s do no t i n t e rp r e t
the r e sul t s  
5 5 , '. !uch of t h i s r e s e a r c h  i s  de s c r i b e d  i n  S l ov i c ,  F i s c h o f f  and
L i c h t e n s t e i n ,  i t e r,u l n t ion o f  l!i s k :  /1 Psycho l ogi c a l  P e r spcqtiyo , i n  
Re gul a tory Pol i cy a nd t h e  Soc i a l  Sc i e n c e s __ ( U. ! lo l l ,  e d . , 
forthcoming 1983 ) , S e c  a l s o  S l ov i c ,  Fi s c h o f f ,  L i c h t e n s t e i n, 
Co r r i g a n  a nd Comb s ,  Preferenc e s  f o r  I n s u r ing Ag a ins t Prol.lllb l e  
Spa l l  Lo s s e s :  I n s u r a nc e  Impl i c a t i o n s ,  44  J ,  iH s k  a n d  I n s . 
237 ( 1977 ) .  
5 6 .  Th i s  i s  s u g g e s t e d  i n  Ake r l o f f  and D i c l: e n s ,  s upra no t e  4 E .  
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57 . Surv eys s h ow t h a t  p e op l e  ov e r e s t i m a t e  t h e  f r equency o f  de a t h s  
f rom s ome c a us e s ,  such n s  a c c i d e nt s ,  homi c i d e s  a nd t o r n a do e s ,  and 
unde r e s t im a t e  t h e  f r e quency o f  de a t h s  f rom ottler c a u s e s ,  such a s  
sc a l l p o x  v a c c i na t i on ,  d i ab e t e s a 11 d  a s t hm a ,  The s e  in i s t a ke s  a r e  
a t tr i but e d  t o  t h e  av a i l ab i l i ty heur i s t i c .  S e e  S l ov i c ,  F i s ch o f f  
and L i c h t e n s t e i n , Fa c t s  v e r s u s  Fear s ;  Unde r s t and i ng l'e rco iyccl 
ll i sk in Judgment Unde r Unc e r t a i nt y  463 , 4 6 5-6 7 . 
P s y c h o l o g i s t s  have b e e n  a t temp t i n g  t o  de v e l op ge ne r a l  
t h e or i e s  t h a t  e x p l a i n  the u s e  o f  t h e  hue r i s t i c s  d e s c r i b e d  a b ov e .  
Two ob s e rv er s r e ce n t l y  s t a te d :  
[ A ] l l  t h e s e  the or i e s  c l a i m  t h a t  i n  n n  i n f e r e n c e  s i tua t i on 
the subj e c t ' s  d e c i s i on i s  a f unc t i on o f  the sub s e t  of the
m o s t  s a l i e n t  d imens i ons w h i c h  n r e  proce s s e d  s e quent i a l ly 
in orde r o f  s a l i e n c e . 
Wa l l  st e n  a nd B a r t o n ,  l'roc c s  s ing i' robnb i l i s  t io ! iu l  t i d  ir.iens i o nql 
I n f o rr.i n t i o n  f o r  r>o c i s i ons , B J ,  l!.xp e r .  P s y ch . : L e a r n i n g ,  liemory,
and Co gn i t i o n  3 6 1 , 3 6 2 ( 1982 ) . Exp e r i m e n t a l  t e s t s  o f  Lh i s  
hypo the s i s  y i e l d  r e s u l t s  t h a t  a r e  c o n s i s t e nt w i t h i t  �ut n l s o o r e 
f a r  f rom c o n c l u s i v e ,  �l e e  .ii! · The hyp o t he s i s  doe s s u c g e s t ,
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tiiough, t h a t  the f a i l u r e  t o  i n s ure a g a i n s t  s o m e  l ow p r obab i l i ty 
e v en t s  i s  a f un c t i on o f  the l ow s a l i e n c e  t h a t  the s e  e v e n t s have 
f or t h e  p e r s o n s  they niny a f f e c t . In the t o rm s  u s e d a b ov e ,  the 
cv o i l ab i l i ty huer i s t i c  may pa r t i a l ly a c c oun t f o r  t h e  f a i l ur e  to 
i ns u r e  phe nor.ieno n ,  
5 8 ,  The r e s e a r ch o n  w h i c h  th i s  p ar a g r aph i s  l ar g e l y  b a s e d  i s  r e p o r t e d
i n  Hum a n  Inf e r e nc e  1 96-225 . S e e  a l s o ,  Ka s s a r j  i a n ,  Consume r 
Psycho l o gy, 33 Ann . li.e v .  P s y c ho! . 6 1 9 , 633-3 4 ( 1982 ) ;  K, G, 
Shav e r ,  An I n t r oduc t i on t o  the A t t r i bu t i on Proce s s  73-92 ( 1 97 5 ) . 
5 9 .  I:o s s  and Antler s o n ,  Shortc o�1 ing s in !.ill< Attribution Proce s s : Qn 
the Or idns .!!!!!. l l a i n t e nance Qf Erroneous � As s e ssments i n
Judgment Unde r Unc e r t a i nt y  129 , 
6 0 .  S e c  Hum an Inf e r e n c e  123 -2 4 ;  K i e  s l  e r  and Mun s o n ,  Attitudes .!!!!!. 
Op i n i o n s ,  2 6  Ann , Rev ,  P s y c ho l .  4 1 5 , 4 2 9-3 0 ( 1 97 5 ) , A r ev iew o f  
t h e  r e c e n t  d a t a  conc l u de s t h a t  b o t h  a c t o r s  a nd ob s e rv e r s  t e nd t o  
a t tr i bu t e  more impo r t a n c e  t o  t r a i t s  t h a n  t o  s i tua t i on s  when 
m a k i n g  a t t r i bu t ions , b u t  p e r sons have a gr e a t e r  t e n d e ncy to 
a t t r i b u t e  c a us a l i ty t o  t h e  env i ronm e n t  when a s s e s s i n g  t h e i r  own 
a c t i on s  than when a s s e s s i n g  t h e  a c t i on s  o f  o t he r s ,  Th a t  i s ,  
a c t o r s  com i t  the f undame n t a l a t t r i b u t i on e r r or l e s s  t h a n  
obs e r v e r s clo . S e c  W a t s o n ,  The Actor A!l!l 111£ Obserye r :  !!.2l! lli 
The i r  P e rc ept i o n s  o f  Caus a l i ty D iv e rgent? 92 Psy c h .  Bul l ,  
6 !\2 ( 1982 ) . The e v i d e n c e  r.1o s t  s t r o n g ly supp o r t s  t h e  r e l a t iv e  
s n l i c n c e  e :i:p l ana t i on t h a t  the t e x t  g i v e s  f o r  th i s  p h e nomenon-­
cnv i r ont1 c n t s  h a v e  l e s s  s a l i e n c e  f or o b s e rv e r s  t h a n  f o r  a c t o r s ,  
I d .  a t  6 !18 ,  A s e cond e xp l ana t i on t h a t  a l so ha s sup p o r t  i n  the 
e v i d e n c e  is t h a t  of "pre e i c t i on a nd control . "  Ac c o r d i n g  t o  i t ,  
a c t o r s  know the i r  own t r a i t s  and r e sp o n s e  pa t t e rns ; for a c t o r s  
t h e s e  to some e x t e n t  a r e  kwm t a b l e ,  Thu s ,  a c t o r s  c a n  1:1 a x i m i z e  
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" the i r  ab i l i ty t o  p r e d i c t a u d  cont r o l  futur e even t s  b y  f o cu s i nc 
on t h e  r e sponse r e qui remen t s  of spe c i f i c s i tu a t i ons a nd on the 
e f f e c t s  that t h e s e  s i tua t i ons have on the i r  b e h av i or . "  I d .  at  
6 92 ,  In cont r a st , ob s e rve r s  ne e d  t o  unde r s t and t h e  p e r s o n s  w i t h  
whom t h e y  d e a l ;  thus they c a n  e nhance t he i r  a bi l i ty t o  p r e d i c t  
a n d  c on t r o l  event s " b y  c a t e go r i z ing p e op l e  a c c o r d i n g  to impo r t a nt 
t r a i t  d imen s i on s . "  I d .  Th i s  e xpl ana t i on a l so i s  cons i s t e n t  w i th 
our v i ew t h a t  p e r sons w i l l  g iv e  approp r i a t e  w e i nh t  to s i tu a t i ona l 
f a c t o r s  when a s s e s s i ng the i r  own c r e d i two r t h i ne s s .  
6 1 . The f ac t or s t h a t  c r e di t  mana g e r s  d o  and s houl d l ook a t  wl1en 
m a k i n g  consum e r  l oans a r e  suw.1 ar i z e d  in r:. llr e a l cy und 8, Hye r s ,
P r i n c i p l e s  o f  Corpo r a t e  Fi nance 5 7 3 -7 6 ( 1 9 31 ) . 
6 2 , The s e  cond i t i on s  a re form a l ly d e r i v c t! a nd e xp l a i ne d  i n  S c hwa r t z
a n d  H i l d e , s upra note 27 , The f ol l ow i n g  a n a l y s i s  o f  s e gm e nt a t i on 
i s  t h e or e t i c a l  b a c kg round to the d i scu s s i on a t  pp . 3 8-40 of when 
f i rm s t h a t  o f f e r  d i f f er e n t  w a r r a nt i e s  n c tu a l l y  s e l l  in the same 
L1nrke t .  
6 3 , Id , 
6 4 , 8 e e  no t e  3 1 , sup r a ;  Schw a r t z  a n d  \·: i l d e ,  .rn!l. :co t e  2 7 . 1'.n 
a dd i t i ona l a s s umpt i o n  r.111de in our r.:ode l s ,  tha t i s  s t a n u a r d  i n  the 
e conom i c  l i t e r a ture , is  that  e a ch f i r�1 s e l l s  a s i u �. l e  p r oduc t ;
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for e xampl e ,  e a ch f i rm se l l s  w i th warrant i e s  o r  w i thout t he1:1 ,  but 
c a nnot o f f e r  d i f f e r e n t  cove r a g e s ,  I n  a c t u a l  marke t s ,  f i rm s 
some t ime s s e l l  w i t h  a s t a nd a r d  w a r r a n t y  b u t  o f f e r  consum e r s  an 
opt i on a l  w a r r a n t y  a t  extra cost that i s  e i th e r  more e x t e n s i v e  or
of l on g e r dur a t i on t h a n  the r e g u l a r  w a r r a n t y ,  Our ana ly s i s  doe s 
not pe r1:1 i t  a f orma l  e v a l u a t i on of th i s  pr a c t i c e , b u t  we s u s p e c t  
t h a t  i t s w e l f ar e  e f f e c t s  a r c  ambi guous .  The g a i n  t o  consum e r s  i s  
a n  i nc r e a s e d l i ke l i hood o f  g e t t i ng w a r r ant i e s  thoy want a t  
r e duc e d  s e a r c h  c o s t s .  I f  consum e r s  s e a rch for de s i r e d  w a r r anty 
cov e r a ge as we l l  ns for l ow p r i c e s ,  how e v e r ,  the p r e s e nce o f  
"mul t i cov c r a g e  f i rm s "  mny in f a c t  r e du c e  s e a r c h ,  whi ch cou l d  
c a us e  p r i c e s t o  ri s e . A s i m i l ar amb i guous w e l f a r e  e f f e c t  c o u l d  
a t t e n d  r e gu l a t i on t h a t  r e qu i r e s  f i rms gene r a l l y  to e xp a nd 
warranty cov e r a g e , I f  consum e r s  wou l d  s e a r ch l e s s  b e c a u s e  they 
knew th a t  e v e r y  firm o f f e r s  a good warranty, p r i c e s could r i se ,  
On the othe r h a n d ,  i f  f irm s a r e  requ i re d  t o  warrant only i n  the 
p a r t i cul ar c a s e s  w h e n  they h a v e  a comp a r a t ive a dv a n t a g e  a t  
s e l l i n g  w i thout w a r r a nt i e s  a nd p r e s e n t  s e a rch i n  t h e  m arke t a t  
i s sue i s  i n s u f f i c i en t  t o  g e ne r a t e  a compe t i t iv e  equ i l i b r i Ulll , the 
r e q u i rement r.-.ny produce ne t w e l fare g a i n s ,  a dm ini s t r a t ive c o s t s  
a s i de , 
6 5 . �le e  A, Done g a n ,  The Theory of Mor a l i ty ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 
66 , Th i s  p o s i t i on i s  s t r on [,l y  n r r- u e d  in R. Good i n ,  Pol i t i c a l  The ory
and Pub l i c Po l i cy 3 9- 5 6 ( 1 982 ) , who a l so c i t e s  e a r l i e r  pape r s  in 
t h e  s ame v e i n , S e e  a l s o i:c nne dy , D i s tr ibut ional ..!!.llil 
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P a t o rn n l i st ic Mo t ive s in Contra c t  and Tort Lu11 w i t h  Spe c i a l  
P.e f o re n c e  to Co�1pu l sory Terms and Unequ a l  lJ a rga i n i ng Powe r,  41 
/.!D. [ .• nev . 5 6 3 , 6 24-4 9 ( 1 9 1!2 )  ( a r g u i n g  f or p a t e rna l i s t i c
i n t e rv e n t i on i n  consumer p r o te c t i on cont e x t s ) . The phenomenon o f  
c h a ng i ng p r e f er e nce s i s  d i scus s e d  i n  d e t a i l  i n  J ,  El s t e r ,  Uly s s e s  
a n d  the S i r e n s : S tud i e s  i n  Ra t i ona l i ty a nd I rr a t i ona l i ty 3 6 -
1 1 1 ( 1 9 7 9 ) , I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  s e e  6 5-G9 . E l s t e r ,  how e v e r ,  b e l i e v a s  
t h a t  the w e l f ur e  s t u t o  s h oul d n o t  be j us t i f i e d  on t h e  ground t h a t  
p r e f er e n c e s m uy cha nge but ra ther o n  t he app a r e n t ly 
d i s t r ibut i on a l ly mot i v a t e d  ground t h a t  r i s k  t uk i n g  should be a 
pa r t i a l ly c u s hi one d a c t iv i ty.  I d .  a t  !1 5 - 8 6 . Such cli s t r i b u t i on u l  
concerns arc i rr e l evant to t h e  ana l y s i s  h e r e .  S e o  no t e  2 ,  snpr u .  
6 7 , Se e R, Goo d i n ,  � not e 6 6 ,  a t  12-1 8 ,  ( j us t i fy i n :;  t h e  proj e c t
o f  regul a t i n g  o n  t h e  ba s i s  o f  future p r e f e r e nc e s  o n  u t i l i t u r i a n  
g r o un d s ) , 
6 8 ,  S e e  t e x t  a t  no t o  3 5 ,  s upru . 
6 9 ,  Til i s  ana l y s i s  impl i e s  th a t  s t a tut e s  s u c h  a s  't h o s e  b n nni n�  a l l
d i s c l a im e r s  i n  consum e r  s u l c s  o r  proh ib i t in g  c r e d i t o r s  f rou 
t a L i n g  nonpu r ch a s e  money s e cur i ty i n t e r e s t s  i n  consuwcr gooijs 
c a nno t  be j us t i f i e d  OI! the r, r ount.! t h a t  ii.1;ic r f o c t  i n f o ni n t i on 
e x i s t s i n  e i t h e r of i t s  a sp e c t s .  Su ch s t a tu t e s f n l s c ly u s s wr. e  u 
p c rv n s iv c  i ncon �rue n c c  b c twc c r. c o n s ur. c r  p r e f e r e n c e s antl co11 s UI.; c r
c o nt r a c t s ,  A l s o ,  t h e  s t r i c t  l i a b i l i ty i n t o r t  doc t r i ne b a n s  a l l  
t e rm s t h a t  a l l oc a t e  t o  consut: e r s  r i s ;:s o c"  pc r so 11u l iuj u r y  o r  
p r op e r ty <lauacc  c a ns c d by �ro�u c t  cl c f c c t s .  TI1 i s  d o c t r i ne i s  
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j us t i f i ab l e only i n  the l im i te d  c i rcum s t a nce s d i s c u s s e d  abov e ,
A s  r c ga r cl s  w a r r a n t y  cont e n t , t h e  i n f orma t i ona l a s s ump t i ons t h u t  
c o�p ara t iv c  a d v a n t a g e  e xp l ana t i on s  make thus a r e  l e s s  f a t a l  to 
the i r  conc l u s i on s  t h a n  the c r i t i c s  of the s e  a s sump t i on s  c l a im ,  
f:c e  te x t  a t  no t e s  1 5-20 , � · Comp a r a t iv e  a dv a n t a ge t h e or i s t s ,
howeve r ,  m i s s  the prob l em tha t c o r r e c t  cover a g e  n1ay b e  o f f e re d  u t  
i ncor r e c t  p r i c e s a s  we l l  a s  the prob l em t h a t  c ov e r a g e  may be 
i nc o rr e c t  i n  the c a se o f  inexp e n s iv e ,  freque n t ly pur cha s e d ,  
o cc a s i on a l ly da ngerous good s ,  
7 0 .  A n  e xc e p t i on t o  th i s  a rg11r.1 e n t  i s  the c a se o f  the l ow probab i l i ty ,
i ne xp e ns i v e ,  h i gh ri sk p roduc t ,  such a s  tho s o d u  b o t t l e  t h a t  
e x p l ode s ,  111i s  c a s e ,  howe v e r ,  s houl d be cov e r e d  b y  a g e ne ra l  b a n  
o f  t h e  s o r t  t h a t  t h e  s t r i c t  l i a b i l i ty in t o r t  doc t r i ne e na c t s ,  
7 1 . S e e  G e r ne r  and Ilry ant , :th.£ Demand for � Seryice � 
W a r r anty, 53 J. Dns , 3 97 , 4 1 3 ( 1 9 80 )  ( "The imp a c t  consum e r s  h ave 
on.  , . re pa i r s ,  • , may have p a r t i cul ar impo r t a nc e  in a ny a t t empt 
t o  l ab e l  a pp l i ance s w i th the i r  e xp e c t e d  f a i l ur e  r a t e s ,  s i nce in 
p a r t  that f a i l ur e  rutc w i l l  b e  t h e  r e s u l t of consum e r s  
t h em s e l v e s " ) , 
7 2 .  � · .& • , t i ,  Y. G e n ,  Ob l i � .  Law s e c t i on 5-702 ( McKi nney Sup p .  1 981-
H2) ; Conn . Gen, S t u t ,  Ann . s e c t i or.s 42-1 5 1 -1 5 8  ( We s t  1 9 81 ) . 
73 , f:e e  I nt e rv e n i u r;  i n  i l n r ke t s 673-7 7 , The author i t i e s  c i te d  i n  no t e
2 6 ,  sup r a ,  s u r, g e s t  th a t  sub s t a nt i a l  p r i ce r e duc t i ons a nd o t h e r  
r: a i ns m a y  f l ow f r om p r oduc t i on o f  th i s kind o f  d n t n . 
7 4 .  'fh c s c  r.i c t h o d s  n r c  thoroughly exp l or e d  in J ,  Tydeman,  H, L i p i n s k i . 
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R ,  Adl e r ,  M .  Nyhan a nd L ,  Zwimp f o r ,  Te l e te x t  a n d  V ideotext  i n  the
Uni t e d  S t a t e s :  Marke t Po tent i a l , Techno l o&y , Pub l i c Pol i cy I s s ue s  
( 1982 ) , APPENDIX 
SOME RESULTS ON CONSUMER FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
SECURITY INTERESTS UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
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We are conce rned here w i th consum e r  f inanc i a l  marke t s  in which 
l ende r s  may or may not t a ke a secur i ty inte r e s t  i n  goods f or whose 
purchase they make l oans t o  consumer s .  Cons ide r a consumer who w i sh e s  
t o  f inance t h e  purch a s e  of some good , s a y  a c a r .  He or  she goe s t o  a 
l e nding ins t i tu t i on to ob t a i n  a l oan.  Th e l ending i n s t i t u t i on ,  a 
bank, say,  charge s some inte r e s t  r a t e  a nd may or may not w i s h  to t a ke 
a s e cur i ty inte r e s t  in the good.  The l oa n  i s  made.  Af te rwards there 
is  some chance the consum e r  de faul t s  on the l oa n  payment s .  Th i s  may 
be because  the consumer goe s b ankrupt or it  may be f o r  other r e a sons . 
I f  the consumer de faul t s ,  the bank sues  for breach  of contr ac t .  I f  
t h e  consumer i s  not bankrup t ,  the bank re cover s  i n  f u l l  any unp a i d  
p r inc ip l e ,  Otherw i s e , how much i t  recov e r s  depend s  on whether i t  h a s  
t a ke n  a s e cu r i ty inte r e s t . I f  the bank h a s  taken a s e c ur i ty inte r e s t  
i t  re cove r s  t h e  good , a n d  i f  t h e  v a l ue o f  t h e  used  g o o d  e xceeds  t h e  
unp a i d  princ i p l e  i t  re turns the d i ff erence to  t h e  consum e r .  Howeve r ,  
i f  t h e  v a l ue of t h e  u s e d  good i s  l e s s  than t h e  unp a i d  p r in c ip l e ,  the 
bank mus t  sue to re cover the di fference , Since the consumer i s  
bankrup t ,  i t  gene r a l ly wi l l  only re cover a por t i on o f  thi s  rem a i ning 
debt . 
I f  the b ank doe s not t a ke a s e cu r i ty int e r e s t  and the cons umer 
de t·au l t s  due to  bankruptcy,  then the entire  unp a i d  p r i nc i p l e  mus t  be 
r e covered t hrough the cour t s .  Aga i n ,  only a port ion w i l l  gene r a l ly be 
ob ta ine d  s ince the consume r ' s  debts  exceed  h i s  or her cr e d i t s .  Of 
int e r e s t  here  i s  whether b anks w i l l  reque s t  s e c u r i ty intere s t s ,  and 
how the a nswer to t h i s  que s t i on i s  r e l a te d  to l oa n  r a te s ,  and consumer 
inform a t i on.  
To begin a f orma l  analy s i s  o f  these  i s sue s ,  we a s s ume a l l  
l oans are  for  a f ixe d amoun t ,  L. The p robab i l i ty of d e f aul t is n and
the probab i l i ty of  bankrupt cy g iven de f au l t  is y .  Th e  r a t e  o f
re covery i n  a bankrupt cy proc e e d ing i s  p .  The va lue o f  t h e  u s e d  good
is V. 
We ne e d  a l so t o  spe c i fy the " t e chnol ogy" facing the l end ing 
i ns t i tut i on s .  W e  a s sum e  f irms o f f e r  l oans w i th or w i thout a se cur i ty 
intere s t  but not both . Le t r be the inte r e s t  r a te they charge 
c onsumer s .  Le t S b e  the tot a l  amount o f  funds ava i l ab l e  for cons umer 
l oans a nd S/L = s be the t o t a l  numbe r  of  l oans that can b e  made . Le t 
F be the f ixed c o s t s  a s so c i a t e d  w i th l ending in t h i s  marke t and c the 
marg ina l ( or " opportuni ty" ) c o s t , mea sured as an inte r e s t  rate , of 
making l oans ; i . e .  the marginal cost  of  l oaning L dol l a r s  is cL. 
F i na l ly ,  l e t  F' be a ny add i t i ona l f ixed c o s t s  a s so c i a t e d  w i th taking a 
s e cu r i ty inte r e s t  ( e s sent i a l ly the c o s t s  of s e l l ing u s e d  goods on a 
whol e s a l e  marke t ) , 
On the demand s ide we a s sume e a ch consumer de s i r e s  a l oan of L 
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dol l ar s  or none . The total  number of consum e r s  is f ixed at A .  Of 
t h e s e  A1 are nonshoppers and A2 are shopp e r s ,  the l a t t e r  of whom
samp l e  pre c i s e ly two f i rm s .  In i t i al ly we a s sume consum e r s  p r e f e r  not 
to  have s e cur i ty intere s t s  taken, We l e t  � b e  the l im i t  p r i c e  ( o r
intere s t  rate ) when no s e curity inte r e s t  i s  t aken a n d  h8 b e  the l im i t
p r i c e  ( o r  int e r e s t  rate ) when a se cur i ty inte r e s t  i s  t a ke n .  
A summary of  notat ion to  b e  u s e d  fol l ows : 
L s i z e  of loan 
r int e r e s t  rate charged 
n = probab i l i ty of  de faul t 
r probab i l i ty of bankruptcy g iven d e f au l t  
p recovery rate  in bankrupt cy proceed ing 
v v a l ue of u s e d  good 
S tota l funds avai l ab l e  
s = S/L = max imum numb e r  o f  l oans
F f ixed c o s t  w i th no secur i ty inte r e s t  
F '  add i t i onal f i xed c o s t  with  s e c ur i ty inte r e s t  
c marginal  cost  o f  funds ( a s  an inte r e s t  r a t e ) 
l im i t  r a t e  g iven no securi ty inte r e s t  
l im i t  r a t e  g iven se cur i ty inte r e s t .  
I n  add i t i on w e  w i l l  u s e  t h e  f o l l ow ing : 
k e ny ( l-p ) = expe cted  ne t marg i n a l  l o s s  due to bankrup t cy 
• 
rN compe t i t ive inte r e s t  rate g iven no s e c ur i ty inte r e s t  
• 
rs compe t i t ive intere s t  rate g iven se curi ty inter e s t  
bre akeven demand for a monopo l i s t  taking no se cur i ty int e r e s t  
b re akev e n  demand f o r  a monopol i s t  taking a secur i ty intere s t .  
Several a s sumpt i ons w i l l  b e  u s e d  i n  the analy s i s  which 
f o l l ow s .  The se are  g iven ne x t .  
Assumpt ion 1 :  L > V .
Thi s  a s sump t i o n  w i l l b e  u s e d  i n  t h e  f o l l owing way. To ke e p  
things s imp l e ,  dynamic e l ement s o f  the prob l em w i l l  be i gnored . Th i s  
wil l have no qua l i ta t iv e  e f fe c t  but helps  the analy t i c s .  In 
part icul arJ a l l  i nt e r e s t  r a te s w i l l  b e  treated  as s imp l e  int e r e s t  in a 
one-p e r i od f ram ework.  No "down-payments" w i l l  b e  made , and any 
de faul t s  w i l l occur b e fore a ny of the prin c i p l e  has been p a i d .  Thu s  
i f  L ) V, t h e  used g o o d  i s  wor th l e s s  t h a n  t h e  n e w  good t h e  instant i t  
i s  purch a s e d .  S i n c e  many d e f au l t s  occur a f t e r  some time h a s  p a s s e d  
a n d  some payments  on t h e  l oa n  have b e e n  made , t h i s  a s s umpt i on capture s  
the most common c a s e  -- tha t  i n  which a se cur i ty i nt e re st  i s  not 
adequate to  cover the rema ining principle  g iven a d e f au l t .  
As sumpt ion 2 :  hN > hs ·
Thi s  a s sump t ion i s  obv i ous -- consumers  are w i l l ing t o  pay 
more i f  no s e cu r i ty intere s t  is taken than if one i s  t aken. Somewhat 
st ronger i s  the f o l l ow ing . 
• • 
As sumpt i on 3 :  � - rN > hS - rs > 0 .
As sump t i on 3 s t a t e s  that  consume rs  pre f e r  no se cur i ty inte r e s t
to  a s e cu r i ty int e r e s t  g iven the oppor t un i ty to  t ake l oans w i th or 
wi thout a s e cu r i ty intere s t ,  but a lways a t  the re l evant compe t i t ive 
• • 
126 
pr ice . The t e rm s  hN - rN and hs - rs repre sent  consum e r  surp l us and
are a s sumed t o  b e  s t r i c t l y  po s i t ive . 
Two more as sumpt ions , of a more spe c i a l iz e d ,  t e c hn i c a l  nature,  
wil l turn out to  be use ful . 
As sumpt ion 4 :  F ' /s < Vk.
Assumpt ion 5 :  � )  Vk/L ( 1  - n ) . 
• • 
The f ir s t  two of the s e  a s sumpt i ons guarant e e s  that  rN > rs ; 
i . e . , the comp e t i t ive intere s t  r a t e  on a l oa n  w i t h  a se curi ty i nt e r e s t  
i s  l e s s  t h a n  t h a t  o n  a l oan w i thout a s e cur i ty intere s t .  I t  imp l i e s  
thi s because  F ' /s i s  the add i t i ona l average  c o s t  o f  taking s e cu r i ty 
int e r e s t s  when the max imum number of l oans are made , and Vk i s  the 
add i t i ona l gain per l oan f rom taking a s e cur i ty i nt e r e s t  with a 
se curi ty int e r e s t  the va l ue of the used  good V is g a ined be fore the 
bankrup t cy proce s s  is ini t i a t e d  and k is the r a te o f  l o s s  due to  be ing 
forced into that proce s s .  The s e cond a s sump t i on is more obs cure . It 
• • 
i s  equiv a l ent to Assumpt i on 3 except that instead  o f  u s ing rN and rs • 
one u s e s  ( c  + k) /( 1  - n )  and [ c  + k + ( Vk/Ll /( 1  - n ) ]  re spe c t iv e l y .
Th i s  i s  the " d i f ferent i ab l e "  average  c o s t  f un c t i on anal ogue to  our 
" f ix e d  c o s t ,  const ant margina l c o s t ,  f ix e d  c a p a c i ty" formul a t ion and 
is generated by l e t t ing F '  = 0 = F .  I t s  r o l e  in the anal y s i s  which
fol l ow s  w i l l be made c l ear b e l ow .  
To b e g in t h i s  ana ly s i s  w e  need to  charac t e r i z e  prof i t s  a s  a 
f unct ion of the l evel  of dem and, x, and the intere s t  r a t e  charged 
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consumers , r ,  for f i rm s  who make l oans w i th and w i thout a s e c ur i ty 
inter e s t ; deno t e d  nS ( x ; r) and nN( x ; r ) , re spe c t ive ly . To w i t : 
Lemma 1 :  
nN ( x : r ) = Lx [ r ( l  - n )  - c - k l  - F ,
ns ( x : r ) = Lx [ r ( l  - n )  - c - k l + xVk - ( F  + F ' ) . 
Proof : Con s i d e r  f ir s t  no s e cur i ty inte r e s t .  
( ( 1 + r ) Lx - F - ( 1  + c ) Lx l  + nx ( - ( 1  + r ) L  + ( 1  - y ) L  + yLpl 
The f ir s t  
de f aul t s . 
Ini t i a l ly 
de f au l tors 
Lx ( r  - c + n [y ( p  - 1 )  - rl l  - F 
Lx [ r ( l - n )  - c - kl - F .
b r acke t e d  t e rm in ( 1 )  i s  d i re c t  prof i t s  i f  there  were no 
W i t h  x l oa n s , nx i s  the exp e c t e d  number of de f au l t s .  
( 1  + r ) L  i s  l o s t  on e a c h  de f aul t .  But 1 - r percent  of
are not b a nkrup t ,  and f or the s e  the e n t i re p r i n c i p l e  L 
( 1 )  
the 
i s  
recovered . For bankrup t c ie s ,  r p e rcent o f  the def aul t s ,  the re cov e ry 
rate  i s  p .  Hence the s e cond bracke t e d  t e rm is n e t  recove r i e s  given
de faul t .  S im i l a r ly ,  
ns ( x ;  r)  [ (1 + r ) Lx - ( F  + F ' )  - ( 1  + c ) Lx l
+ nx ( - ( 1  + r ) L  + ( 1  - y ) L  + y [V + ( L  - V) p l } 
Lx ( r  - c + n [- r -y ( l  - p ) l }  + xVk - (F + F ' )  
Lx l r ( l  - n )  - c - k l  + xVk - ( F  + F ' ) .  ( 2 )  
The d i f ference b e tween ( 2 )  and ( 1 )  i s  the add i t ional f ixed c o s t  F '  and 
the add i t i on a l  exp e c t e d  r e cove r i e s  given d e f aul t .  If the consumer i s  
ba nkrup t ,  V i s  r e cover e d  w i th certa inty and the b a l ance L-V i s  
r e c overed a t  r a t e  p b e cause only i t  i s  forced into the bankrup t cy 
proce s s .  
• • 
Us ing Lemma 1 we can charac t e r i z e  rN and rs exp l ic i t l y .
Lemma 2 :  
[ ( F/Ls ) + c + kl / ( 1  - n )
( [ (F + F ' ) /L s l  + c + k - ( Vk/L) l / ( 1  - n ) .
Proo f :  Compe t i t iv e  i nt e r e s t  rate s are d e f ine d by zero prof i t s  a t  
capac ity s .  Hence f or no security inte r e s t ,  
or 




L s [ rN ( l  - n )  - c - kl - F ,
• 
rN [ ( F/Ls ) + c + kl / C l  - n ) . 
• 
Ls [rs ( l  - n )  - c - kl + sVk - C F + F ' )
• 
whi ch y i e l d s  rs · Q. E . D .  
Lemma 1 a l s o  a l l ow s  us  to  e xp re s s  � and as form a l l y .
Lemma 3 :
� = F/L [ hN( l  - n )  - c - kl
as = ( F  + F ' ) / f L[ hs ( l  - n) - c - k l  + Vk ) . 
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Q. E . D .  
Proof :  By defini t ion °N and as are breakeven demands for  monopo l i s t s  





Solving for °N and as g ives  the l emma .  Q. E . D .
A f ina l l emma re lat ing °N to as wil l turn out to  be o f  
l at er .  
Lemma 4 :  °N < as . 
�: From Lemma 3 we have °N < as i f  and only if 
use 
F/L[hN( l  - n) - c - k]  < (F + F ' ) / {L[hs( l  - n) - c - k]  + Vk) .
S impl i fy ing ( 3 ) , we have °N < as if and only i f  
( �  - hs) ( l - n )  > (Vk/L) - (F ' /F) [ hN( l  - n )  - c - k] .
• • 
But As sumpt ion 3 s t a te s  � - rN > hS - rs which, us ing Lemma 2 ,
impl i e s  
� - [ (F/Ls ) + c + k] /( 1 - n )  > 
hs - [ (F + F ' ) /Ls)  + c + k] - (Vk/L> l / ( 1  - n ) . 
( 3 )  
( 4) 
( 5 )  
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Re arrang ing ( 5 )  g ive s 
(� - hs) ( l - n )  > ( Vk/L) - ( F ' /SL) . ( 6 )  
Inequa l i ty ( 6 ) imp l i e s  inequa l i ty ( 4 ) , and hence the  l emma , if 
( Vk/L) - ( F ' /sL) > (Vk/L) - ( F ' /F ) [ hN( l  - n )  - c - k] . ( 7 )  
Inequa l i ty ( 7 ) , however , reduce s to 
sL[�( l - n )  - c - k] - F > O .  
But sL[�( l - n )  - c - k]  - F = nN( s ; �) > 0 since
Assumpt ion 3 .  Thus ( 7 )  mus t hold ,  imply ing ( 4 )  holds , imply ing 
Thi s  complete s  our prel iminary analysi s .  We are now ready to 
cons ider the po s s ib l e  equil ibrium conf igurations in more d e ta i l . 
Equil ibrium here i s  a consumer-firm ratio ,  a = A/N, a d i s tribut ion of 
f irms be tween those offering l oans with securi ty intere s t , nS, and
those offering l oans without security intere s t ,  °N; and a d i s tribution 
of interest  ra t e s in  each  marke t ,  Gs ( ' )  and GN( ' ) ,  such that all  f irms 
earn  z ero prof i t s  and no f irm can  earn pos i t ive prof i t s  by  changing 
i t s  interest  rate . Here 
N total number of 
NN number  of f irms 




wi thout s e curi ty intere s t  
with securi ty interest  
I \ \ 
Theorem s 1 through 8 a l l  pre sume Assumpt ions 1 through S hol d ,
The orem 1 :  A ne c e s s a ry and s u f f i c i ent c o nd i t i on for nS = 0 and t he 
marke t f or l oa n s  w i t hout s ecur i ty int e r e s t s  to be compe t i t ive i s  
Proo f :  W i t h  n = 0 and t h e  s e cu r i ty inte r e s t  marke t compe t i t ive , s 
expe cted  demand a t  r� must e qu a l  s . Hence a = A/N = s .  A f i rm 
• 
e n t e r i ng t h i s  marke t above rN should charge � s ince i t  g e t s
nonshoppe r s  only . Nonpo s i t ive prof i t s  thus r e qu i r e s  
A f i rm a1aL[� ( l  - n )  - c - kl - F i  O, or us ing  Lemma 3 ,  a1 a i �· 
e nt e r i ng t h e  s e cur i ty i n te r e s t  ma rke t shou l d  anal ogous l y  charge hS . 
Nonpo s i t ive prof i t s  then requ i r e s  a1aL[ hS ( l  - n )  - c - k l  + 
a1aVk - ( F  + F ' )  i 0 ,  or a1a i as . But Lemma 4 s hows � < as . 
Q. E . D. 
Thus 
The orem 2 : � = 0 and t h e  marke t f or l oans w i t h  security intere s t s  to
b e  compe t i t ive is impo s s ib l e .  
f!.QQf : I n  t h i s  c a s e  a = A/N = s a g a i n ,  s ince capa c i ty i s  inse n s i t ive
• • 
t o  whe ther a s e cur i ty inte r e s t  i s  taken or not . Now � - rN > hS - rs 
• 
(As sump t i on 3) imp l i e s  there exi s t s  an inte r e s t  r a t e  rN > rN such that
• 
At t h i s  intere st  r a t e  consumer s are  ind i f f e rent tohN - rN = hs - rs . 
a l oan w i th no s e c ur i ty inte r e s t  and one w i th a s e cur i ty inte r e s t  a t  
• 
rate  rs . Hence a f irm enter ing the marke t for l oans w i thout s e cu r i ty 
intere s t s  a t  rN w i l l  ge t exp e c t e d  demand equal to s .  Prof i t s  are then
• 
Ls [�N( l  - n )  - c - kl - F which i s  s t r i c t ly po s i tive s i nce rN > rN and
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• 
Ls [ rN ( l  - n )  - c - k l  - F 
• 
0 by de f ini tion o f  rN ( s ee proof
of Lemma 2 ) , Q. E . D .  
The o rem 3 :  Both  marke t s  compe t i t ive i s  impo s s i b l e .  
Proo f :  The proof o f  th i s  resul t i s  anal ogous t o  that  o f  Theorem 2�a 
f i rm char g i ng rN and not taking a s e curi ty i nt e r e s t  must ne ce s s a r i l y
e a rn s t r i c t ly po s i tive prof i t s  • Q, E . D . 
The orem 4 :  A n e c e s sary and s u f f i c i e nt cond i t ion for nS = 0 and the
marke t for l oa n s  wi thout security intere s t s  t o  be noncompe t i t ive i s  
Proo f :  W h e n  nS = 0 ,  t h e  h i gh e s t  interest  rate  i n  the marke t f or l oans
w i thout se curi ty inte r e s t s  i s � · Zero prof i t s  thus imp l i e s
Now cons ider the d i s t ribut ion o f  inte r e s t  r a te s  i n  the no 
• 
s e cu r i ty intere s t  marke t ,  GN( ' ) ,  Suppo s e  i t  h a s  a m a s s  point a t  rN . 
• 
Exp e c t e d  demand a t  rN i s
Zero prof i t s  t h e n  imp l i e s  
O ,  
or 
A noncompe t i t iv e  d i s t r ibu t i on o f  inte r e s t  r a t e s  i n  the no s e cur i ty 
interest  marke t require s G� ( 1 ,  or ( a1 + 2a2 ) - ( s /a) < a2 • Since
a =  aN/a1 , this reduce s  to � < a1 s .
Wha t  about entry into the marke t for l oans with security 
interests ?  To ca lculate expected  prof i t s  a t  various inte rest  rates  in 
this marke t we need to  know the exact form of GN( 0 ) .  Expected demand 
at interest  rate r is a { a1 + 2 a2 [ 1  - GN( r ) ] } .  Hence if we l e t  nN( x , r )
e when x equa l s  e xpected  demand a t  r be  denoted nN ( r ) , 
n� ( r ) = a { a1 + 2 a2 [ 1  - GN( r ) ] } L[ r ( l  - n )  - c - k] - F .  ( 8 ) 
Zero prof i t s  requi res n� ( r )  = 0 ( for those r actual ly offered ) . Hence 
( 8 ) yiel ds 
F - a1aL[ r ( 1  - n )  - c - k]1 - 2a2 a L[ r ( l  - n )  - c - k]
( 9 )  
If a f irm ent er s  the  marke t for  l oans wi th  security inter e s t s  a t  rate 
qS it loses some shoppers  to f irms of fering l oans without secur i ty 
interest s .  In f a c t ,  a t  rate qN' where  � - qN = hS - qs• consumers 
are indifferent , and for any r < qN' they prefer to take a l oan 
without a secur i ty interest  a t  rate r rather than take one with a 
secur i ty interest  a t  rate qS . Thus ,  def ining n� ( 0 )  anal ogously to
n� ( ° ) ,  
( 10) 
Us ing ( 9) in (10) w·e ge t 
( 11 )  
Different i a t ing ( 1 1 )  with respect  to  qS g iv e s  
FL( l  - n ) [L (� - hs) ( l - n )  - Vk] 
2 2 L [ (� - hS + qS) ( l - n )  - c k] 
The s i gn of dn
�
( qs ) /dqs equa l s  the s i gn of L (� - hS) ( l - n )  - Vk.
But by As sumption 5 ,  this i s  pos i t iv e .  Hence dn� ( qs) /dqS ) 0 and 
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e • e ns ( qs) � O for a l l  qs e [ rs , hs ] i f  and only i f  ns < hs) � o .  But f rom
( 11 )  this reduc e s  t o  � � as • which nec e s sarily holds
given Lemma 4 . Q. E .D .  
Theorem 5 :  � = 0 and the marke t for l oans with security intere s t s  to  
be noncompe t i t ive is imposs ib l e .  
Proof :  
I f  � 0 then the hi ghe st interest  rate in the marke t for l oans with 
secur i ty intere s t s  i s  hs . Zero prof i t s  then impl i e s  a =  as/a1 • A
f irm entering the no securi ty interest  marke t  a t  � w i l l  a t tract  a1o
cus tomer s .  Prof i t s  a r e  then a1oL[ hN( 1  - n )  - c - k]  - F which are
nonpos i t ive i f  and only if as < �· a cond ition which contradic t s 
Lemma 4 .  Q .E .D .  
Theorem 6 :
The marke t f or  l oans wi th security intere s t s  t o  be compe t i t ive and 
that for loans wi thout security interes t s  to  be noncompe t i t ive i s  
imposs ible .  
Proof : The l og i c  here i s  the same a s  in  the proof s of Theorems 2 and 
• 
3�expe c t e d  demand a t  rs i s  s .  A f i rm offering rN e � -
a l so a t tract  s consum e r s  and must the r e f ore earn s t r i c t ly 
po s i t ive prof i t s . Q . E . D .  
The orem 7: The marke t for l oans wi thout s ecur i ty intere s t s  to be 
compe t i t ive and the marke t f or l oans  with s e c u r i ty in t e re s t  to be 
noncompe t i t ive is impo s s ib l e .  
1 ) '> 
Thi s  proof f ol l ows a s  that  of Theorem 5--zero prof i t s  at hS imp l i e s
a = as/a1 and t h i s  consumer/ f i rm  r a t i o  nece s s a r i ly a l l ows s t r i c t ly 
po s i t ive prof i t s  a t  � un l e s s  � > as , a cond i t i on which
v i o l a t e s  Lemma 4 .  
The orem 8 :  
Both marke ts  noncompe t i t ive is impo s s i b l e .  
Q. E . D .  
Proo f :  To prove t h i s  the orem w e  ne e d  f ir s t  t o  show there canno t e x i s t  
two inte r e s t  r a t e s  in  the marke t f or s e cur i ty intere s t s ,  say p8 and
q8 , such that qN = � - h8 + qS and pN = � - hs + qN are both offered
in the no s e cu r i ty int e r e s t  marke t .  For suppose there were two such 
int e r e s t  ra te s .  Exp e c t e d  demand a t  pS .
wil l e qual exp e c t e d  demand a t
PN and e xp e c t e d  demand a t  q8 w i l l e qual e xpe c t e d  demand a t  qN. Def ine
these  v a l ue s  by Ds < Ps> •  DN( pN) ,  DS ( qS) and DN ( qN) ,  re spe c t ively.  The n
z ero pro f i t s  g iv e s  
LDS( pS) [p8 ( 1  - n )  - c - t] + D8 ( p8) vt - ( F  + F ' ) 
LDN ( pN) [ pN ( l  - n )  - c - k ]  - F ( 12 )  
and 
LDS ( qS) [p S ( l  - n )  - c - t]  + DS ( qS) Vk - (F + F ' ) 
LDN ( qN) [ qN( l  - n )  - c - t] - F .
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( 13 ) 
But pN 
t o  
DN ( pN) .  Bence ( 12 )  i s  e quiv a l ent
LDS ( p8) [ pS ( l  - n) - c - t]  + D8 ( pS) Vt - (F + F ' )' 
= LD8 ( pS ) [ ( � - hS + pS ) ( l - n )  - c - t ]  - F ,
o r ,
Solving ( 1 4 )  for DS ( ps) g ive s 
( 14) 
which i s  independent o f  Ps and thus must hold  for qS a s  w e l l .  Bence
Ps equa l s  q8 , and only one such point can ex i s t .  But such a point
mu s t  e x i s t  i f  b o t h  marke t s  a r e  noncompe t i t iv e .  Furthermore ,  
DS ( ps ) > 0 i f  and only i f  Vt > (� - hs) ( l - n ) , whi c h  contrad i c t s
As sump t i on S .  Thus no such point  c a n  e x i s t  s ince e xp e c t e d  demand
there w i l l  be ne g a t ive . Q. E . D .  
Thi s  comp l e te s  our ana l y s i s  o f  the c a s e  i n  which consumers  
prefer  l oans w i thout s e cur i ty int e r e s t s ,  g iven comp e t i t ive p r i c ing . 
It c a n  be summ a r i z e d  n i ce ly in the f o l l owing corol l ary . 
Coro l l ary 1 :  Und e r  As sump t i ons 1 through S ,  the marke t f o r  l oans w i th 
I ll 
a s e cur i ty i nt e r e s t  c a n  never e x i s t . The marke t for l oans w i thout a 
se cur i ty i nt e r e s t  i s  compe t i t ive i f  and only i f  a1 s � � ·  I t  i s
noncomp e t i t iv e  i f  and only i f  a1 s > � ·  
I t  shou l d  b e  pointed o u t  that i f  Assumpt i on 5 doe s not hold  
the  ne c e s sary and  s u f f i c ient cond i t i ons for nS = 0 and  the no s e cu r i ty 
int e r e s t  m arke t to b e  noncompe t i t iv e  are more r e s t r i ct ive ( Theorem 4 ) , 
and the po s s i b i l i ty of both marke t s  b e i ng noncompe t i t ive a r i s e s  
(Theorem 8 ) . 
We now want to cons ider  a s i tua t ion in which consum e r s  p r e f e r  
to have l oans m a d e  w i th s e cu r i ty inte r e s t s  i f  they are pr i c e d  
• • 
compe t i t iv e l y ;  i . e . , the redu c t i on i n  p r i c e  f rom rN to rs i s  more than
enough to comp e n s a t e  consumers  f or the p r e s ence o f  the s e c ur i ty 
intere s t .  Some new nota t i on w il l  be neede d .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  we  l e t  lN 
be the l im i t  rate  f o r  l oans w i thout a s e c u r i ty int e r e s t  and l s be the
l im i t  rate  f or l oans  w i th a s e cu r i ty inte r e s t .  We a l so l e t  PN and Ps 
be the breakeven demands for monopo l i s t s  charging l N for l oans w i thout
a s e cur i ty i nt e r e s t  and l s for l oans w i th a se curi ty intere s t ,
respect ive l y . The r e l evant a s sump t i ons for thi s  c a s e  are : 
As sumpt ion 2 ' : lN > l s 
• • 
Assumpt ion 3 ' : 0 < l N - rN ( l s - rs . 
Assumpt ions 1 and 4 remain un changed and the anal ogue to A s s umpt i on 5 
can be s t a t e d  a s  a l emma ,  
Lemma 5 :  l N - l s < Vk/( 1  - 11 ) L.
Proo f :  We 
• • 
know f rom Assumpt i on 3 '  that IN -
L 1B 
• • 
I s < rN - rs · But
[ Vk/L( l - 11 ) ]  [ F '  /sL( l - 11 ) ] . rN - rs 
= 
- Bence 1 - Is < Vk/( 1  - 11 )  N 
i f  
[ Vk/L( l - 11 ) ]  - [ F ' /sL( l  - 11 ) ]  ( Vk/( 1  - 11 ) ] L, 
which obv ious ly hol ds s i nce 
0 ( 11 ( 1 . Q. E. D .  
Lemma 6 :  
F /LC lN( l  - 11 )  - c - k l
( F  + F ' ) / {L[ l s( l  - 11 )  - c - kl + Vk} . 
Proo f :  
Thi s  re sul t  fol l ow s  a s  Lemma 
3 .  Q. E . D .  
Lemma 1 and 2 a r e  s t i l l  va l id .  Howeve r ,  the a na l ogue t o  Lemma 4 now 
fai l s ;  tha t i s ,  PN and Ps bear no p a r t i c u l a r  re l a t i on to e a ch othe r .
The orem s  9 through 16  a r e  ana l ogous t o  Theorems 1 through 8 .  
Al l pre sume As sump t i on 1 ,  2 ' ,  3 '  and 4 hol d .  
Theo rem 9 :
nS = 0 and 
the marke t f or l oans w i thou t secur i ty intere s t s  to b e
compe t i t ive is impo s s ib l e .  
Proo f :  
• 
0 and a l l  l oans w i th no s e cur i ty intere st  p r i c e d  a t  rN ' 
a = A/N = s .  A f i rm o f fer ing l oans w i th secur i ty intere s t s  a t  rs ' 
• 
wher e  r8 i s  de f ined by I S - rs = IN - rN' w i l l a l s o  a t t r a c t  s 
consumer s .  Prof i t s  are  the n :  
Ls [;S ( l  - n )  - c - k l  + sVK - ( F  + F ' ) ,
• 
which are s t r i c t ly p o s i t ive s ince nS ( s , rS ) 
• 
rs > rs . 
The orem 10 : 
0 by d e f i n i t ion a nd 
Q, E . D .  
I 1 9  
A ne ce s sary a n d  s u f f i c i ent  cond i t ion for � = 0 a n d  the marke t f o r
l oa n s  w i t h  s ec u r i ty int e r e s t s  to  be comp e t i t ive i s  a1 s � m i n [pN , Ps i ·
Pro o f :  
The proof o f  th i s  re sul t i s  s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  of The orem 1 .  With  
• � = O and a l l  l oa n s  w i th s e cur i ty intere s t s  p r i c e d  a t  rs , 
a =  A/N = s .  Nonpo s i t ive prof i t s  a t  I S reduce s t o  a1 s � Ps and
nonpo s i t ive prof i t s  at l N reduce s to  a1 s � pN . S ince PN and Ps bear
no  spe c i a l  re l a t ion t o  e ach othe r ,  both  cons t r a i n t s  are  
r e l  event . Q . E . D .  
The orem 1 1 : 
Both ma rke t s  compe t i t ive i s  impo s s i b l e .  
Proo f : Thi s  proof i s  anal ogous t o  that  of Theorem 9-- e f irm char g i ng 
rs end t o king a s e cur i ty inte r e s t  must ne ce s s a r i l y  earn s t r i c t ly 
po s i t ive prof i t s .  
The o rem 12 : A nece s sa ry end s u f f i c i ent  condi t i on for nS 
Q. E . D .  
0 end the 
1 4 0  
marke t for l oans  wi thout s e curity intere s t s  t o  be noncompe t i t ive i s :  
Proo f :  W i t h  nS = 0 and the no s e cu r i ty inte re s t  marke t 
noncompe t i t iv e ,  the h i ghe st  p r i c e  i n  the l a t t e r  must  be I N . Hence
a = A/N = PN/a1 by zero prof i t s . O ;  there can 
• 
be no m a s s  a t  rN ' for i f  there  were f i rm s  coul d enter  a t  rs and e arn
s t r i c t ly pos i t iv e  prof i t s  ( s e e  the  proo f o f  Theorem 9 ) . Le t  tN be the
l owe st  p r i c e  in t h e  no s e cur i ty inte r e s t  m arke t a c t ua l ly o f fered,  and 
e de f ine nN { r ) be equal  t o  nN ( x , r)  whe n  x i s  e xp e c t e d  demand a t  r .  Then
Zero prof i t s  then g iv e s  
tN = [ [ F/aLC a1 + 2 a2 > l  + c + kl / ( 1  - n ) . ( 16 )  
• 
I t  must be that  tN > rN . U s i ng ( 1 6 )  and Lemma 2 ,  this  r e du c e s  t o
a1 s )  PN < a1 + 2 a2 ) .  But t h i s  i s  imp l i e d  by As sumpt ion 3 ' .
Whe t about entry into the marke t for l oans w i th s e c u r i ty 
intere st s .  As i n  the proof of The orem 4 ,  we have f or any r & [ tN, lN] ,
Using  n� { r )  0 this  g iv e s
(F - e1aL[ r ( l  - n )  - c - k] ) 1 - �������-,-�����-2 a2 a L [ r ( 1 - n )  - c - k l
( 17 )  
Le t ts b e  d e f ine d by l s - ts 
J !i J 
( 18)  
where n; ( · )  i s  def ined analogously to n� ( ' ) .  Using ( 17 )  in ( 18 ) , we 
g e t  
F [L[ q8( 1  - n )  - c - k l  + Vk l  
��������������� - (F + F ' ) ,L[ tN - 18 + q8) ( 1 - n )  - c - k ]  
and di fferent i a ti ng ,  
FL( l  - n ) [ L( lN - ls) ( l - n )  - Vk] 
L2 [ ( 1N - 18 + q8) ( 1 - n) - c - k]
2
Now Lemma S impl i e s  the bracketed t erm in the numerator i s  nega t iv e .  
Hence we  nee d  only guarantee n; ( t8 ) � 0 to prevent e ntry i n  the no
security interest  marke t .  But t8 : 18 - IN + tN . Hence
F [L[ ( ls - IN + tN) ( l - n) c - k l  + Vk] 
- (F + F' ) • L[ tN( l  - n )  - c - k ]  
Us ing ( 16 ) t h i s  reduces  t o  
Since a : JlN/a1 , n; ( t8) � 0 can be stated in  the form g iven i n  the
Theorem. Note that Lemma S implies  Vk - L( lN - 18) ( 1 - n) > 0 so thi s
constraint i s  nontr ival when 
F '  > O .  Q. E . D .  
Theorem 13 : Nece s sary and sufficient cond i t i ons for � : 0 and the
marke t for l oans with security int ere s t s  to  be noncompe ti tive are : 
( i )  lls < a1 s ,
( i i )  lls � llw 
l4 2 
Proo f :  W i th � : 0 ,  the h ighest  rate i n  the securi t i e s  marke t must b e  
18 . Zero prof its  then imp l i e s  a :  118/a1 • To gua rantee that  G8( ' ) i s
nonde generate we  fol low the usual procedure ( se e  t h e  proof of Theorem 
4 for exampl e ) : 
• 
a s sume a mass point exi s t s  a t  r8 , use zero prof its  to
ca lculate  its s i z e ,  and then require i t  to be s t r i c t ly l e s s  than 1 .
Thi s  yields  Ilg < a1 s ,  cond i t ion ( i) .
Condit ion ( ii )  is  a l so given by standard argument s regarding 
nonentry in the no security interest  marke t ,  Us ing zero prof i t s  we 
• 
show for r ) rs • 
1 - G8( r) : [ [ (F + F ' l /a [ L( r ( l  - n )  - c - k ) ] ] - a1 J /2a2 •
and 
(F + F ' ) L[ qN( l  - n )  -c - k ]  
( F  + F ' ) L( l  - n ) [L ( ls  - IN) ( l - n )  + Vk] 
2 L[ ( ls - lN + qN) ( l - n )  - c - k] + Vk] 
Thus Lemma S impl i e s  dn� ( qN) /dqN ) 0 and we  need only gua rantee that
n� ( lN) � 0, Thus ,  however,  reduce s to llN 2 Ilg•  cond i t ion ( ii ) .
Q, E , D .  
Theorem 14 : Nece s sary and sufficient conditions for the marke t for 
loans with security intere s t s  t o  b e  compe t i t ive and that for l oans 
wi thout security intere s t s  to  b e  noncompe t i t ive are : 
< i) PN < a1 s
( i i )  Vk - L( lN - ls) ( l - n )  < a1F ' / [ 2 a1 s - ( a1 + 2 a2 ) p
N] ,
Proof : 
With the no secur i ty interest  marke t noncompeti t ive and the securi ty 
interest  marke t compe t i tive , the h ighest  rate charged in the former 
mus t be  lN ' Zero profits  then g ive s a =  PN/a1 •
• 
As usua l ,  GN( ' )  cannot have a mas s  point a t  rN ( se e  Theorems 
• 
9 ,  1 1  and 12 ) . Furthermore ,  expected  demand a t  rs must equal s .  
Hence 
Hence � ) 0 yields  a1 s ) PN and � < 1 yields  a1 s < PNC a1 + 2a2 ) .
However,  the l a t t er  i s  impl ied by Assumpt i on 3 ' .  Hence we have ( i) ,
Le t tN be the m inimum rate charged in the no se cur i ty interest 
marke t .  Then  zero prof its imp l i e s  
0 ,  
or 
{ (F/(2s  - ( a1 + 2a2 ) a) L] + c + k l / ( l - n ) .
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• 
Hence tN ) rN if and only if PN< a1 + 2a2 ) ) a1 s ,  the same const raint
a s sociated w i th � ( 1 ,  
Conside r ,  fina l ly ,  entry into the se curi ty inte r e s t  marke t 
• 
above rS . Fol lowing the standard procedure we have 
{ [F/aL( r ( l  - n) - c - k ) ]  - a1 J /2a2�
and 
{F [L( qs( l  - n) - c - k) - Vk] 
L( lN - ls + qS) ( l  - n) - c - k] ) 
- ( F  + F ' ) .
Thus 
FL( l - lN - ls ) ( l - n )  - Vk]
e ( ) / e Lemma 5 then impl i e s  dns qs dqs � 0 ,  so we nee d  ns < ts ) � 0 ,  or after
some al gebra, 
cond i t ion(  i i ) , Q, E, D .  
Theorem 15 : The marke t for loans without s ecuri ty intere s t s  to  be 
compe t i t ive and the marke t for l oans with securi ty inte re s t s  to  be 
noncompe t i t ive is  impo s s ib l e .  
Proof : 
Firms  could a lways enter the secur i t i e s  marke t a t  rs and e a rn 
strictly po s i t ive  profi t s  ( se e  Theorems 9 and 1 1 ) , Q, E . D. 
Theorem 16 : Nece ssary and suffici ent condi t ions for both ma rke t s  
noncompe t i t ive are 
( i ) ( a1 + 2 a2 ) pN [Vk - ( lN - ls) ( l  - n ) L] > a1F •
( i i )  F '  ) pN[Vk - ( lN - ls) ( l - n ) L] 
( i i i )  a1F •  < [ Vk - ( IN - ls) ( l - n ) L] [ 2a1 s - ( a1 + 2 a2l pN]
Proof : The first  step  in this  proof is to show that the maximum price 
in  the no secur i ty interest  marke t i s  lN and the maximum price in t he 
secur i ty interest  marke t  i s  s trict ly l e s s  than 18 • 
For suppose the
oppo s i t e  is the case  (both lN and l s cannot be of fered ) . As in 
Theorem 8 ,  there can ex i s t  only one rate ,  say pN' such that both 
At pN and Ps are offered,  where Ps is  de f ined by lN - PN = ls - Ps · 
pN' expe cted demand i s  a ( a1 +2 a2nS) s ince pN is the h ighest rate in
the no s e curi ty intere s t  marke t ( and by a s sumption pN < lN) .  But
expected  demand at Ps i s  a l so a ( a1 + 2 a2nS) . Hence z ero prof i t s
y ields  
or  
a( a + 2 a  n ) ( L[p (1  - n )  - c - l ]  - Vk] } - (F + F ' ) .1 2 s s 
Solving for ns,
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whe re Z [ Vk - L( lN - ls) ( l  - n ) ] . We nee d  0 < nS < 1 ,  or
( 19) 
Next , let qN be the minimum rate in the no securi ty intere s t  marke t .
• 
It must  be that qN ) rN or entry a t  rs would yield  s t r i c t ly pos i t ive 
pro f i t s .  But cons ider entry in the security interest  marke t  a t  qS' 
where qS is  de f ined by lN - qN = ls - qS.  Zero prof its  a t  qN implies  
0 ,  
or 
( [F/a< a1 + 2 a2 ) L] + c + tl / ( 1  - n ) . 
Thus 
a ( a1 + 2 a2 ) (L[ q8( 1  - n )  - c - t] + Vt] - ( F  + F ' )
Sub s t i tuting for qN and requiring n; ( qS) � 0 g ives
or 
which contradic t s  the l eft-hand inequa l i ty in (19 )  � ns ( 1 .
Thus i t  must be that the maximum rate in the no securi ty 
interest  marke t i s  lN and in the secur i ty interest marke t i t  i s  Ps • 
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where Ps i s  de f ine d a s  above .  The minimum price i n  the no se cur i ty 
interest marke t i s  pN, where pN and Ps sati sfy ls - Ps = lN - PN ·
As be fore , we can solve for expe cted demand a t  PN and Pg · 
Here we have that i t  equa l s  a ( a1 + 2 a2nN) and thus
F ' /Z .  
Thus 0 < nN < 1 imp l i e s
• 
a s  in ( 19 ) . It must a l so be  that pN ) rN . But pN is given by
or 
PN = [ (FZ/F ' L) + c + k] / ( l  - n ) . 
• 
Thus IN ) pN ) rN i f  and only i f  
p� ( F '  ( sZ ,  
the  first  of the se be ing equivalent to  nN ) 0 and the se cond to  
As sumpt i on 3 ' . 
( 20 )  
( 21 ) 
Two cons ide rations remain :  nonde generacy of Gs( ' )  and e ntry 
above Ps or b e l ow pN . Concerning the former , suppose Gs( ' )  has a mass  
• 
point at rs ·  Then zero prof i t s  impl i e s  
s ,  
or 
• 
Thus GS( rs) < 1 if and only if 
148  
( 22) 




Theorem 12 ) . For entry b e low pN, dnN( r ) dr ) 0 for r & [ rN, pN] ( a s  in
Theorem 13 ) . Hence zero profi t s  at  Ps and pN covers  the se  two c a s e s .
Sub s t i tuting a =  PN/a1 into ( 20 ) , ( 21 ) and (22 )  and using
Z = Vt - ( IN - ls) /( 1 - n )L  give s the  theorem. Q. E . D  • 
The se results  can be summarized in the fol lowing Corol l ary . 
Coro l l a ry 2 :  
( i ) A compe t i t ive equil ibrium in the marke t for l oans with 
security interests  with °N = 0 exi s t s  i f  and only if 
( i i )  A noncompe t i t ive equil ibrium in the marke t for l oans w ithout 
security intere s t s  with °N = 0 exi s t s  if and only if ( a )  Ps i PN and 
( ii i )  °N > 0 if and only if pN < min £a1 s , pS J .  Fur thermore ns 
if and only if [Vt - L( IN - IS) ( l - n ) ]  PN< a1 + 2 a2 ) i a1F ' .
These  condit ions are exhaust ive and mutua l ly exc l us ive • 
Proof :  Part s  ( i) and ( ii )  fol l ow from Theorems 10 and 13 .  The 
ne ga t ive  of these c a s e s  i s  equival ent to PN < min(a1
s , ps > ·  The
0 
nec e s sary and suf f ic i ent condit ions for each of the se case s reduce to : 
12 :  zpN ( a1 + 2 a2 ) � a1F •
14 :  Z [ 2a1 s - C a1 + 2 a2 pNJ < a1F '
16 : zpN ( a1 + 2 a2 ) > a1F •
F '  > p� 
a1F '  � Z [2a1 s - ( a1 + 
2a2pN
] ,
where Z = Vk - L( lN - 18) ( 1 - n ) .  But F '  > p� i s  equival ent to
PN < p8 and this  i s  implied  by  PN min { a1 s , p8 } .  Fur thermore ,  the
ne c e s sary and suffic ient cond i tions for Theorem 16 which remain are 
the ne gat ion of  those  for Theorems 12 and 14 .  Thus when 
PN ( min { a1
s, p8 J one of the three c a s e s
mus t hol d ,  Q. E . D .  
